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Moines organized and engaged in local elections under the Des Moines 
Plan’s commission form of government because they believed that they 
were uniquely equipped to provide the moral impulse for an otherwise 
materialistic city-boosting movement. 
 
JEFFREY T. MANUEL, associate professor in the department of his-
torical studies at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, describes 
Iowa’s first major debate over ethanol, a movement—known as the power 
alcohol movement—to legislate alcohol-gasoline blends in the 1930s, a 
time when power alcohol, like ethanol today, was the focus of vigorous 
debate in Des Moines and Washington, D.C., that pitted farmers and their 





Members of the Prairie Club of Des Moines who have been members for   
30 years or more pose in 1935. The Prairie Club provided a venue for Des 
Moines’s religious leaders to build stronger relationships with the city’s 
business leaders. For the role of Des Moines’s religious leaders in municipal 
reform and electoral politics in the years under the Des Moines Plan’s com-
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1 
Building a City on a Hill: 
Evangelical Protestant Men 
and Moral Reform under the 
Des Moines Plan, 1907–1916 
PAUL EMORY PUTZ 
ON APRIL 6, 1908, exactly one week after Des Moines held its 
first municipal election under the commission system popularly 
dubbed the Des Moines Plan, the Des Moines Register and Leader 
began its editorial section with the heading, “A City on a Hill.” 
Underneath the heading was an excerpt from the Chicago Record-
Herald. “To all students of municipal reform, and especially of the 
commission plan,” the Record-Herald proclaimed, “Des Moines 
will be like a city set upon a hill for the next few years.”1  
 For readers today, the “city on a hill” phrase is a well-worn 
part of the American vocabulary, conjuring up images of Puri-
tans and American exceptionalism. Yet, as historian Richard 
Gamble has shown, those connotations were not yet in place in 
the early twentieth century.2 When citizens of Des Moines used 
the metaphor to describe their city, they drew not from the Puri-
tans, but from the same source as John Winthrop had: the Gospel 
of Matthew. In that book’s account of the Sermon on the Mount, 
                                                 
I thank three anonymous readers and the editor for their helpful comments on 
this article. I also acknowledge the State Historical Society of Iowa Research Grant 
that supported research for the article. 
1. “A City on a Hill,” Des Moines Register and Leader (hereafter cited as R&L), 
4/6/1908. R&L accessed via www.newspapers.com.  
2. Richard Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmaking of an 
American Myth (New York, 2012). 
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Jesus tells his listeners, “Ye are the light of the world. A city set 
on a hill cannot be hid. . . . Even so let your light shine before 
men; that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father 
who is in heaven.”3  
 The biblical reference to a city as a model to bring glory to 
God fit naturally with Des Moines’s pioneering efforts in mu-
nicipal reform. Following the logic of white Protestant leaders 
like Congregationalist minister Josiah Strong, many Americans 
believed that the nation’s salvation depended in part on the sal-
vation of its cities. The cities, Strong had argued in his popular 
tract Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (1885), 
were “where the forces of evil are massed” and where “the need 
of Christian influence is peculiarly great.”4 But despite attempts 
over the next two decades to eliminate such urban “forces of 
evil” as ward politics, corruption, and vice—problems usually 
associated with the growing number of immigrants and Catholics 
in the cities—by 1905 many white, English-speaking Protestants 
still considered municipal government to be a failure.5 To re-
form Des Moines’s government carried with it the possibility 
that Des Moines could point the way forward for the rest of the 
nation’s cities. 
 Despite the biblical rhetoric surrounding the Des Moines Plan, 
its religious dimensions have not been fully explored. This is 
partly because scholars have focused most of their attention on 
the mechanics and structure of the commission form of gov-
ernment and on questions of capital and labor and how “pro-
gressive” the commission system really was. Partly, too, most 
studies of the plan do not cover the post-1908 elections.6  
                                                 
3. Matt. 5:14–16 (American Standard Version). 
4. Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (New 
York, 1885), 134. 
5. Of course, as Paul Boyer highlights in Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 
1820–1920 (Cambridge, MA, 1978), attempts by middle-class Protestants to 
reform cities had been ongoing since the antebellum era. 
6. The most detailed accounts of the Des Moines Plan are John F. O’Connell, 
“Des Moines Adopts the Commission Form of Municipal Government” (M.A. 
thesis, Drake University, 1975); Bradley Robert Rice, Progressive Cities: The 
Commission Government Movement in America, 1901–1920 (Austin, TX, 1977); 
and Robert E. Bionaz, “Trickle-Down Democracy: The Commission Government 
Contest in Des Moines, 1905–1908,” Annals of Iowa 58 (1999), 241–71. 
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 Religion first became a central feature of Des Moines’s city 
elections in 1910. Thus, although Des Moines’s religious leaders 
did not lead the charge for the commission system, once it was 
approved the Des Moines Plan galvanized evangelical Prot-
estants to exert their moral authority. They saw in the excite-
ment of local electoral politics an opportunity for both self-
preservation and service—the former because the masculine 
domain of politics served as an attractive recruiting tool for 
ministers increasingly distressed about the feminization of their 
churches; the latter because they believed that they were 
uniquely equipped to provide the moral impulse for an other-
wise materialistic city-boosting movement. From 1908 until 1916 
they organized and engaged in local elections as they sought to 
ensure that Des Moines would not gain the whole world— or at 
least an efficient government and expanding local economy—
while losing its soul.   
 
WHEN AGITATION for the commission system began in 1905, 
Des Moines was the largest city in Iowa, with a population of 
75,628. Yet, as Iowa historian Dorothy Schwieder has observed, 
Iowa’s cities in the early twentieth century had a strong agrarian 
tint.7 Flora Dunlap, who moved from Chicago’s famed Hull 
House to run Des Moines’s Roadside Settlement House in 1904, 
remarked that her new environment “seemed almost like a coun-
try village.”8 Not only did Des Moines’s size pale in comparison 
to other industrial cities in the region, such as Omaha, Chicago, 
and Kansas City, but Des Moines also had a relatively homoge-
nous population dominated by native-born, English-speaking 
Protestants. Even when compared to other Iowa cities, Des 
Moines was exceptional in this regard: of the state’s eight cities 
with at least 20,000 people in 1905, Des Moines had the second-
lowest percentage of foreign-born residents, at 12 percent. Re-
lated to this, Des Moines had only 3,658 Catholics; Protestant 
churches claimed six times as many communicants. The Jewish 
community, listed at 183 families, was small as well, and with 
                                                 
7. Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa: The Middle Land (Ames, 1996), 184. 
8. Flora Dunlap, “Roadside Settlement of Des Moines,” Annals of Iowa 21 (1938), 
165. 
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African Americans constituting just 3 percent of the city’s popu-
lation, Des Moines was a bastion of white Protestantism.9  
 The “seven sister” Protestant denominations—the Disciples 
of Christ, northern Methodists, Presbyterians, Evangelical Luther-
ans, northern Baptists, Congregationalists, and Episcopalians—
stood at the forefront of Des Moines’s informal white Protestant 
establishment. The Disciples of Christ, typically a more rural 
denomination, had an unusually powerful presence. Thanks in 
part to the presence of Drake University, a Disciples university 
founded in 1881, there were more Disciples in proportion to the 
total population in Des Moines than in any other American city 
except Lexington, Kentucky. Northern Methodists stood right 
behind the Disciples in membership count, followed by Presby-
terians, northern Baptists, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and 
Evangelical Lutherans.10 
 To speak of a “white Protestant establishment” in Des Moines 
is not to suggest a wholly united entity acting in concert and im-
posing its will. Rather, as historian William Hutchison suggests, 
it is best to think of the early twentieth-century Protestant estab-
lishment as a “group of denominations” and a “network of lead-
ers in general connected with them.”11 In the early twentieth cen-
tury that network identified itself as “evangelical,” a descriptive 
term used at that time for all Protestant denominations that of-
ficially accepted the divinity of Jesus; Unitarians, Catholics, and 
                                                 
9. Census of Iowa for the Year 1905 (Des Moines, 1905), 687; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Religious Bodies: 1906, Part I (Washington, DC, 1910), 434. The one Iowa 
city with a lower percentage of foreign-born residents was Waterloo. 
10. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Religious Bodies: 1906, 434. In Des Moines, 6 per-
cent of the population belonged to a Disciples church. For a brief description 
of the Disciples of Christ/Church of Christ in the early twentieth century, see 
David Edwin Harrell Jr., The Church of Christ in the 20th Century: Homer Hailey’s 
Personal Journey of Faith (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2000), 3–9. The non-creedal nature of 
the Disciples movement helped the denomination earn citywide influence. 
Drake University did not require students or faculty to agree to any particular 
religious tenets, and the college reached out to the wider Des Moines commu-
nity. Its original board of trustees included three prominent Des Moines citizens 
who were not associated with the Disciples. See Charles J. Ritchey, Drake Uni-
versity through Seventy-Five Years: 1881–1956 (Des Moines, 1956), 41, 90. 
11. William R. Hutchison, “Protestantism as Establishment,” in Between the Times: 
The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900–1960, ed. William R. 
Hutchison (New York, 1989), 3–4.  
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Jews could not claim the evangelical label, but Methodists, Pres-
byterians, Disciples, and even Episcopalians could. So, too, the 
leaders of the white Protestant establishment tended to assume 
that they possessed responsibility for the moral and spiritual 
well-being of their community and nation.12 In Des Moines 
special occasions such as Good Friday or Thanksgiving provided 
opportunities for white Protestants to ritualize their privileged 
cultural place. On those days the leading pastors from each of 
the city’s “seven sister” denominations gathered at one of the 
downtown churches for union services, with generous media 
coverage from the city’s leading newspapers.13 
 In 1905 two of Des Moines’s best institutional expressions of 
these establishment traits—of connected evangelical Protestants 
who felt a shared sense of responsibility for the moral state of 
their community—were the Young Men’s Christian Association 
(YMCA) and the Ministerial Association. Both confined their 
membership to evangelicals. The former, founded in 1868, 
focused on community uplift and character development but 
generally did not engage in political agitation. The latter, 
formed in 1872, provided fellowship and an occasional forum to 
speak out on such moral issues as prostitution, gambling, un-
regulated saloons, and immoral amusements.14  
 The evangelical ministers were no monolith. Some conser-
vative ministers, such as John A. Wirt of St. John’s Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, resisted the Ministerial Association’s attempts 
to get involved with moral reform. Wirt believed that clergy 
should eschew any engagement with “secular” topics while act-
ing in their ministerial role.15 On the other hand, some liberals 
rejected the narrowness of the association’s moral reforms; 
                                                 
12. Edwin S. Gaustad, “The Pulpit and the Pews,” in Between the Times, 21. 
13. “Thanksgiving at Plymouth Church,” R&L, 11/24/1905; “Seven Excellent 
Sermons,” R&L, 3/30/1907. Bill R. Douglas discusses the importance of the 
Thanksgiving services in “Making Iowa Safe for Differences: Barnstorming 
Iowa on Behalf of Religious Tolerance, 1936–1943,” Annals of Iowa 75 (2016), 
247–49.  
14. Johnson Brigham, Des Moines: The Pioneer of Municipal Progress and Reform 
of the Middle West, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1911), 1:585–86, 353; “New Society of City 
Clergymen,” R&L, 12/25/1903. 
15. “No Pledges Asked from Candidates,” R&L, 3/3/1908; “Rev. John A. Wirt 
Dies Suddenly,” R&L, 5/10/1908. 
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rather than regulating vaudeville shows, they wanted church 
leaders to take on issues like the relationship between capital 
and labor.16 Controversy also arose from time to time over the 
association’s exclusion of nonevangelicals, in part because the 
city’s Unitarian church, led by the brilliant Mary Safford, had a 
number of influential and well-to-do members.17 In 1903 two of 
Des Moines’s leading evangelical ministers—Episcopalian 
rector J. Everett Cathell and Plymouth Congregational Church 
pastor Frank Hodgdon—departed the association because of its 
exclusion of Unitarians, Catholics, and Jews.18  
 Yet these divisions, personally rancorous as they may have 
been, remained relatively minor. Hodgdon and Cathell still par-
ticipated in union church services, for example, and enjoyed the 
benefits of their establishment status. As for the Ministerial 
Association, when challenged for excluding nonevangelicals, its 
members claimed that they stood in “perfect accord with the 
great religious movements of the age” like the YMCA. They 
also claimed to stand for “the uplifting of humanity and the 
advancement of the Kingdom of Christ in the world,” a task at 
which evangelical organizations had been successful precisely 
because they stood for “definite religious truth.”19  
 As its rhetoric suggests, the Ministerial Association did not 
view its exclusion of nonevangelicals as reason to cede the 
ground of progressive religion. In its view, evangelical Protes-
tantism stood at the forefront of progress. That was certainly the 
view of Harvey Breeden, pastor of the city’s largest evangelical 
church, Central Christian, from 1885 until 1906. Breeden mod-
eled a practical progressive evangelicalism that was committed 
to the superiority of evangelical Protestantism while remaining 
open to new methods, ideas, and relationships. In 1902 a writer 
                                                 
16. “New Society of City Clergymen,” R&L, 12/25/1903. 
17. Among the influential Unitarian citizens were James Hanna and Johnson 
Brigham. Safford’s leadership of Des Moines’s Unitarian community (as well as 
that of her co-laborer, Eleanor Gordon) is featured in Cynthia Grant Tucker, Pro-
phetic Sisterhood: Liberal Women Ministers of the Frontier, 1880–1930 (Boston, 1990). 
18. “Rector Cathell Raises Storm,” R&L, 12/26/1903. On the push by liberal 
Protestants for interfaith cooperation and inclusion at the turn of the twentieth 
century, see David Mislin, Saving Faith: Making Religious Pluralism an American 
Value at the Dawn of the Secular Age (Ithaca, NY, 2015), 63–89. 
19. “Ministers Rise to Tell the Story,” R&L, 12/29/1903. 
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for a leading liberal Protestant journal, The Outlook, visited 
Breeden’s church for a series on “Religious Life in America.” The 
author came away impressed. Most of the elements that histo-
rians associate with early twentieth-century liberal Protestantism 
were present: social service activities, commitment to progress, 
and a pastor who embraced “modern developments of theological 
thought,” including evolution and higher criticism of the Bible. 
But Breeden did not make his theological views a centerpiece of 
the church; in matters of theological opinion, congregants had 
“absolute freedom, except as to the divinity of Christ.” Instead, 
Breeden fostered unity in action and efficiency, keeping church 
members busy and involved in Christian work in the city.20  
 Breeden’s practical progressivism had influence beyond the 
bounds of his congregation, pointing to one final trait of the 
white Protestant establishment in Des Moines: its connection to 
business and professional elites. In 1890, for example, Breeden 
founded the Prairie Club. Intended for intellectual discussion 
and fellowship, its meetings featured paper presentations and 
discussions on a variety of topics, ranging from literature and 
art to religion and politics. The club’s records show that mem-
bers were decidedly middle- and upper-class, with occupations 
including lawyers, physicians, judges, editors, clergymen, pro-
fessors, and business owners. An impressive array of religious 
leaders claimed membership, including Jewish, Catholic, Uni-
tarian, Lutheran, Methodist, Congregational, and Disciples of 
Christ clergymen. Rallying around shared cultural values and 
socio-economic exclusiveness, the club provided an important 
way for the city’s religious leaders to build stronger relation-
ships with business and political leaders.21 In organizations like 
                                                 
20. Ernest Hamlin Abbott, “Religious Life in America IX: The Eastern West,” 
Outlook, 6/14/1902, 459; A. T. DeGroot, ed., Central of Des Moines: The Story of 
Central Christian Church (Des Moines, 1945), 63–81. While in Des Moines 
Breeden mentored Charles Clayton Morrison, who would go on to become the 
editor and publisher of the Christian Century, the most important liberal 
Protestant journal in the United States. See Elesha Coffman, The Christian Cen-
tury and the Rise of the Protestant Mainline (New York, 2013), 15–17.  
21. Prairie Club Minutes, 1890–1917, folder 1, box 1, Prairie Club of Greater 
Des Moines Records, 1890–1993 (hereafter cited as PCGDMR), State Historical 
Society of Iowa, Des Moines (hereafter cited as SHSI-DM). See also Prairie 
Club Minutes, Sept. 1933–May 1945, folder 4, box 1, PCGDMR. The various 
occupations of members were listed in the Card Index Record of 1890–1941, 
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the Prairie Club, then, Des Moines’s white Protestants could em-
brace interreligious cooperation while at the same time using 
the Ministerial Association and other Protestant-only organiza-
tions to ensure that interreligious cooperation did not impinge 
on white Protestant claims for primary moral authority within 
the city.    
 
MUNICIPAL REFORM had been the subject of discussion at 
Prairie Club meetings since its founding in the 1890s.22 By 1905, 
however, municipal reform was more than a discussion topic in 
                                                                                                       
box 13, PCGDMR. Although its membership was limited to 30, the rules al-
lowed members to bring guests, and nonactive members were rotated out in 
order to open up space for those who could participate in the monthly meet-
ings. Prominent members included Albert B. Cummins, James Berryhill, Hen-
ry Wallace Sr., Gardner Cowles, and Harvey Ingham. 
22. Prairie Club Minutes, Sept. 1933–May 1945, p. 3, folder 4, box 1, PCGDMR. 
(The minute book for 1933–1945 includes an insert at the front of the book with 
a brief history of the club and a list of the speakers and speaker topics since the 
club’s inception.) 
 
In 1935 the Prairie Club of Des Moines celebrated its members of 30 years 
or more. Front row (l to r):  James B. Weaver, James C. Hume, Johnson 
Brigham, Henry S. Nollen; middle row:  Gardner Cowles Sr., H. H. Stipp, 
James C. Davis, F. I. Herriott; back row: Jesse A. Miller, Harvey Ingham. 
Photo from State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines. 
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Des Moines. Dissatisfaction with city government intensified 
among business and professional men who believed that cor-
ruption and inefficiency burdened Des Moines’s government. 
Using the Commercial Club as a base, these men began to agi-
tate for a new city government that would be more conducive 
to economic growth and efficiency.23 
 While many individuals associated with the Commercial 
Club were also connected with the city’s religious institutions, 
they did not act on behalf of the churches or frame their project 
in religious terms.24 Rather, they framed their reform efforts as 
an attempt to apply business methods to city government. 
James Berryhill—a wealthy Des Moines businessman whose 
wife was a leading Unitarian—jump-started the reform cam-
paign when he took a trip to Galveston, Texas. There Berryhill 
studied the commission form of government that Galveston had 
implemented in 1901 in the wake of the devastating hurricane 
that had largely destroyed the city the previous year. Unlike in 
the mayor-council system used by Des Moines and most other 
cities, under the commission system each elected official took 
charge of a single city department. That arrangement effectively 
merged the legislative and executive functions into one body 
while making it clear who was responsible for the day-to-day 
operation of the specific functions of city government. The com-
mission system also eliminated ward-based voting in favor of 
at-large representation.25  
 Berryhill first presented his findings to the Commercial Club 
near the end of 1905. From that time until March 1907—when 
Iowa’s state legislature passed a bill allowing Des Moines to vote 
on adopting a new charter—the pro-reform forces sought to 
consolidate support for the plan. They faced strong opposition 
from various quarters, including organized labor, city officials 
                                                 
23. For the view that municipal government in Des Moines was not as bad as 
the businessmen believed, see Bionaz, “Trickle-Down Democracy,” 246–49. 
24. For example, of the Commercial Club’s 18 board members in 1908, the bi-
ographies of 12 are listed in volume 2 of Brigham’s Des Moines. Of those 12, 
8 are described as being associated with evangelical Protestant denominations: 
three Episcopalians, two Presbyterians, one Congregationalist, one Disciple, 
and one Methodist. The other four were one Catholic, one Jew, and two with 
no religious affiliation listed.  
25. Rice, Progressive Cities, 34–51.  
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then in power, socialists, and public service corporations. The 
opposition had a geographical and class dimension. Most of 
those who championed the commission system lived in the af-
fluent neighborhoods on the west side of the Des Moines River. 
Not surprisingly, the working-class population on the east side 
viewed the elite-led movement with suspicion.26  
 Supporters tinkered with the commission system in order to 
appease its critics. They arranged for nonpartisan elections to ease 
the minds of Democrats who feared irrelevance in a Republican-
dominated city, and they responded to cries that the system was 
antidemocratic by adding initiative and referendum features. In 
1906 they also linked their plan with a city-boosting movement 
spearheaded by the Greater Des Moines Committee, a group 
that had spun out of the Commercial Club. In November 1906 
the Greater Des Moines Committee announced a slogan for its 
movement: “Des Moines Does Things.” Proclaimed in the press 
and printed on buttons and the sides of streetcars, the slogan 
quickly became identified with the push for the commission 
system.27  
 As Des Moines’s businessmen organized and led the cam-
paign for the Des Moines Plan, the city’s Protestant leaders 
mostly cheered from the sidelines. Some, however, caught the 
booster spirit, none more so than Frank Hodgdon, pastor of 
Plymouth Congregational Church. In a sermon delivered on Feb-
ruary 3, 1907, Hodgdon interpreted the storm that had devas-
tated Galveston and led to its commission system as “cleansing 
waters” sent by God, and he applauded the work of the Greater 
Des Moines Committee. Unlike past efforts for reform, in which 
“the best men said, ‘We can’t do anything’ and ‘Why not preach 
sermons that shall be balm to our souls,’” the booster movement 
had brought about a different attitude in Des Moines. “Men are 
saying, ‘We can do it,’” Hodgdon declared.28  
 Not all ministers supported the Des Moines Plan as explicitly 
as Hodgdon did. Conservatives in the Ministerial Association 
remained timid about entering too fully into the realm of politics; 
                                                 
26. Bionaz, “Trickle-Down Democracy,” 256.  
27. “Slogan for Des Moines Chosen,” R&L, 11/7/1906; Rice, Progressive Cities, 38. 
28. “Hodgdon Is for Galveston System,” R&L, 2/4/1907.  
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at a May 1907 meeting the Ministerial Association censured 
Hodgdon for his outspoken agitation for the commission sys-
tem.29 Most evangelical ministers seemed to be sympathetic to 
the movement, however, and Des Moines’s three west-side daily 
newspapers, united in support of commission government, am-
plified any supportive ministerial voices. On the last Monday 
before the special election the Register and Leader ran a front-
page story stating that it was the “consensus of opinion among 
the ministers that moral virtue can be obtained for the city only 
through the Des Moines plan.” The Tribune, an east-side daily 
newspaper launched specifically to combat the Des Moines 
Plan, agreed with the Register and Leader’s assessment, although 
its attitude toward ministerial support was decidedly negative. 
The ministers’ willingness to support the Des Moines Plan and 
thereby join the “assault upon popular government,” a Tribune 
editorial declared, would not be forgotten when the ministers 
“appear before the great white throne.”30 
 It is important to note that the white Protestant establish-
ment did not hold a monopoly on appeals to religious morality. 
Those sympathetic to the cause of working people pointed out 
that the Des Moines Plan was conceived largely by the city’s 
elites.31 Standing within a long tradition of working-class Chris-
tianity that cast suspicion on wealth and empathized with the 
“common man” over the upper classes, this group appealed to 
the Bible as they argued that the Des Moines Plan would hinder 
democracy by concentrating power in the hands of a privileged 
few.32 Leonard Brown, an economic populist and longtime resi-
dent of Des Moines, blasted the idea of running a city govern-
ment on the basis of business principles. Drawing on a biblical 
                                                 
29. “A Stir Among Ministers,” R&L, 5/7/1907. 
30. “Pastors Plead for Better Conditions,” R&L, 6/17/1907; “The Pulpit and 
Press,” Des Moines Tribune (hereafter cited as DMT), 6/21/1907; O’Connell, 
“Des Moines Adopts the Commission Form of Municipal Government,” 82–87.  
31. Of the Committee of 300—the group that organized to boost the plan—253 
were from the west side, while only 28 were from the east. See O’Connell, 
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passage from Isaiah 3:5, Brown argued that in practice “busi-
ness principles” equated to “grinding the faces of the poor.”33  
 Some Catholic and Jewish leaders supported working-class 
Christians in the fight against the Des Moines Plan. Leaders in 
those communities likely understood that citywide elections 
would favor the white Protestant majority in the city. Thus, the 
Hebrew Republican Club and Catholic priest Joseph F. Nugent 
went public with their opposition to the “anti-democratic” fea-
tures of the Des Moines Plan.34 Des Moines’s west-side news-
papers tended to downplay the religious arguments used by 
non-Protestants and working-class Protestants, choosing instead 
to portray white Protestant ministers as the dominant voice of 
moral authority.35  
 Voters approved the Des Moines Plan on June 20, 1907. The 
push for a commission system had been spearheaded by busi-
nessmen and framed as the application of efficient business 
principles to city government. But once the plan passed, Des 
Moines’s Protestant establishment seized the moment and began 
to co-opt the “Des Moines Does Things” booster spirit for the 
purpose of moral reform. For many of Des Moines’s ministers, 
the slogan fit perfectly with their hopes for a Christianity that 
could remain relevant to modern life by appealing to “mascu-
line” action rather than the supposedly outdated emphasis on 
dogma and private piety. At the same time, it resonated with 
their longstanding belief that they served as moral guardians 
for the communities in which they lived and worked. 
 
LIKE MANY PROTESTANT LEADERS in the early twentieth 
century, Des Moines’s Protestant ministers feared that their brand 
of religion had become feminized. They were right to recognize 
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that women tended to be more involved in church activities than 
men. Within the evangelical Protestant denominations in Des 
Moines in 1906, the percentage of male communicants ranged 
from a low of 34.7 percent (Congregationalists) to a high of just 
38.4 percent (Disciples of Christ). For Des Moines’s Catholics, on 
the other hand, 47.2 percent of communicants were men.36 That 
disparity had long been true for American Protestants, but it 
took on new urgency at the turn of the twentieth century as 
women became increasingly involved in public life. In response, 
many ministers sought to refashion themselves and their con-
gregations in masculine hues. “It is more or less true that there 
are three genders, the masculine, feminine, and ministers,” 
Methodist minister E. T. Hagerman remarked at a meeting of 
Des Moines’s Ministerial Association in late 1907. “What we 
need is men.”37 Believing that men would reject an overly emo-
tional or sentimental religion, ministers shifted toward preaching 
a more practical message, and they increasingly brought their 
church structures into conformity with the masculine business 
world. Furthermore, believing that action appealed to men, 
they launched numerous social service and reform initiatives.38  
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 A racial and nationalistic component underlay the urgent call 
for men as well. In the age of Teddy Roosevelt’s “strenuous life,” 
white Americans feared the emasculating tendencies of “over-
civilization” and linked manliness with white racial supremacy 
and national progress.39 For American evangelical Protestants 
                                                 
39. Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and 
Race in the United States, 1880–1917 (Chicago, 1996), 184–214. 
 
This “Ding” Darling cartoon appeared in the Des Moines Regis-
ter and Leader, April 11, 1909. It comments on the relative rari-
ty of men’s involvement in churches. All “Ding” Darling cartoons 
courtesy of the Jay N. “Ding” Darling Wildlife Society. 
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who perceived themselves as guardians of the nation’s morality, 
the call for virile men to serve the nation’s increasingly expan-
sive global agenda was also a call for Protestant churches to 
make sure that America’s virile men were moral men. Thus, the 
Progressive Era Protestant obsession with bringing men into 
church was not just about preserving the church; it was also 
about preserving the Protestant character and supposed moral 
superiority of the American nation. 
 The passage of the Des Moines Plan made the city a local 
staging ground for this larger national trend. Even before the 
plan passed, Des Moines’s ministers had begun to discuss their 
potential responsibility. In October 1906, for example, Methodist 
minister Orien Fifer spoke to the Ministerial Association about 
the movement for a “greater Des Moines.” Fifer urged ministers 
to provide the booster movement with a moral backbone by 
venturing “a little farther in our leadership and activity” and 
arousing church members “to their civic responsibilities.”40 
 Less than two weeks after the passage of the Des Moines Plan, 
famed revivalist J. Wilbur Chapman (Billy Sunday’s mentor) 
made a similar plea. While holding revival services in the area, 
Chapman applauded Des Moines’s booster movement but cau-
tioned that something was missing. “If you would make your 
city famous throughout the world,” he implored, “you should 
organize a body to better the moral conditions.”41  
 Polk County Sunday School Association president H. M. 
Whinery took Chapman’s words to heart. In late July he orga-
nized a parade of Sunday School children to march through the 
streets of Des Moines “singing gospel hymns and waving aloft 
banners of Christianity.” A newspaper reporter praised the 
event by linking it with the booster movement: “‘Des Moines 
Does Things’ had a new demonstration.”42 Meanwhile, Charles 
Medbury, pastor of University Christian Church, served notice 
that Des Moines’s evangelical ministers might turn to electoral 
politics in order to guide the city’s moral progress. Nine months 
before the first election under the Des Moines Plan, Medbury 
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urged the city’s Protestant churchgoers to focus on moral con-
siderations when choosing the first set of commissioners.43 
 For Medbury (and most evangelical ministers), the primary 
moral issues of the day involved alcohol consumption, prostitu-
tion, gambling, immoral amusements, and Sabbath breaking. 
Those concerns were not new; they had been a central part of 
Protestant moral reform efforts since the nineteenth century, 
and Des Moines’s Ministerial Association had agitated for them 
in the past.44 But the intensity and cooperation with which 
evangelical leaders pursued moral reform and the way they 
linked it with modern progress was new. With the commission 
system in place, Des Moines’s evangelical leaders sought to 
consolidate their forces and launch a moral campaign on an 
unprecedented scale befitting a pioneering progressive city.  
 In late 1907, a few months before the 1908 city election, Des 
Moines’s ministers found an opportunity to test their new asser-
tive political approach. At issue was the Mulct Law, a compro-
mise bill passed in 1894 to limit the scope of the 1884 statewide 
prohibition on alcohol. The law, historian Herman Bateman ex-
plains, “retained prohibition” but “permitted carefully regulated 
saloons to operate in counties where a majority of voters ap-
proved.”45 Anti-liquor forces in the state responded by carefully 
monitoring saloons for violations and hounding local officials to 
shut down offenders. But in counties with popular support for 
alcohol, local officials often declined to enforce the regulations. 
That infuriated the drys; in 1905 they began urging Governor 
Albert Cummins to use his power to make sure that recalcitrant 
officials enforced the law. Cummins did not have the authority 
to follow the drys’ wishes, but criticism from ardent prohibi-
tionists continued.46  
 Cummins shared many of the cultural assumptions of his 
fierce anti-liquor antagonists. A lawyer in Des Moines before 
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his election as governor, Cummins was cozy with the white 
Protestant establishment. He spoke to Sunday School classes, 
supported the YMCA, and saw churches as a “potent ally of 
good government.”47 In general he sought to limit the consump-
tion of alcohol and such vices as prostitution and gambling. But 
he did not match the zeal of many of the evangelical ministers. 
He was, as he explained in one letter, “connected with the Con-
gregational denomination” but was not a church member; so, 
too, he did not support statewide prohibition at the time, believ-
ing that the Mulct Law was more effective.48 For these reasons 
evangelical moral reformers in Iowa viewed him with suspicion.  
 In October 1907 the simmering controversy over Mulct Law 
enforcement boiled over when wets in Davenport accosted a 
prohibitionist and his lawyer. Word of the Davenport “riots” 
quickly spread. Seeing an opportunity for manly Christian ac-
tion, the Des Moines Ministerial Association threw itself into 
the fray, adopting a resolution that urged Governor Cummins 
to enforce the Mulct Law. Cummins, with an eye toward posi-
tive publicity, responded by inviting the ministers to meet with 
him and offer advice “respecting the power of the Governor.” 
Des Moines’s ministers faced a conundrum. Passing a resolution 
was one thing; to meet collectively and publicly advise the gov-
ernor was quite another. After debating the governor’s invita-
tion, Des Moines’s ministers ultimately agreed to attend. Their 
meeting with Cummins was cordial and mostly uneventful, but 
it was also symbolically important: it represented a new will-
ingness on the part of Des Moines’s ministers to engage collec-
tively and more openly in political agitation. C. H. Gordon, a 
professor at Highland Park College and an ardent prohibitionist, 
described the meeting as historic and concluded that it proved 
that “Des Moines ministers does [sic] things.”49  
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 Gordon’s praise was undoubtedly welcomed by Des Moines’s 
ministers. Well aware of religion’s feminine connotations, min-
isters knew that forging a more masculine Protestantism involved 
forging more masculine ministers. By throwing themselves into 
the masculine domain of politics—women did not have the 
                                                                                                       
vately predicted afterwards that the meeting would help “correct the misappre-
hension” about his stance on the temperance question. See Albert B. Cummins to 
James A. Smith, 11/13/1907, Letter Copy Book, vol. 21, Cummins Papers. 
 
This “Ding” Darling cartoon, published in the Des Moines Register 
and Leader, December 22, 1907, was captioned “ ‘Sundaying’ in Dav-
enport.” It depicts Darling’s view of the options available to the citizens 
of Davenport after the saloons were forced to close on Sundays.  
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right to vote in Iowa until 1919—ministers could project a mas-
culine image and potentially recruit men to join their cause. At 
the same time, by electing candidates sympathetic to the preferred 
moral safeguards of the evangelical Protestant establishment, 
ministers could attempt to inculcate morality in men previously 
unreached by their Christianizing influence. Evangelicals often 
framed these safeguards as a way to protect women, of course, 
but increasingly in the early twentieth century they also por-
trayed them as protecting men from corrupting influences that, 
according to First Baptist pastor Howland Hanson, “destroy 
manhood.”50  
 
CITY ELECTIONS under the Des Moines Plan worked as a 
two-step process: a primary election narrowed the candidates 
for city council down to ten; a general election two weeks later 
selected five men (one mayor and four councilmen) for office. 
Each elected official would be assigned to one of five city de-
partments. The simplicity of the arrangement helped build 
enthusiasm for the election. With clearly delineated roles and 
responsibilities, voters felt that they could hold elected officials 
accountable for their assigned duties. That sense, in turn, 
heightened the responsibility voters felt to elect candidates who 
could do the job well.  
 The groups that had united behind the Des Moines Plan 
struggled to decide which candidates to support. Eventually a 
committee selected by the Commercial Club settled on a slate of 
five candidates: Eugene Waterbury, Harry C. Evans, James R. 
Hanna, Buffon S. Walker, and Charles S. Worth.51 Deemed the 
“Des Moines Plan Ticket” by its supporters and the “silk stock-
ing” slate by its detractors, these five represented the supposed 
consensus of Des Moines’s “best men.” But the consensus had 
fractured. One of the three west-side dailies, the News, refused 
to back the slate, in part because it did not include controversial 
former mayor John MacVicar, who had returned to Des Moines 
from a New York–based stint as secretary of the League of 
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American Municipalities. MacVicar was sure to draw support 
not only from business and professional men but also from 
working-class voters who remembered that he had championed 
municipal ownership of public utilities.52 A Methodist, MacVicar 
saw his evangelical Protestant credentials bolstered by the sup-
port of his confidant John J. Hamilton, a prominent Presby-
terian layman. In late 1907 Hamilton recognized the growing 
evangelical political interest in Des Moines, urging MacVicar to 
get “right on the fundamental moral issues” if he wanted to win 
in 1908.53 
 As the city election approached, a group within the Ministe-
rial Association pushed to make moral reform a central part of 
the campaign. They wanted to force all candidates to go on rec-
ord on two issues: strict enforcement of the Mulct Law and elim-
ination of the “segregated vice” system within Des Moines.54 
The latter, common in many cities throughout the United States, 
confined businesses engaged in vices like gambling and prosti-
tution to specific parts of the city and subjected them to regular 
fines. Proponents of the segregated vice system argued that it 
was better to regulate gambling and prostitution and keep it geo-
graphically contained than to outlaw it outright and allow it to 
flourish underground. Opponents, on the other hand, believed 
that the system effectively provided government sanction and 
protection for sinful activity that harmed the community. Fur-
ther, they claimed that it bred corruption, enslaved women, and 
did not effectively segregate the vice since gambling and prosti-
tution still occurred elsewhere in the city.55   
 Members of the Ministerial Association generally agreed 
that the segregation system needed to be eliminated. But in 1908 
they decided against seeking pledges or putting candidates on 
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record. Most ministers reasoned that the survival of the Des 
Moines Plan should be secured before moral issues could come 
to the forefront of local elections.56 Although Des Moines’s evan-
gelical ministers decided not to engage in collective political 
action, the city’s Christian Endeavor societies (an evangelical 
young people’s group) sent questionnaires to the candidates 
asking for their positions on five issues: Sunday theater, Sunday 
baseball, unregulated saloons, the segregated vice system, and 
whether they had signed the Brewery Petition (which would 
have indicated approval of bringing a liquor-related business to 
the city). The letter warned that failure to respond to the inquiry 
would lead the society to “consider that your views on the sub-
jects are such that a Good Citizen should not support you for 
the office to which you aspire.”57 The effort did not go unno-
ticed. The Tribune, continuing its anti–Des Moines Plan activism 
by opposing the “silk stocking” candidates, suggested that 
Christian Endeavor members should “keep out of politics and 
keep on endeavoring to be Christians.”58 Although the group 
did not have the clout to make a dent in the election outcome, 
its activities portended a more politically active evangelical 
establishment.  
 So, too, did the sermons preached by evangelical ministers 
during election season. From March 15 (the Sunday before the 
primary election) through April 5 (the Sunday after the general 
election), Des Moines’s Protestant leaders proclaimed a new era 
of political interest and manliness from the pulpit. “It is time for 
the church to become aroused and come into her own in the 
control of the city’s affairs,” asserted O. C. Luce of North Des 
Moines Methodist Church. Howland Hanson of First Baptist 
Church saw in the election evidence of a “new manhood” and 
envisioned God declaring, “‘Behold, I will do this thing in Des 
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Moines.’” Finis Idleman, Harvey Breeden’s successor at Central 
Christian Church, appealed to an unlikely hero while expressing 
similar sentiments: “Savonarola declares that Jesus had a right 
to rule Florence. So he had. So has he a right to rule Des Moines.” 
Charles Medbury, meanwhile, urged “men who count the moral 
issues supreme” to stand together at the ballot box.59  
 The moral issues that Medbury referred to were, of course, 
the problems of gambling, alcohol, prostitution, and immoral 
amusements. But on election day Des Moines’s voters seemed 
to vote on behalf of another moral issue: that of the concentra-
tion of wealth and power in the upper classes. Repudiating the 
“silk stocking” slate entirely, voters selected A. J. Mathis, John 
MacVicar, John Hamery, Wesley Ash, and Charles Schramm. 
All except MacVicar had received favorable comments from Des 
Moines’s leading labor weekly, the Iowa Unionist, and two (Ham-
ery and Ash) had been endorsed by Des Moines’s labor leaders.60 
 If Des Moines’s ministers were disappointed with the results, 
they quickly recovered. In a post-election sermon, Howland 
Hanson drew on a New Testament parable to declare that Des 
Moines faced two options: the narrow road or the broad road. 
The latter, Hanson argued, would lead to a “wide-open” town 
that “gives free rein to every animal passion of life” and is “lined 
with saloons, brothels, opium joints, barbarism, death, and the 
soul of man partakes of the body’s doom.” The former was 
the way of “strict law enforcement for the city”; it would lead to 
“homes, schools and business, churches, life.”61  
 With responsibilities clearly delineated in the new city 
council, the forces of evangelical Protestantism could monitor 
the new city government for its adherence to the evangelical 
moral agenda. They had their eye on two officials in particular: 
the commissioner of public safety (who oversaw the police de-
partment) and the mayor.62 Employing pulpit and press, they 
                                                 
59. “Qualifications for Officials,” R&L, 3/16/1908; “Preachers on Event To-
day,” R&L, 3/30/1908; “Des Moines Decides Today,” R&L, 3/16/1908. 
60. Bionaz, “Trickle-Down Democracy,” 269; “The Labor Vote,” Iowa Unionist, 
3/21/1908.  
61. “City’s Election Is Theme of Sermons,” R&L, 4/6/1908. 
62. On the structure of Des Moines’s police system, see Douglas Wertsch, “The 
Evolution of the Des Moines Police Department: Professionalization and the 
Moral Reform in Des Moines      23 
planned to exert public pressure on those two officials to lead 
the city down the narrow path. And if officials failed to follow 
that path, an election in 1910 beckoned. 
 As an omen of the increased political involvement to come, 
John A. Wirt, a dogged defender of a nonpolitical pulpit, died 
suddenly less than two months after the 1908 election. Fittingly, 
Wirt’s companions in the Prairie Club remembered him as a 
man “possibly inclined to dogmatism” who did not believe “in 
certain kinds of [ministerial] activity in public affairs.”63  
 
THE FIVE MEN elected to office in 1908 represented a rejection 
of the very forces that had pushed for the Des Moines Plan. 
Indeed, the newly elected mayor, A. J. Mathis, had originally 
opposed the commission system. But the elected officials were 
not antibusiness radicals. They won not just with a strong 
showing among working-class voters but also with the support 
of middle-class voters who rejected a Des Moines Plan slate that 
seemed forced upon them. In some ways the election results 
were the best thing that could have happened to ensure city-
wide support for the plan, because it invested working-class 
voters in the success of the commission system.64 
 Because of his experience and skill in politics, John MacVicar 
was the leading personality in city hall.65 Mayor Mathis and 
newly appointed commissioner of public safety John Hamery 
stood next in importance and attention. The genial 64-year-old 
Mathis had friends far and wide in Des Moines, but some evan-
gelical voters had their suspicions. A Democrat from the east side, 
Mathis had earned a reputation for lenient sentencing when he 
served as a police judge. Although an evangelical Protestant 
who personally abstained from alcohol—Mathis was a deacon 
at Calvary Baptist Church—he did not support statewide pro-
hibition. Mathis’s unorthodox views on moral reform became 
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an issue late in the 1908 election, leading the Tribune to defend 
him as “a good Christian man.”66  
 As for Hamery, he was more of a wild card. Elected as an 
alderman in 1906 under the old city government system, he re-
mained relatively unknown to Des Moines’s business, profes-
sional, and religious elites. Upon assuming office, however, he 
ingratiated himself with Des Moines’s white Protestant leaders 
by zealously enforcing the law. Hamery especially earned their 
trust when, on September 15, 1908, he shut down Des Moines’s 
red light district, located at the time at East Court Avenue. In 
years past the red light district had been temporarily shut down 
but always with the knowledge that the brothels would eventu-
ally return or relocate. Hamery’s order proved to be permanent.67 
If evangelical leaders had not known Hamery before the election, 
they quickly came to view him as an ally.  
 Leading observers in Des Moines were cautious about pro-
claiming Hamery’s plan a success. They worried that prostitu-
tion would simply spread unchecked throughout the city if not 
confined to a regulated district. But within a year even Mayor 
Mathis, who had supported the segregated vice system, came to 
support Hamery’s plan. “Until lately I had not believed the ex-
periment would prove a success,” Mathis wrote to an inquirer 
in October 1909, but it “seems to be bringing much better re-
sults than segregation.”68  
 Mathis’s rosy assessment of Hamery’s reform reflected an 
emerging consensus that the Des Moines Plan was a smashing 
success. With the city’s finances, services, and morality appar-
ently improved, the press lavished praise on the new govern-
ment. In November 1909 the Register and Leader published a fea-
ture article under the splashy headline “Eyes of Whole World 
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Are on Des Moines, ‘The City on a Hill.’” Noting with pride the 
thousands of letters that had poured into Des Moines asking 
about the plan, the author declared that despite nearly two years 
of intense scrutiny “a big flaw is yet to be found.”69 In 1910 
the popular muckraking monthly McClure’s agreed, publishing 
an essay that praised the Des Moines Plan for marking “an 
advance of our civilization at the point where, in many ways, it 
has been at its lowest—the modern city.”70  
 Such glowing reviews might lead one to believe that Des 
Moines’s voters would reelect the five incumbents in a land-
slide. Certainly the city’s evangelical establishment should have 
been pleased with Hamery’s elimination of the segregated vice 
system. Yet the widespread acclaim for the city only heightened 
the responsibility that its evangelical leaders felt. If the whole 
world was indeed watching, the city’s guardians of morality 
could not rest content. 
 As the 1910 city election approached, evangelical leaders 
clamored for change, directing most of their ire at A. J. Mathis. 
The Tribune had defended him in 1908, but by 1910 it had been 
bought out by Gardner Cowles, owner of the Register & Leader. 
It continued publication but was no longer a staunch defender 
of Mathis.71  
 Although Mathis had come around to support the elimina-
tion of the red light district, he did not share his evangelical 
Protestant counterparts’ zeal for moral reform. They wanted a 
champion who believed that white Protestant moral causes 
were right for the whole city; Mathis seemed uncomfortable 
with their triumphalist reform initiatives. In early January 1910, 
for example, even though prize fighting was illegal in Iowa, 
Mathis welcomed professional boxer James Jeffries to Des 
Moines, greeting him at the train station and offering him the 
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“freedom of the city.” Des Moines’s ministers censured Mathis. 
His own pastor, J. W. Graves of Calvary Baptist, issued a state-
ment on behalf of the Ministerial Association denouncing prize 
fighting as illegal and degrading to public morals. Other min-
isters called out the mayor by name. Thomas Sykes, pastor of 
Sixth Presbyterian Church, described Mathis’s warm welcome 
for Jeffries as “an insult to all decent citizens.” He urged church 
members to ensure that such a disgrace would never happen 
again. With a city election in March and Mathis up for reelec-
tion, Sykes’s implication was clear. 72 
 In 1908 the Ministerial Association had mostly refrained from 
endorsing particular candidates or launching a coordinated 
campaign. For the 1910 election, however, they openly named 
and denounced candidates. Following their denunciation of 
Mathis, councilman Wesley Ash came in for a tongue-lashing 
when he admitted that he occasionally drank bourbon. The Min-
isterial Association passed a resolution expressing regret that “a 
candidate for the office of commissioner under the Des Moines 
plan” should openly admit to immorality and thereby “cast a 
reproach upon the fair name of our city.”73 
 The Ministerial Association was reinforced by the formation 
of the Laymen’s Civic Union (LCU).74 Organized in early Feb-
ruary, the LCU took up the idea discarded by the Ministerial 
Association in 1908: to force candidates to state their positions 
on pressing moral issues. The LCU identified four such issues: 
opposition to gambling, the strict regulation of saloons, continua-
tion of the effort to abolish the red light district, and the suppres-
sion of “immoral amusements.” In order to achieve its aims, 
the LCU vowed to investigate and make public the “character 
and qualifications of candidates” regarding “law enforcement 
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and civic morality” and to work for the election of candidates who 
met with the league’s approval. Aiming to unite Des Moines’s 
Protestant churches for moral action, the LCU sought representa-
tion from all evangelical churches in the city. Frank Dunshee, an 
elder at Central Presbyterian Church, served as president. John 
Hamilton, MacVicar’s confidant, also played an active role.75  
 The LCU’s efforts to secure pledges or statements from can-
didates met with ridicule from some quarters and intransigence 
from many of the candidates.76 But members cobbled together 
information from their own investigations and the statements 
submitted by candidates to issue a report one week before the 
primary election. Although they did not explicitly endorse a 
particular candidate or group of candidates, it was clear from 
the language of the report whom they backed. For mayor, James 
Hanna earned the most vigorous support and A. J. Mathis the 
most criticism. Among council candidates, the LCU praised 
Hamery and offered relatively positive assessments of John 
MacVicar and Charles Schramm. Wesley Ash, W. H. Brereton, 
and Zell Roe, on the other hand, received subtle rebukes.77  
 Although the LCU worked toward the same Protestant es-
tablishment ends as the Ministerial Association, not all evangel-
ical pastors fully endorsed the LCU’s methods. Howland Hanson, 
for example, preached a sermon urging Des Moines church-
goers to mobilize in order to provide the city’s booster move-
ment with a moral center. “We rejoice in a Greater Des Moines,” 
Hanson declared, “but must not forget the relation of civic spir-
ituality to true greatness.” Yet he explicitly rejected the LCU’s 
tactics. Instead of pressuring candidates for pledges, Hanson 
urged the “moral minded people . . . gathered in the churches” 
to repent of “civic indifference” and to strive together for new 
“ideals of manhood.” Orien Fifer of Grace Methodist Church, 
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on the other hand, praised the work of the LCU, arguing that 
it represented a much-needed effort by Christian men to get 
involved in city government. “The one conspicuous failure of 
America has been her government of cities,” Fifer said. He 
blamed that failure on the “teaching of the devil that Christian 
men and churches have no business in city politics.”78 
 Whatever their differences of opinion regarding the LCU’s 
methods, by the eve of the general election Des Moines’s evan-
gelical pastors joined their lay counterparts in support of two 
candidates: James Hanna for mayor and John Hamery for city 
council. Just as vigorously, they opposed three candidates: A. J. 
Mathis, Wesley Ash, and William Brereton. The ministers 
viewed Hamery’s election as crucial: a rejection of Hamery 
would signify a rejection of his anti-vice policies. “The crisis be-
fore us tomorrow is a moral crisis,” asserted Charles Medbury. 
Medbury had the backing of his congregants: the Register and 
Leader reported that when Medbury mentioned Hamery’s name, 
the walls of the church resounded with applause and cheering. 
A. J. Mathis, on the other hand, came in for rebuke from the 
ministers, who reminded their congregants of his “disgraceful” 
act of welcoming Jeffries and pointed out his friendliness with 
supporters of the saloon. “Let us be men,” W. R. Coventry of 
Clifton Heights Presbyterian declared after denouncing Mathis, 
“and vote with our conscience and upon Christian principle.”79 
 In the eyes of many evangelical Protestant ministers and 
laymen, the moral issues seemed clear. To be sure, they recog-
nized other election issues at play besides the suppression of 
vice. Perhaps most prominent was the debate over city owner-
ship of public service corporations. But Des Moines’s evangel-
icals managed to link even that issue to their moral agenda, 
urging the city to take control of public service corporations in 
part because such corporations were supposedly in a political 
alliance with saloon and gambling house owners.80  
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 For many Des Moines residents, however, the moral issues 
were not as clear-cut as the evangelical establishment believed. 
Iowa Unionist editor D. H. Caldwell, for example, became a thorn 
in the side of the Ministerial Association, constantly challenging 
the ministers’ claim to moral authority. Subverting the moral 
censures so often doled out by the ministers, Caldwell argued 
in August 1908 that the Ministerial Association itself was “one 
of the evils of our city” because it was narrow-minded and out 
of touch with ordinary citizens.81  
 In 1909 Caldwell’s critiques of the evangelical establishment 
caught the attention of Howland Hanson, who wrote to the Un-
ionist editor. Like many of Des Moines’s leading ministers at the 
time—including Frank Hodgdon, Finis Idleman, and Orien Fifer 
—Hanson followed the path of Harvey Breeden in embracing 
progressive religious ideas, including more open support for 
the cause of labor.82 Yet Hanson betrayed his moral priorities by 
spending most of his letter criticizing Caldwell for opposing 
Sabbath laws and for being friendly with saloon owners. “We 
do not need a criticism of those institutions which seek to advance 
public morals,” Hanson implored, “while speaking in terms of 
semi-approval of institutions that break down morals.”83 True 
to form, Caldwell scoffed at Hanson’s letter. He rejected a cen-
tral tenet of the evangelical establishment—their guardianship 
of the community’s moral well-being—writing that clergy could 
no longer “dictate and domineer” when it came to morality. 
The people, Caldwell claimed, had as much right to criticize the 
clergy as the clergy had to criticize others.84  
 Des Moines’s African American citizens also followed a dif-
ferent moral calculation when deciding how to vote. For them, 
a moral city included not just suppression of vice, but also fair 
treatment of black citizens. Using that calculation John L. Thomp-
son, editor of the Bystander, which represented the city’s African 
American residents, endorsed Mathis over Hanna. He also re-
                                                 
81. “Our Ministerial Association,” Iowa Unionist, 8/1/1908. 
82. “Dr. Idleman Gives Des Moines Church His Farewell Message,” Christian 
Century, 1/6/1916, 14; “Organizations Combine in Farewell to Fifer,” R&L, 
9/9/1913; “Element of Nerve Is Demand of Day,” R&L, 6/24/1912. 
83. “Rev. Hanson Has a Grievance,” Iowa Unionist, 11/12/1909. 
84. “In Reply to Reverend Hanson,” Iowa Unionist, 11/12/1909. 
30      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
fused to support John Hamery, the candidate so beloved by Des 
Moines’s white Protestant leaders. Thompson would later de-
scribe Hamery as “too narrow, and too prejudiced to our race 
for us to consider him at all.” Even in 1916, six years after 
Hamery’s time as commissioner of public safety had ended, 
Thompson recalled that Hamery’s department was the “worst 
department in treatment of colored people that we ever experi-
enced in the history of Des Moines.”85  
 A. J. Mathis, too, was unwilling to cede the moral high ground 
to his ministerial critics. When they denounced him for wel-
coming Jeffries to the city, he refused to apologize. “Everybody 
in Des Moines is not a church goer,” he noted, adding that even 
“if they are they like a little sport.” It was not that Mathis did not 
believe in the benefits of the evangelical faith; when a young ac-
quaintance moved to Omaha, Mathis privately urged him to get 
involved with a church in his new city. But Mathis felt uncom-
fortable using coercion. “You can’t legislate people into being 
good,” he remarked when asked about the LCU’s objectives.86 
 Although not everyone embraced the evangelical establish-
ment’s moral issues, they became a central issue in the 1910 elec-
tion. Evangelical voters undoubtedly celebrated James Hanna’s 
defeat of A. J. Mathis by 15 votes. Yet Hanna’s victory was not 
necessarily a ringing endorsement for evangelical political agita-
tion. John MacVicar, Wesley Ash, Zell Roe, and Charles Schramm 
claimed the four council seats; John Hamery, the evangelical co-
alition’s favored candidate, finished sixth. Only in the First Ward, 
Des Moines’s most affluent one, located on the far west side of the 
city, did Hamery poll in the top four. In all four working-class 
wards located near the river or on the east side, Hamery finished 
in seventh place. If, as his evangelical supporters claimed, a vote 
for Hamery was a vote for the preferred morality of evangelical 
Protestantism, Des Moines’s voters had rejected it.87  
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 Given Hamery’s tepid showing, it seems clear that Hanna 
did not win primarily from the support of evangelical moralists. 
Rather, Hanna owed his success to a broad campaign that em-
phasized his honesty and his support for municipal ownership 
of public service corporations. Employing that strategy, Hanna 
managed to win the approval of the Ministerial Association’s 
antagonist, the Iowa Unionist, despite his support for the moral 
reforms preferred by evangelicals.88 Although Hanna failed to 
outpoll Mathis in the four working-class wards, by appealing 
to a constituency beyond the white Protestant voters in Des 
Moines’s affluent districts, he managed to win just enough votes 
across the city to put him over the top.89  
 There was some irony in Hanna’s victory. His opponent, a 
Baptist deacon and YMCA member, had unquestioned evangeli-
cal Protestant credentials. Hanna, on the other hand, was a Uni-
tarian, a member of a congregation led by a woman and denied 
a place in the Ministerial Association. But Hanna’s Unitarian 
affiliation may have helped him avoid the pitfalls of the evan-
gelical establishment. While evangelical leaders tended to think 
of themselves as the triumphant moral voice of the entire city, 
Unitarians had no delusions about their power. With fewer than 
200 members, they were, as Johnson Brigham put it in 1905, 
simply a “little band . . . at the state capital” that “may not soon 
become the Church Triumphant.”90 Given Hanna’s Unitarian 
affiliation and its status just outside the evangelical establish-
ment, it is perhaps not so surprising that he managed to speak 
sincerely to the moral concerns of competing constituencies and 
win support from both the Iowa Unionist and the Ministerial 
Association. 
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HANNA would go on to serve three terms as mayor. In the 
meantime, the push for a more masculine church accelerated. In 
1910, for example, Samuel Zane Batten, a nationally known pro-
ponent of the social gospel, accepted a position at Des Moines 
College, a Baptist school founded in 1865.91 Batten supported a 
broad progressive moral agenda, with vice suppression a prom-
inent part of his work. Soon after arriving in Des Moines, Batten 
helped form the Des Moines Citizens Association, serving as its 
vice-president. In late 1910 the group threw itself into the fight 
against the saloon, launching a drive to get signers of a saloon 
consent petition to withdraw their signatures (petitions were a 
Mulct Law requirement for saloon operators). The group worked 
with the LCU in subsequent years as they investigated vice, 
fought the saloon, and dispatched men to the polls on election 
day to monitor for potential voter fraud.92    
 In 1911 Batten also helped lead the charge in Des Moines for 
the Men and Religion Forward Movement (MRFM), a national 
campaign advertised as a “stirring challenge to . . . red-blooded 
Christian men” to get involved with Protestant churches.93 Or-
ganizational work for Des Moines’s MRFM campaign launched 
in the spring of 1911, culminating with a week-long series of 
meetings and addresses in October. At the official kick-off rally 
for the campaign, Methodist minister Orien Fifer linked the 
movement with the Des Moines Plan. “Des Moines, far more than 
many other cities, will receive close observation,” Fifer argued, 
because Des Moines had a reputation for “progressiveness” 
and “for pioneering the way to satisfactory city government.” 
Charles Medbury followed by praising the MRFM for its poten-
tial to “redeem the non-Christian manhood from the clutches of 
certain destruction.”94  
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 The MRFM sought to present church work—especially so-
cial service activity—as manly by portraying it as businesslike, 
efficient, and practical.95 Des Moines was no exception to this 
general trend. But the work of the MRFM in Des Moines was 
not entirely different from the political mobilization that had 
resulted from the Des Moines Plan. Des Moines’s leading minis-
ters had already urged Christian men to break down the secular 
and sacred divide by bringing their faith into the realm of poli-
tics, and the Laymen’s Civic Union had launched “scientific” 
investigations of candidates’ moral positions.  
 After Des Moines’s MRFM campaign, the city’s white Prot-
estant leaders sought to channel newly reached men into Protes-
tant institutions. Central Christian Church, for example, held a 
follow-up “Enlistment Week,” and the city’s evangelical churches 
worked together to form the Interchurch Council, a new, broader 
institutional expression of the evangelical Protestant establish-
ment. As with the MRFM, the council featured social service 
endeavors and aimed to recruit men into the Protestant churches. 
J. W. Graves, Mathis’s pastor at Calvary Baptist, left behind his 
ministerial position to serve as the Interchurch Council’s first 
executive secretary.96 Thanks in part to the Interchurch Council, 
Batten boasted in 1912, the “moral and religious forces” were 
more “fully federated” in Des Moines than anywhere else, 
and few cities had “a more earnest and active interest in social 
service.”97  
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 The evangelical establishment did not neglect local electoral 
politics.98 The precedent set in 1910 of mobilizing evangelical 
voters after investigating candidates’ positions on moral issues 
continued through the outbreak of World War I. The success of 
those efforts fluctuated. The 1912 election, for example, belonged 
to the Labor League and its allies, who portrayed the election as 
“a strictly capital vs labor fight.” Labor unequivocally won the 
fight; two of the five elected candidates (Zell Roe and William 
Needham) received official Labor League endorsements, and the 
other three (James Hanna, Fred Van Liew, and Joseph Myerly) 
all earned unofficial support from the Iowa Unionist. Zell Roe, 
the only candidate categorically condemned by evangelical mor-
alists, tallied the second-most votes of the council candidates.99  
 The election in 1914 proved to be more successful for Des 
Moines’s white Protestants. The LCU once again mobilized, 
but more importantly the Interchurch Council—an organization 
with a much broader scope of interests—entered the fray at the 
behest of its executive secretary, J. W. Graves. At a meeting on 
March 19, just three days after the primary election, the Inter-
church Council condemned three candidates for their support 
of the saloon: R. M. Galbraith, James Conroy, and Harry Frase. 
The Labor League had endorsed the latter two, so their presence 
on the list was no surprise. But Galbraith was a businessman, 
widely recognized as one of two candidates on a businessman’s 
slate along with W. F. Mitchell. The censure Galbraith received 
led to howls of protest from some businessmen within the Inter-
church Council. Still, the council stuck by its decision. “If we 
win,” Graves predicted, “we will get the biggest victory that has 
ever been won in the country.” By bringing the Interchurch 
Council into a political campaign, Graves felt that Des Moines’s 
evangelical voters were ushering in “a new era in church work.”100  
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 The Interchurch Council’s reproof of Galbraith did not win 
approval from all quarters within the city’s white Protestant 
establishment, but it did earn the support of most of the promi-
nent ministers. Howland Hanson supported the council’s ac-
tions. So did C. W. Lowrie of Westminster United Presbyterian 
Church, who declared that the fate of the Des Moines Plan was 
at stake; its success could only be achieved by voting for men 
who had no history of supporting the saloons, men who could 
be trusted to oppose “the perpetuation of this assassin of Amer-
ican manhood.”101 
 The final tally went as well as Graves could have hoped: all 
three candidates opposed by the Interchurch Council went down 
in defeat. It is difficult to ascertain just what influence the coun-
cil’s denunciation had on Galbraith’s loss. Galbraith tallied 
fewer votes than Mitchell, his business-slate counterpart, in all 
seven wards. Still, it is suggestive that in the First Ward, which 
should have been friendliest to a business candidate, Galbraith 
trailed Mitchell by nearly 500 votes. And in the precincts of the 
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First Ward with the greatest gap in votes between Mitchell and 
Galbraith, John Hamery, the darling of the evangelical moral-
ists, did disproportionately better than in the precincts in which 
Galbraith and Mitchell received roughly equal tallies.102  
 Building on the encouraging results of the 1914 election, the 
forces of evangelical Protestantism received another boost that 
year when Iowa-born revivalist Billy Sunday came to town. 
Launching his campaign on November 1, 1914, Sunday followed 
his typical pattern of preaching an old-time gospel coated in 
bombastic theatrics and witty slang, buttressed by attacks on 
the saloon and effeminate church leaders. By the time he de-
parted, nearly 20,000 people had walked the sawdust trail, in-
cluding Register and Leader editor Harvey Ingham.103  
 That Ingham, a theological liberal, would support Sunday 
is not surprising. In 1915 the evangelical establishment—
particularly in cities like Des Moines, where it remained the dom-
inant religious force—had not yet splintered into competing 
fundamentalist and modernist camps. Thus, while Ingham’s 
moral vision included interests like racial and economic justice 
that went beyond the scope of Sunday’s message, he could rally 
around the revivalist’s call to manly, practical action and his 
fight against alcohol.104 Indeed, just a few months after Sunday’s 
revival in Des Moines, the liberal Protestant Outlook published a 
piece lauding the revivalist. The article’s author admitted that 
Sunday focused on outdated notions like eternal damnation and 
that he unnecessarily limited his social concern to “the simple 
saloon issue.” Despite those flaws, the article continued, Sunday 
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succeeded where high-minded liberals could not: he reached 
the “heart and mind and conscience of the man in the street.”105 
Ingham made a similar point when defending Sunday from 
criticism dispensed by Everett Martin, Mary Safford’s successor 
at First Unitarian Church. The Register and Leader editor argued 
that Sunday reached men that other preachers could not reach 
and that he inspired them to action. “He is a power for the right 
side,” Ingham declared.106 
 Events soon after Sunday’s campaign seemed to back up 
Ingham’s claim, at least for those who viewed the evangelical 
Protestant establishment as the “right side.” James Hanna, lead-
ing a city council friendly to evangelical moral causes, announced 
that saloon licenses in Des Moines would not be renewed. With 
that decision, carried out on February 15, 1915, the evangelical 
Protestant establishment finally had their dry city—if they 
could keep and enforce it.107  
 
THE EVANGELICAL political mobilization that began in the 
wake of the Des Moines Plan’s passage culminated with the elec-
tion of 1916. At stake was the protection of the most important 
step toward moral progress since 1908: the elimination of the 
city’s saloons. Although the Laymen’s Civic Union was still in 
operation, the most dynamic evangelical political agitation in 
1916 came from the pulpit of Plymouth Congregational Church. 
Nine years earlier Frank Hodgdon had employed the Plymouth 
pulpit to vigorously support the passage of the Des Moines Plan; 
in 1916 his successor, J. Edward Kirbye, campaigned to ensure 
that the Des Moines Plan would continue to be a force for moral 
progress.  
 Branching out from church-based organizations, Kirbye led 
a group of fellow evangelical ministers who joined with the 
Good Government Association. They settled on a slate of three 
candidates: John Budd, Ben Woolgar, and Fred German. With 
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only five men on the council, evangelicals needed just three to 
ensure that their moral reforms would be properly implemented. 
In the two weeks leading up to the election Kirbye and Good 
Government Association members gave speeches, organized 
get-out-the-vote campaigns, and sent a resolution in support of 
their three candidates to every evangelical pulpit in the city.108  
 On the eve of the election, evangelical pulpits in Des Moines 
thundered with urgent appeals to vote. “I do not want the 
words to be scattered far and wide that Des Moines is dropping 
behind,” First Methodist pastor J. L. Hillman pleaded, asking his 
congregants to vote for “law and order and all that makes for a 
clean progressive city.” Kirbye promoted the Good Government 
slate with a sermon titled “Shall the Church in Des Moines Be 
Like the First Church in Jerusalem?” Following the sermon, 
Plymouth Congregational Church unanimously passed a reso-
lution supporting Kirbye “in this fight he is making for good 
government in Des Moines.”109 
 The election results revealed mostly good news for evangel-
ical voters. Two of the three Good Government candidates, Ben 
Woolgar and John Budd, earned a spot at city hall. Although 
the voters elected two candidates opposed by the evangelical 
establishment—Harry Frase and Tom Fairweather (owner of 
the city’s baseball team, the Des Moines Boosters)—newly elected 
mayor John MacVicar had the trust of white Protestant leaders.110 
With three city council members who seemed to support the 
moral reforms of the evangelical establishment and with the 
cornerstones of those moral reforms in place—the red light dis-
trict abolished and alcohol prohibited—evangelical Protestants 
in Des Moines could be proud of the progress they had made.  
 
THE 1916 ELECTION signaled the end of the unusually intense 
evangelical voter mobilization that had resulted from the passage 
of the Des Moines Plan. Eight years earlier, inspired by the evan-
gelical Protestant sense of moral guardianship and the push for 
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a more masculine and active faith, the city’s evangelical leaders 
had entered into the political realm at an unprecedented level. 
Their efforts intensified two years later during the 1910 election 
with the formation of the Laymen’s Civic Union and the fight to 
ensure that the moral progress achieved under John Hamery did 
not recede. Over the next three elections the LCU and evangeli-
cal ministers played a prominent role. Their efforts were always 
challenged by those who held to different conceptions of morality 
or to a different ordering of moral priorities. Yet the evangelical 
Protestant establishment repeatedly consolidated its forces and 
expanded its constituency; if its favored candidates fared poorly 
in the 1910 and 1912 elections, that pattern was reversed in the 
1914 and 1916 elections.  
 Evangelical Protestants continued to take an interest in elec-
toral politics after 1916, of course, but the context was rapidly 
changing. One change—women winning the right to vote—
promised to bring reinforcements to the white Protestant moral 
cause.111 Yet it also caused a reorientation away from the mas-
culine rhetoric that dominated white Protestant calls for elec-
toral action in the years between 1908 and 1916.112 Meanwhile, 
the Great War in Europe increasingly pushed international 
issues to the forefront of public attention while the commission 
system fell out of favor and a new system, the city manager 
plan, took its place.113 The sense that the eyes of the world were 
on Des Moines abated.  
 So, too, did the connection between progress and evangelical 
Protestantism. Buoyed by demographic dominance in Des 
Moines, in the first two decades of the twentieth century con-
servative and liberal Protestant leaders could unite behind a 
push for a practical and masculine faith that sought to embed 
the moral values inherited from the nineteenth century within 
the rapidly changing consumer-driven society of the twentieth. 
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But with the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and the fundamentalist 
movement after World War I, evangelical moral reform increas-
ingly became associated with reaction and maintenance, with 
protection of an old order rather than the advancement of a new. 
In Des Moines, as in the country at large, the white Protestant 
establishment divided in response to this new state of affairs, 
with some liberal Protestants finding that they shared more in 
common with the inclusive moral vision of non-Protestant reli-
gious leaders like Rabbi Eugene Mannheimer than with their 
conservative coreligionists.114 We can surmise that in this new 
postwar cultural climate, the slogan that had previously in-
spired Des Moines’s evangelical leaders to create their “city on a 
hill” took on a rather different connotation. What had once sig-
nified a zeal for progress and cutting-edge reform now seemed 
to signify the ordinary banality of a city dominated by white 
Protestants: “Des Moines Does Things.”  
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Iowa’s Original Ethanol Debate:  
The Power Alcohol Movement  
of 1933–1934 
JEFFREY T. MANUEL 
IOWA is perhaps best known to the rest of the nation for two 
things: corn and politics. Iowa’s prestige for the productivity 
of its farms dates from the state’s earliest days. Iowa’s fame for 
politics also has a long history, although many Americans in the 
twenty-first century associate the state’s political influence with 
the Iowa caucuses, which became the first test for presidential 
hopefuls beginning in the 1970s.1 When Iowa’s crucial role in 
choosing presidential candidates was combined with its enor-
mous corn production, ethanol— the name given to ethyl alcohol 
that is often produced from grain (typically corn) and used as a 
liquid transportation fuel—became central to the state’s history.2  
 Iowa has consistently led the nation in ethanol production. In 
2016 Iowa was forecast to produce almost 3.9 billion gallons of 
ethanol for fuel—far and away the most of any state, nearly double 
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the production of second-place Nebraska.3 Ethanol became one 
of Iowa’s major industries by the early twenty-first century, gener-
ating 43,000 jobs and approximately 3.5 percent of the state’s gross 
domestic product, according to industry advocates.4 Ethanol has 
received substantial political support over the years, ranging from 
tax breaks in the late 1970s to the 2005 Renewable Fuel Standard’s 
nationwide mandate for ethanol-gasoline blends. 
 Both Congress and presidential administrations supported 
ethanol during this period, largely for political reasons. In the late 
1970s, for instance, President Jimmy Carter launched a nation-
wide ethanol program as part of an effort to woo Iowa voters 
during the 1980 presidential election. The ethanol question domi-
nated Iowa’s presidential contests, leading candidates from both 
parties to support ethanol in the hope of winning the crucial Iowa 
caucuses. One reporter joked during the 2008 primaries that once 
presidential aspirants arrived in Iowa to campaign, “one of their 
first orders of business was bowing to the ethanol gods.”5 In short, 
Iowa has been central to the nation’s great debate over ethanol 
over the past 40 years.  
 Debate over ethanol and biofuels sharply divided Iowans and 
other Americans concerned about energy policies during this era. 
Supporters portrayed ethanol as a miraculous fuel that could pro-
mote energy independence by weaning the nation off of foreign 
oil. Ethanol, supporters claimed, would clean the air while sup-
porting the nation’s farmers. In contrast, ethanol’s detractors por-
trayed the fuel—and government subsidies for it—as a political 
boondoggle. Ethanol did little to help the environment, detractors 
noted, and shifted large sums of taxpayer dollars into the pockets 
of agribusiness corporations and their lobbyists.6 Ethanol debates 
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crossed party lines, often pitting midwestern and rural politicians 
—both Democrats and Republicans—against representatives of 
metropolitan areas or oil- and gas-producing regions. 
 Yet for all the debate over ethanol in recent decades, there has 
been a surprising amnesia about alcohol fuels in Iowa before the 
1970s energy crises. Both sides of the ethanol debate have forgot-
ten about alcohol fuel’s long history in Iowa and have failed to 
learn from previous efforts to promote alcohol fuels. This is part 
of a larger amnesia about the complex history of energy use and 
alternatives to oil and gas in the United States. As Alexis Madrigal 
notes, “There’s almost no institutional memory of what happened 
before the energy crises of the ’70s.”7 This article describes Iowa’s 
first major debate over ethanol, a movement—known as the power 
alcohol movement—to legislate alcohol-gasoline blends in the 
1930s, a time when power alcohol, like ethanol today, was the 
focus of vigorous debate in Des Moines and Washington, D.C., 
that pitted farmers and their representatives against gasoline 
consumers and oil companies. 
 The 1933–1934 power alcohol debate was a significant mo-
ment in Iowa’s twentieth-century industrial and agricultural his-
tory. Although the state ultimately did not pass a law mandating 
alcohol-gasoline blends, the movement fused farm interests, 
state politicians, and researchers into a powerful interest group. 
That coalition would later prove crucial to the creation of Iowa’s 
agrochemical industrial complex. The power alcohol movement 
also highlights the key role that several Iowans played in setting 
national agricultural and energy policy in the 1930s. Henry A. 
Wallace’s contributions to the New Deal are well known, but his 
initial support for alcohol fuels as a form of farm relief has been 
little discussed by historians. The power alcohol movement was 
Wallace’s final attempt to find new markets for corn before fully 
embracing supply reduction strategies through the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration. Less well known but also important 
was chemical engineer Leo Christensen, an Iowa State College 
professor and tireless booster for power alcohol. Christensen co-
ordinated power alcohol’s diverse advocates in the 1930s. In 1934 
he coauthored an influential book, Power Alcohol and Farm Relief, 
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that made a case for power alcohol as technically feasible and po-
litically necessary.8 The outlines of Iowa’s later biofuel debates 
originated in the 1933–1934 power alcohol movement. 
 Iowa’s power alcohol movement is also significant within the 
longer history of alcohol fuels in the United States. Historians 
have portrayed the push for power alcohol in the 1930s as an in-
teresting precursor to the serious ethanol policy that was launched 
in the 1970s. Other historians have discussed the demand for fed-
eral power alcohol legislation in those years but have overlooked 
Iowa’s key role in launching the movement to legislate alcohol-
gasoline blends.9 Iowa’s debate was not a curious sideline or an 
isolated local example; it marked an important turning point in 
the history of alcohol fuels in the United States, which stretched 
back into the nineteenth century and continues well into the 
twenty-first. 
 The 1930s movement stands out as the last moment when 
nineteenth-century agrarian rhetoric was central to arguments for 
alcohol fuel from grain. Farmers in the 1930s were keenly aware 
of the energy transition on the farm that was replacing horses with 
cars and tractors. Thus, they framed the argument for alcohol 
fuel in terms of an old agrarian demand that farmers needed pro-
tective legislation to ameliorate the costs of technological change. 
Iowa’s power alcohol debate was also an origin point for legisla-
tion mandating alcohol-gasoline blends. The idea that legislation 
should require that motor fuel contain a certain percentage of al-
cohol gained national attention in the 1930s in the wake of Iowa’s 
debate. The idea circulated among ethanol boosters for decades 
before finally becoming law in the early twenty-first century with 
the Renewable Fuel Standard. Finally, the power alcohol debate 
in Iowa highlights how energy and agricultural policymaking 
has often involved regional or interstate conflict based on re-
source production. After the 1970s energy crises, rhetoric about 
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national energy independence or energy security has tended to 
obscure important regional differences within the United States 
regarding energy policies. Those differences were at the center of 
the 1933–1934 debate, which pitted midwestern farm interests 
against the oil and gas producers based in other regions. Inter-
estingly, many of those interstate conflicts may reappear in the 
twenty-first century as a result of the shale revolution’s dramatic 
increase in U.S. oil production, which has raised difficult questions 
about which regions should benefit from federal energy policy. 
Similar questions were at the heart of the 1930s power alcohol 
debate. 
 
USING ALCOHOL as fuel had a long history prior to the 1930s. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Americans used blends 
of alcohol and other liquids—often turpentine—to fuel lamps for 
lighting. Fuels known as “burning fluids,” or camphene, used in 
alcohol lamps, gave off a brighter light than tallow candles and 
were significantly cheaper than whale oil. Unfortunately, they 
were highly explosive.10 With the development of the internal-
combustion engine in the late nineteenth century, alcohol was 
held out as a potential fuel for the new motor. Although alcohol 
fuel was overshadowed by gasoline as the fuel of choice for 
internal-combustion engines, the door never fully closed on al-
ternative fuels in the early decades of the twentieth century. Calls 
to use alcohol as a fuel—either in its pure form or blended with 
gasoline—arose whenever there were concerns that gasoline 
might run out or when surplus crops sent prices down and farm-
ers sought new markets for their harvests.11 During the 1920s, 
several companies attempted to market alcohol fuels or gasoline-
alcohol blends, but the blends were rendered uneconomical by 
cheap gasoline from newly opened wells in the mid-continent oil 
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fields. The discovery that tetraethyl lead could be added to gas-
oline to prevent it from knocking (pre-igniting in the cylinder) 
killed demand for alcohol as an octane booster in the 1920s.12 By 
the early 1930s, alcohol fuels were considered technically feasible 
but economically unpromising. 
 At the same time, the United States was undergoing a trans-
formation as motive power shifted from animals and steam en-
gines to gasoline-powered automobiles, tractors, trucks, and buses. 
As historian Daniel Yergin writes, the years following World 
War I witnessed “the motorization of the American people.”13 
Iowa was hardly exempt from this process. By 1931, Iowa had 
over 700,000 registered passenger cars and consumed over 364 
million gallons of gasoline annually.14 Less noticed but equally 
important was the marked decline in the demand for animals to 
supply power in cities and on farms. During the 1920s, Ameri-
cans destroyed over six million horses and mules.15 
 The shift from animal power to engine power had profound 
effects on American farming. As farm animals gave way to trac-
tors and cars, land that had previously been used for pasture was 
freed up for grain production. During the 1920s, approximately 
21 million acres of farmland shifted from growing feed for 
animals to producing commodities for the market.16 But fewer 
animals on American farms and in American cities meant less 
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demand for feed, exacerbating the glut of grain that lowered crop 
prices throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Prices for agricultural 
products dropped throughout the 1920s and then fell precipi-
tously at the beginning of the Great Depression.17 Although the 
farm problem of the 1920s and early 1930s was multifaceted, 
many observers at the time blamed gasoline-powered engines 
for farmers’ woes. For instance, a 1933 photo in the Des Moines 
Register captured this sentiment by showing a farmer driving a 
tractor with the caption, “They displaced horses, but they don’t 
eat the resulting surplus of feed.”18 Farmers, like most Ameri-
cans, eagerly embraced the internal-combustion engine but were 
also keenly aware of how it disrupted the older farm economy. 
 Power alcohol offered the alluring prospect that crops could 
be converted into alcohol fuel and farms could return to the old 
days of growing fuel for the animals—or machines, in this case—
that worked on the farm. As an Iowa newspaper editorial put it, 
“Instead of having our horses eat the corn we can make the tractor 
eat it.”19 Farmers and their allies also framed a pro–power alcohol 
argument in terms of a debt owed by petroleum. As oil and gas 
displaced agricultural products as fuel, farmers contended that 
oil and gas owed something in return to farmers and rural Amer-
ica. As a longtime farmer recalled, “Petroleum products first be-
gan to crowd out agricultural products when the kerosene lamp 
succeeded the tallow candle, and they have been at it ever since. 
. . . Today, when the suggestion is made that petroleum products 
pay back to the farming industry a small part of what it has 
robbed them of . . . a hulabaloo goes up from one end of the country 
to the other, and thousands of dollars are spent in propaganda 
against such a proposition.”20 American farmers in the 1920s and 
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’30s had witnessed a wholesale transformation of motive power 
on their farms. It was impossible for them to deny the benefits of 
gasoline-powered tractors and cars, but they were keenly aware 
of the costs of the transition in terms of destroyed animals and 
falling crop prices. Alcohol fuels held out the possibility of re-
gaining some of what gasoline had taken away. 
 Another factor motivating support for alcohol fuels in the 1930s 
was concern that gasoline supplies would run out in the near 
future. That worry was as old as the oil industry. Fears of deple-
tion had stalked the petroleum trade since its birth in the mid–
nineteenth century. In the early decades of the twentieth century, 
there were gasoline shortages in some regions, especially as de-
mand for automobile fuel surged ahead of refining capabilities. 
Fears of a so-called gasoline famine were endemic in the 1900s 
and 1910s.21 By the 1920s and early 1930s, however, refining break-
throughs that increased gasoline production and falling demand 
due to the depression alleviated immediate fears of gasoline short-
ages. Nonetheless, many observers fretted about depletion even 
in the midst of low prices during the 1930s. Their fears were 
driven less by rational analysis of markets and supplies than by 
a commonsense notion that oil was a nonrenewable resource that 
must run out at some point. For instance, advocates of power 
alcohol described the nation’s oil and gas as a “national reserve” 
that was constantly being depleted. In contrast, crops were a “na-
tional income of energy” or a renewable resource that could be 
replenished each season.22 
 The technical feasibility of using alcohol as a fuel, the shift 
from animal to motor power, and fears of oil depletion were the 
deep factors driving interest in power alcohol in the 1920s and 
’30s. But it was the collapse of crop prices in the early 1930s that 
spurred serious discussion of mandating alcohol fuels and led to 
Iowa’s proposed power alcohol legislation in the 1930s. Average 
commodity prices dropped 37 percent between 1929 and 1933 
while farmers’ gross income dropped 52 percent.23 In 1933 the 
Iowa Farmers Grain Dealers Association described the farm crisis 
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as “the greatest emergency the state has ever seen.”24 It was in 
this context of acute crisis that legislation mandating the use of 
alcohol fuel was first proposed in Iowa. 
 By the early 1930s, then, Iowa farmers were both dependent 
on gasoline-powered machinery and reeling from a long-term 
agricultural depression that had slashed commodity prices. Out 
of this vortex came the power alcohol movement, a popular but 
diffuse campaign to mandate that the nation’s gasoline supply 
be blended with alcohol derived from American-grown crops. 
The proposal was intended primarily as a means of providing 
economic relief to struggling farmers by creating a lucrative new 
market for their harvests.25 
 
LEGISLATION supporting alcohol-gasoline blends cropped up 
in several midwestern states during the 1930s, but Iowa was the 
clear leader of the movement. Iowa’s interest in power alcohol 
began with a study by researchers at Iowa State College (now 
Iowa State University). In late 1932 several professors at Iowa 
State began investigating the feasibility of using a blend of 8 per-
cent ethyl alcohol, 2 percent of a blending agent such as benzene, 
and 90 percent gasoline as a motor fuel. The study brought to-
gether faculty from chemistry, mechanical engineering, chemical 
engineering, and agricultural economics. These researchers were 
convinced that the food market for agricultural production would 
not expand in the near future, so alternative markets were needed 
to avoid ongoing agricultural depression. They also were intrigued 
by evidence that alcohol-gasoline blends were already being used 
successfully in several other countries.26 Early tests found that 
blended fuels containing 10 to 20 percent alcohol had better anti-
knock properties than pure gasoline (that is, it was less likely to 
pre-ignite in the combustion chamber). The researchers’ main 
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emphasis, however, was the fuel’s ability to use up excess corn 
supplies and relieve the farm crisis.27 
 It is not surprising that Iowa’s power alcohol plan was hatched 
at Iowa State College. In the early 1930s Iowa State was a hothouse 
for collaboration between engineering and agricultural sciences. 
Engineering faculty and agricultural researchers worked on par-
allel tracks in most universities at the time, often competing for 
scarce funding during the depression. Yet Iowa State College 
developed a “highly unusual” and very productive collaboration 
between the two fields. Practically, the harmony between engi-
neering and agriculture found an outlet in the work of chemical 
engineers who eagerly promoted a new chemical industry 
based on agricultural products. Throughout the 1920s, chemical 
engineering faculty experimented with various ways to turn agri-
cultural waste into useful products. Experiments included turn-
ing corncobs into chemicals such as acetone, oxalic acid, furfural, 
and even plastics. Iowa State’s chemical engineers were also 
savvy promoters of their research. They recognized that ongoing 
funding and public support for their investigations depended on 
publicizing their work to the state’s major industries and high-
lighting the industrial possibilities of Iowa’s abundant agricul-
tural waste products. Thus, Iowa State College researchers ap-
proached the alcohol fuel issue with the confidence borne of a 
decade of experimenting across disciplinary lines to create indus-
trial products from farm output.28 Building on the researchers’ 
initial findings, Iowa legislators quickly brought the issue to the 
state capital. 
 In the first days of 1933, Iowa politicians took the research 
coming from Ames and pulled it into the orbit of state politics. 
Power alcohol legislation found fertile ground in Iowa’s 45th 
General Assembly. An unprecedented Democratic majority had 
entered office on the coattails of Roosevelt’s landslide election. 
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Patrick Bauer describes the 1932 election in Iowa as one in which 
“Democratic candidates were elected to positions that had been 
held by an almost unbroken line of Republicans since before the 
Civil War.”29 Reversing decades of Republican dominance of 
Iowa’s General Assembly, Democrats controlled Iowa’s House 
of Representatives with a 77–31 majority; the Iowa Senate was 
evenly split between the parties, with the Democratic lieutenant 
governor breaking tie votes; and Democrat Clyde Herring occu-
pied the governor’s mansion, only the second Democratic gover-
nor in Iowa since the Civil War. That wholesale shift in Iowa’s 
political culture created a context in which new and more radical 
ideas for farm relief, such as power alcohol, received more con-
sideration than they had in earlier eras. Due to the farm crisis, the 
political situation in Iowa in 1932 and 1933 “had reached the 
point where [leaders] were ready to risk a change.”30 
 Iowa State researchers had shown that alcohol-gasoline blends 
were technically feasible, but it remained unclear whether there 
would be a market for them given the low price of oil and cus-
tomers’ familiarity with straight gasoline. As a solution, state law-
makers considered mandating that alcohol derived from Iowa’s 
surplus corn be blended into gasoline. A legal mandate would 
solve alcohol fuel’s economic problems by instantly creating a 
market for the fuel regardless of cost. Iowa state senators Frank 
Byers of Linn County and Fred Nelson of Story County, both Re-
publicans, outlined a proposed bill. They were motivated pri-
marily by the belief that, if passed, such a bill “would absorb the 
corn surplus.” Yet they acknowledged that any legislation would 
be effective only if it could reach beyond Iowa. Eventually, the 
U.S. Congress would need to adopt a similar proposal nation-
wide to make a serious dent in the country’s corn surplus.31 Thus, 
when Iowa’s General Assembly convened on January 9, 1933, the 
alcohol fuel issue was poised to be one of the year’s most conten-
tious legislative matters. 
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 Support for power alcohol legislation came from a coalition 
of farmers, agricultural scientists, and politicians representing 
rural interests. The foremost supporters of power alcohol were 
scientists and engineers at midwestern universities who believed 
that converting agricultural surpluses into fuel could solve the 
farm crisis. These scientists were supported by Corn Belt farmers 
who were always eager to find new markets for their products, 
organizations such as the Farm Bureau that represented farmers’ 
interests in the halls of power, and politicians who sought farm-
ers’ votes. 
 Opposition to the power alcohol plan developed more slowly, 
but once it became clear that possible legislation would mandate 
an alcohol fuel blend, the petroleum industry coordinated a 
powerful counterattack. Nationally, the petroleum industry in 
the early 1930s was organized through the American Petroleum 
Institute (API). Facing low oil prices and rising taxes in 1932, 
including a new federal excise tax on gasoline, the API focused on 
lowering state and local gasoline taxes. Many states had raised 
gasoline taxes, or were considering doing so, to make up for 
budget shortfalls during the Great Depression. The API formed 
a new industries committee meant to “protect the petroleum 
industry from and relieve it of unjust burdens resulting from 
discriminatory taxation or adverse legislation.”32 When the power 
alcohol bill was first considered in Iowa, then, the petroleum 
industry was already keenly concerned about new state taxes and 
regulations on gasoline and well organized to lobby against them. 
 Within Iowa, petroleum business interests were defended by 
the Iowa Petroleum Association (IPA). That organization was 
formed in 1921—it was originally the Iowa Independent Oil Men’s 
Association—and was made up primarily of jobbers. By 1932, the 
IPA was working closely with other state petroleum organiza-
tions and groups representing drivers’ interests to fight against 
new state and local taxes. For instance, at a meeting in February 
1932 a speaker warned IPA members that state gasoline taxes 
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were “the fastest growing tax in history” and opened the door to 
an “orgy of fraud” by gasoline bootleggers.33 Also opposed to the 
power alcohol plan were the nation’s automobile clubs, such as 
the American Automobile Association, which saw themselves as 
defenders of gasoline consumers.34 
 As word spread that a law requiring alcohol fuel to be blended 
into Iowa’s gasoline supply was brewing in the General Assembly, 
newspapers around the state began reporting on the issue. Many 
of the state’s editorial pages strongly supported the proposal. 
The Ames Daily Tribune-Times called it “most interesting and per-
haps most fruitful of real benefit for Iowa.” The Sumner Gazette 
noted that “nothing which has been announced for some time 
has appealed so much to the popular imagination, according to 
conversation heard in the past two weeks.” News of the benefits 
of alcohol-gasoline blends spread statewide in mid-January when 
the Des Moines Register’s farm editor explained how his own car 
benefited from the fuel. He described better acceleration from the 
blended fuel and encouraged its use across the state, writing, 
“Use of this blend the last few days in my own car has impressed 
me with its merit.”35 
 Some intrepid Iowans took matters into their own hands and 
started mixing regular radiator alcohol into their gasoline after 
reading about the technical success of alcohol-gasoline blends. 
Iowa State faculty rushed to remind people that radiator alcohol 
contained too much water and should not be blended with gas-
oline outside of a laboratory for fear of harming automobile 
engines.36 
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 Bills supporting Iowa’s power alcohol movement were quickly 
drafted and brought before the General Assembly. The legisla-
tion required two stages: first, the state needed to pass laws per-
mitting the manufacture of industrial alcohol (alcohol unsuitable 
for human consumption), which had been banned during Prohi-
bition. Second, legislators needed to tackle the specific mecha-
nism by which alcohol fuel would be mandated. Dealing with 
the first problem was straightforward. In late January the Iowa 
House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill that al-
lowed for the manufacture of industrial alcohol. Observers noted 
the irony that the president of the state’s Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union had offered the traditional prayer before the 
legislative session opened. On February 3, the Iowa Senate easily 
passed the bill, and Governor Herring signed it into law the fol-
lowing week.37 
 The second phase of legislation, determining exactly how an 
alcohol fuel mandate would work, proved far more difficult. 
While the General Assembly was in session, several powerful 
voices in Iowa politics weighed in with their support for an alco-
hol fuel mandate. First was the formidable Farm Bureau, which 
endorsed alcohol fuels in late January. The Farm Bureau’s annual 
platform called for the production of new products, including 
alcohol fuels, from Iowa’s agricultural crops.38 Next to weigh in 
was Henry A. Wallace, who was among the nation’s most influ-
ential voices on agricultural matters. His father had been U.S. Sec-
retary of Agriculture in the Harding and Coolidge administra-
tions, and he held the same position in the incoming Roosevelt 
administration. In addition, the Wallace family’s farm journal, 
Wallaces’ Farmer, was an influential voice in the agricultural com-
munity in Iowa and the larger Midwest. Speaking to the Iowa 
General Assembly on January 31, Wallace advocated power 
alcohol derived from corn as one important tool for getting the 
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nation’s farmers out of the deep financial furrow of the Great 
Depression.39 
 Wallace had been investigating the power alcohol plan for 
several months and had met with Iowa State researchers. In 
August of the previous year, he had written a column in Wallaces’ 
Farmer claiming, “The chances are ten to one that the automobiles 
of our children and grandchildren will be run to a considerable 
extent with alcohol made from corn.” Converting corn into alco-
hol fuel would be a boon to Iowa, Wallace argued. “We should 
not send all of our automobile money out of the state. If we can 
grow one-fourth of our motor fuel at home, let’s get ready to do 
it.”40 
 In December 1932 Wallace included the power alcohol plan 
as part of the domestic allotment farm relief plan being crafted in 
Congress. Mandating alcohol-gasoline blends was proposed as a 
useful way to help corn farmers in Iowa and Illinois who sold 
corn to the market rather than feeding it to hogs. Mandating that 
some portion of the corn crop be converted into alcohol fuel 
would lessen the depths of the cuts to hog production. Wallace 
acknowledged that the power alcohol plan might harm oil-
producing states in the name of farm relief: “The oil producers 
of the southwest would undoubtedly be temporarily somewhat 
damaged, but the benefit done to the corn farmers would be 
much greater than the damage done to the oil producers.”41 Ini-
tially, Wallace framed the 1933–1934 power alcohol debate as an 
issue of interstate competition rather than national energy policy. 
 Momentum seemed to be on the side of alcohol fuel. The key 
bill mandating that alcohol be mixed into Iowa’s gasoline supply 
was introduced in the Iowa Senate on February 9. The compli-
cated bill would have required that all gasoline sold in Iowa be 
blended with alcohol produced from Iowa crops at a percentage 
set by a new executive council that would monitor annual har-
vests to determine how much of a surplus existed. A state alcohol 
administrator would be charged with permitting new distilleries 
and ensuring that they did not make more than 10 percent profit. 
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As proposed, the bill was technocratic and punitive. It would 
have instantly transformed the state’s gasoline supply and en-
dowed the new alcohol administrator and executive council with 
sweeping power to control the state’s agricultural and energy 
industries.42 
 Criticism of the proposed law appeared immediately in some 
Iowa newspapers. The Mason City Globe-Gazette, for instance, 
worried that the plan would raise gasoline costs for consumers 
and might harm engines.43 In the national press, Business Week 
weighed in with sharp criticism, describing Iowa’s entire power 
alcohol plan as “among the more scatterbrained proposals put 
forward in the general anxiety over the plight of the farmer.” The 
article’s author argued that diluting gasoline with alcohol made 
no financial sense. “What this scheme comes down to is the dilu-
tion of gasoline, selling for 5¢ at the refineries, with an inferior 
liquid fuel costing five times as much per gallon.”44 Opponents of 
the alcohol gasoline mandate spoke on behalf of the petroleum 
industry and, more broadly, Iowa’s gasoline consumers who were 
more worried about the price they paid at the pump than about 
supporting farmers. 
 In February supporters of power alcohol ramped up their 
lobbying on behalf of the bill. Researchers at Iowa State College, 
who had initiated alcohol fuel research months earlier, moved 
quickly to form a committee to promote the plan statewide. 
Ames was to be the center of “a statewide educational cam-
paign” on behalf of the power alcohol bill. Supporters of the bill 
from northwestern Iowa organized a caravan to Des Moines to 
demonstrate the bill’s widespread support in rural Iowa. Propo-
nents of power alcohol legislation also pointed to foreign nations, 
such as Germany, Hungary, and Brazil, that had already enacted 
similar laws. Opponents argued that the situation in those for-
eign nations did not apply to the United States since it was an oil 
exporter and such laws were meant to promote national energy 
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self-sufficiency. Foes of alcohol fuel argued that in the United 
States, unlike in those nations that mandated alcohol fuels, “there 
is a great plenty of oil, and there are both an important petroleum 
industry and a great body of motorists to protest.”45 
 In mid-February, Iowa’s petroleum industry launched a co-
ordinated critique of the power alcohol bill pending in the Gen-
eral Assembly. In a letter of opposition, the IPA outlined numer-
ous criticisms of the bill. (1) It would raise gasoline prices since 
alcohol was more expensive to produce than gasoline. (2) Higher 
gasoline prices would lead many consumers, especially Iowans 
living near a state border, to buy gasoline outside Iowa. (3) Boot-
leggers could bring out-of-state gasoline into Iowa and undersell 
filling stations. (4) As higher prices caused people to cut back on 
driving, the total amount of gasoline taxes collected would de-
crease. (5) High-priced gasoline would lead automotive tourists to 
avoid Iowa, which, in turn, would lead to lower tourism spending. 
(6) New storage facilities would be needed to keep water out of 
gasoline (water caused alcohol and gasoline to separate), and the 
blended fuel would ruin the shellac on carburetor floats. (7) The 
legislative mandate  would use up only 3 percent of the corn crop, 
so it would not actually help Iowa’s farmers much.46  
 Iowa’s power alcohol plan was also criticized by the national 
petroleum industry. The Oil and Gas Journal, the main petroleum 
industry trade publication, reported on Iowa’s power alcohol bill 
throughout early 1933. Early articles focused on technical prob-
lems with alcohol-gasoline blends and emphasized that previous 
efforts to promote alcohol fuels had failed.47 Once it became clear 
that the Iowa legislature was seriously considering the power 
alcohol bill, however, the Oil and Gas Journal took a more critical 
stance. “The petroleum industry needs be concerned,” the journal 
wrote in March 1933, describing Iowa’s legislature as barreling 
ahead with a plan to help farmers despite the costs to the petro- 
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leum industry and drivers. Reflecting the petroleum industry’s 
national perspective, the Oil and Gas Journal argued that a state-
by-state approach to power alcohol would not be helpful. Man-
dating alcohol fuels might make sense in Iowa, but it could un-
leash a wave of beggar-thy-neighbor state legislation. “The ques-
tion then resolves itself into whether each . . . state is to set itself 
apart from the rest of the country and try to live more and more 
within itself. . . . If practiced to place certain states at a disad-
vantage, it is possible retaliatory measures will be taken by those 
states. Maybe Oklahoma will require that every pound of hog 
lard contain 10 per cent hydrogenated cotton seed oil, or Nevada 
might say that every package of corn flakes must contain 10 per 
cent toasted cactus flakes.” Overall, the Oil and Gas Journal argued, 
Iowa’s power alcohol bill “will mean investing additional capital 
to produce an inferior motor fuel from a raw material, the price 
of which is too high even now to compete with petroleum.”48 
 Some local newspapers were sympathetic to the petroleum 
industry’s critiques of power alcohol. The Oelwein Daily Register, 
for instance, wrote, “There is no reason why the auto drivers 
should be penalized for a surplus of corn in the state.”49 Or, as 
the manager of the Iowa Motor Club summed up its opposition, 
“It is a plan to tax motorists one or two additional cents a gallon 
and give this tax to the farmers.”50 
 As Iowans learned about the bill and its potential effects, it 
was clear that it pitted the economic interests of farmers against 
those of gasoline consumers. Thus, when the bill was first de-
bated in Iowa’s General Assembly on February 21, 1933, each 
side of the power alcohol debate made an impassioned case for 
or against the bill. Opponents argued that alcohol from grain was 
expensive to produce and would lead to a rash of engine prob-
lems, such as clogged carburetors and fuel lines. Supporters 
presented evidence from Iowa State College tests showing that 
cars running the gasoline-alcohol blend got better mileage and 
performance. They also emphasized how the fuel would help to 
                                                 
48. W. T. Ziegenhain, “Program of Substituting Alcohol for Gasoline as Motor 
Fuel Appears to Be Short-Sighted,” Oil and Gas Journal, 3/2/1933, 10, 37. 
49. “Opposing Mixing Alcohol and Gasoline,” Oelwein Daily Register, 2/23/1933. 
50. “Rhoades States Alcohol, Gasoline Mixture False Economy for Agriculture,” 
Mason City Globe-Gazette, 2/21/1933. 
Power Alcohol Movement      59 
alleviate the enormous corn surplus that held down commodity 
prices.51 
 Legislative debate focused on technical questions such as the 
fuel’s performance in automobile engines and potential effects 
on the corn surplus. For instance, the bill’s opponents noted that, 
because even a nationwide plan to blend 2 percent alcohol into 
the gasoline supply was expected to raise the price of gasoline by 
approximately ½ cent, it would be simpler to add a small gasoline 
tax and use the money to purchase corn and then destroy it.52  
 Some observers felt that the General Assembly’s technical de-
bate had drained the life out of an idea that initially resonated with 
a simple agrarian message. The Algona Upper Des Moines newspa-
per wrote, “It seems that somebody or something is always taking 
the joy out of life when what Iowa needs worse than anything else 
is higher prices for hogs and corn.” The Bode Bugle also described 
the bill’s appeal in simple language: “The farmers want these 
measures passed. The business people of Iowa favor the idea. It 
is the one way in which Iowa can do something for herself.”53 
 Because of the “heated debate,” the House of Representatives 
did not move on the alcohol fuel bill in the first session; it was 
pushed back to the second session.54 During the recess from Feb-
ruary 24 to March 6, opponents of the power alcohol bill mar-
shaled their forces and launched a publicity drive urging Iowa leg-
islators to vote no. Rhetoric from the bill’s supporters also sharp-
ened over the recess. One farm woman wrote to the Des Moines 
Register to express her belief that it was time for Iowans to look out 
for their own economic interests. She described the debate as a 
fight between regional interests, pitting Iowa and the Farm Belt 
against “the eastern states where the big factories are located” and 
“the southern states where these big oil men live in luxury.”55 
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Clearly, power alcohol struck an old, agrarian chord among Io-
wans who saw the debate as one pitting the righteous farmers of 
the Midwest against the parasitic oil men of the East and South. 
 As word of Iowa’s power alcohol debate spread, however, it 
became clear that not all farmers supported it. That was espe-
cially true when farmers outside Iowa weighed in on the issue. 
The president of the National Farmers Union, a farmer from Ok-
lahoma, pointed out that many farmers in oil-producing states 
received royalties for oil wells on their land and opposed any-
thing that would lessen the value of that oil. For such farmers, 
the union’s president argued, “crude oil . . . is a farm crop just as 
much as cotton or wheat.”56 
 When the General Assembly returned from its spring recess 
on March 6, the power alcohol bill was the first item on the 
House’s calendar.57 When the bill came up for a vote on March 8, 
it was defeated by a vote of 48–57. The deciding arguments 
against the bill were that it was too vague about where grain al-
cohol would be produced and blended, whether it would come 
from Iowa crops, and whether such a law would constitute an 
unfair tax on Iowans. Other legislators favored the idea but be-
lieved it would work only if implemented on a nationwide basis 
and therefore voted against the Iowa bill.58 Although power 
alcohol had many vocal supporters in Iowa, they were unable to 
alleviate concerns about the effect of requiring a significant 
change in the state’s fuel supply. 
 Many supporters blamed the shadowy machinations of the 
oil industry for the bill’s failure. According to the Rock Valley Bee, 
“The big oil industries got into the game and worked against the 
measure to the end that it was defeated.”59 There was some truth 
to the accusation that the oil industry had worked to defeat the 
Iowa bill and similar ones developed in other states. The American 
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Petroleum Institute coordinated opposition to the bill by or-
ganizing the oil and gas industry as well as other groups repre-
senting motorists, such as state auto clubs, to forge a powerful 
counterpunch to the proposed alcohol fuel mandates.60 
 Opposition to the power alcohol proposals included creative 
marketing schemes funded by the API. Gas station attendants 
received mimeographed paperwork to share with drivers dis-
cussing the perils of alcohol fuel. Filling stations also received 
small sample kits with gasoline and alcohol meant to show how 
the two liquids would separate with the presence of water.61 
 Gasoline consumers—a group that by the mid-1930s included 
most Iowans—were torn. Given concerns about higher gasoline 
prices and technical problems associated with alcohol fuels, many 
motorists likely needed little encouragement from the API to 
oppose power alcohol. Yet Americans were also deeply suspicious 
of the oil industry in the wake of the 1920s Teapot Dome scandal 
and earlier revelations about Standard Oil’s monopoly practices.62 
 Behind the scenes, the API and individual oil companies de-
bated how to respond to the power alcohol mandate. There was 
consensus that the large oil companies would not tolerate pro-
posals such as Iowa’s that required a 10 percent blend of alcohol 
into the gasoline supply, but many companies were open to pro-
posals to blend 1 or 2 percent alcohol if it would alleviate political 
pressure. Although the prospect of losing a percentage of the 
national gasoline supply was hardly welcomed, oil companies 
were well aware that rural gasoline consumption had dropped 
precipitously during the depression. The loss of sales to alcohol 
blends might be made up in increased purchasing power among 
farmers and rural motorists. Standard Oil of New Jersey, for in-
stance, simultaneously lobbied against any national alcohol fuel 
laws and explored how it could profit if the law was passed.63 
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FOLLOWING the power alcohol bill’s failure in early March, 
Iowans who supported a mandate for power alcohol turned their 
attention to Washington, D.C. They hoped a nationwide bill sim-
ilar to the one rejected in Iowa would solve the farm problem. In 
part, supporters realized that Iowa alone was too small of a gas-
oline market to make a dent in the nation’s agricultural glut. A 
report by Iowa State College economists in late March confirmed 
that the state’s plan for mandating alcohol fuel would have had 
no significant effect on the price of corn. Only a nationwide pro-
gram would consume enough surplus to significantly raise the 
price of corn.64 
 Confirming that Iowa politicians hoped to shift the power 
alcohol issue to the federal government, on March 22 the Iowa 
General Assembly passed a resolution encouraging the federal 
government to “enact legislation tending to promote and de-
velop the production of grain or ethyl alcohol to be used as a 
blend with petroleum products as a motor fuel.” The General As-
sembly also asked Congress to add an import duty on blackstrap 
molasses—the primary feedstock for industrial alcohol produc-
tion—to make it equal to the price of corn.65 Newspapers echoed 
the General Assembly’s support for a nationwide alcohol fuel 
plan. According to one editorial, “It might be hard for one state 
alone to make a success of the venture, but if the mixture could 
be used nationally, there is no question but that it would use up 
the surplus of farm products.”66 
 It was not surprising that Iowa politicians turned to the fed-
eral government to solve the power alcohol debate. During the 
spring of 1933, the eyes of Iowans—and most Americans—were 
transfixed on Washington, where the Roosevelt administration 
was preparing to take power. Roosevelt had promised swift, de-
cisive action upon taking the oath of office, and many Iowans that 
spring pondered whether a nationwide alcohol fuel bill might be 
in the cards of the New Deal. 
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 Other states had followed Iowa’s lead in pushing for alcohol 
fuel bills in early 1933.67 On Iowa’s eastern border, a chemist 
from El Paso, Illinois, named Paul Beshers began promoting a na-
tionwide plan to require alcohol be mixed into the nation’s gaso-
line supply. He modestly called it the Beshers Plan.68 It electrified 
farmers in central Illinois and quickly drew condemnation from 
the eastern business press. Business Week mocked Beshers as the 
“current patron saint of this old scheme in modern dress.” Yet 
Beshers’s ambitious plan differed from the one proposed just 
weeks earlier in Iowa by calling for nationwide legislation rather 
than a state law. Beshers and his supporters immediately cap-
tured the attention of Illinois representatives and senators who 
brought forth bills in Congress.69 Yet state officials in Illinois 
nonetheless looked to Iowa to take the lead on alcohol fuel legis-
lation. In a letter, the director of Illinois’s Department of Agricul-
ture wrote, “After we see what Iowa does, we will be in a better 
position to work out a plan for Illinois.”70 
 Other streams of support for alcohol fuel rose up across the 
Midwest, but the key figure channeling their flow into Washing-
ton was an Iowan: Henry A. Wallace. Likely the state’s best-
known farmer and editor, Wallace had Roosevelt’s ear on agri-
cultural matters even before his appointment in late February as 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, the position his father had held un-
der Presidents Harding and Coolidge. Wallace had learned of the 
power alcohol experiments at Iowa State College months earlier, 
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and he encouraged President Roosevelt to give the idea serious 
consideration as part of his emerging agricultural agenda.71 As 
legislation wound its way through congressional committees, 
Wallace carefully studied alcohol fuel as a potential solution for 
the farm crisis. Wallace even tried using ten gallons of the fuel in 
his official federal vehicle.72 
 National debate over the alcohol fuel legislation came to a 
head in May. Various bills had been introduced in Congress’s 
first session, but none had made it out of committee. In May Wal-
lace went before the Senate Finance Committee to support a bill 
that appeared more promising. It would increase the federal gas-
oline tax by one cent per gallon through 1934. The tax would be 
raised to three cents per gallon after that. If gasoline was mixed 
with alcohol—in a percentage rising from 1 to 5 percent after 
1934—it could avoid the federal gasoline tax altogether.73 
 As it had in Iowa, the API strongly criticized the bill, even 
though it required half as much alcohol as Iowa’s proposed bill. 
An API spokesman suggested that it would be cheaper and more 
efficient for every driver to buy five bushels of corn and burn 
them. The API charged, “The blend legislation . . . was placed on 
the congressional doorstep after failing of enactment in the legis-
latures of Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota.” Iowa representa-
tive Otha Wearin countered that Iowa’s General Assembly had 
petitioned Congress to support a nationwide law even though it 
had rejected it at the state level.74 The Senate Finance Committee 
tabled the bill two days later, arguing that it raised questions 
about whether such a bill could combine new taxes with an alco-
hol fuel mandate.75 
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 Alcohol fuel’s supporters were heartened by a U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) report in mid-May showing that 
power alcohol was technically feasible and would benefit Amer-
ica’s farmers.76 Iowa’s congressional delegation met with Wal-
lace on May 17 to again argue for the importance of a power 
alcohol bill in Congress. Secretary Wallace remained supportive 
but noncommittal.77 
 The May debate in Washington, D.C., proved to be the high-
water mark for alcohol fuel legislation in the 1930s. While Wal-
lace was reassuring Iowa’s congressional delegation that he still 
supported a power alcohol bill, the New Deal’s agricultural pro-
gram was gathering speed and moving in a very different direc-
tion. Laws mandating alcohol fuel blends were predicated on the 
principle of expanding markets for corn as a means of farm relief. 
Wallace and President Roosevelt had concluded, on the other 
hand, that cutting supplies was a more realistic and immediate 
answer to the farm crisis. To that end, the landmark Agricultural 
Adjustment Act was passed on May 12, 1933. Working through 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), the USDA 
worked with farmers to reduce the output of major agricultural 
crops, including corn. Although Wallace and the AAA focused 
immediately on cotton since it was the primary product of the 
beleaguered South, by the summer of 1933 the AAA’s attention 
was turning to corn farmers.78 
 When Wallace returned to Des Moines in June, he outlined the 
New Deal’s farm relief efforts thus far. While most of Wallace’s 
focus was on cutting production to raise prices, he indicated that 
he was still considering the power alcohol plan. “We must either 
cut down production or find new markets at home or abroad. 
I think the use of alcohol made from corn in a motor fuel blend 
might offer one outlet for some of our surplus grain so that we 
could produce a normal corn crop again without upsetting the 
balance and causing low prices,” Wallace told an Iowa audience.79 
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Yet the government’s emphasis had shifted to prioritize cutting 
production over mandating new markets. Just as work horses and 
mules had been replaced by petroleum-powered tractors, national 
alcohol fuel legislation was soon left behind by the AAA’s sweep-
ing program to reduce farm output. 
 
WHILE CONGRESS was considering a nationwide alcohol fuel 
bill, debate over power alcohol continued in Iowa even after the 
General Assembly voted down the bill in early March. Only a 
few days after the alcohol fuel bill was defeated in Des Moines, 
the Spencer Chamber of Commerce sponsored an event to sell 500 
gallons of alcohol-blend gasoline in the hope of convincing drivers 
that stories about technical problems with the fuel were untrue.80 
Faculty from Iowa State College and local chambers of commerce 
came together in April to stage a demonstration of the fuel for 
the General Assembly in Des Moines, as well as local demonstra-
tions in Storm Lake, Fort Dodge, and Garner. Another plan sur-
faced to encourage use of alcohol-blend fuels in all state-owned 
vehicles and, ultimately, to reintroduce the failed mandate bill 
in a later legislative session.81 Power alcohol’s backers in Iowa 
clearly had not given up hope that their fuel would be supported 
by consumers and legislation. 
 The largest of the demonstrations came in May, when filling 
stations in Ames sponsored a three-day sale of 22,000 gallons of 
alcohol-blend fuel. The sale was heavily advertised in local news-
papers, and the participating filling stations reported high de-
mand. Drivers who filled their tanks during the sale also reported 
satisfactory results from the new fuel. It was later revealed, how-
ever, that much of the so-called corn alcohol produced for these 
demonstrations was not made from Iowa corn but was distilled 
instead from blackstrap molasses brought in from Cuba and Lou-
isiana. The few midwestern distilleries capable of producing 
anhydrous alcohol were unwilling to invest in new equipment 
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without a law ensuring a steady market for the product, so sup-
plies had to be imported from elsewhere. Legislators, stung by 
the molasses debacle, soon introduced a bill levying a tax of 25 
cents per gallon on alcohol produced from blackstrap molasses.82  
 Legislators tried for another alcohol fuel bill in mid-April. 
That bill would have taxed regular gasoline at five cents per gal-
lon and alcohol-gasoline blends at three cents per gallon, putting 
the two fuels at parity for consumers. The bill was blocked in a 
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parliamentary move on the grounds that it was too similar to the 
failed bill from March.83 
 During the warm summer of 1933, arguments went back and 
forth over alcohol fuel’s performance in automobiles. Iowa State 
researchers found that the fuel performed well in real-world tests, 
leading to minor improvements in acceleration and fuel economy. 
But a major test sponsored by the American Automobile Associ-
ation found that alcohol-blend fuels decreased mileage. Sup-
porters of alcohol fuel charged that the American Automobile 
Association test was faulty, citing faulty equipment and the hot, 
humid conditions of the Virginia test. Congress even considered 
getting into the testing business that summer, with Illinois con-
gressman Everett Dirksen proposing a long-distance road test of 
the fuel in cars driving from Washington, D.C., to the Midwest 
and back. The long-distance road test was delayed several times 
before it was ultimately canceled.84 
 Alcohol fuel supporters in Iowa launched an increasingly bit-
ter critique of the “oil interests” based outside the region. The 
Humboldt Independent wrote, “Propaganda from the east is now 
flooding the mails against the alcohol-gasoline fuel for motor ve-
hicles. It is a determined effort on the part of the large refineries 
to stop the western move for the ‘alky-gas’ mixture.”85 
 Whether alcohol fuel supporters knew it or not, the political 
campaign to mandate the fuel in Iowa and nationwide had al-
ready passed its zenith. By the fall of 1933, the Roosevelt admin-
istration had abandoned its support for power alcohol and in-
stead favored immediate crop reductions for farm relief. That fall 
the AAA launched its hog reduction program by purchasing and 
then destroying six million hogs. Since hogs were major consum-
ers of corn, slaughtering so many hogs exacerbated the corn glut. 
So the AAA began a program to immediately reduce the corn crop 
as well by contracting with farmers to cut production.86 
                                                 
83. “Alcohol and Gasoline Motor Fuel Bill Is Reported to House,” Mason City 
Globe-Gazette, 4/15/1933; “New Delegation Boosts Corn Alcohol,” Humboldt 
Independent, 4/18/1933. 
84. “Hard to Convince,” Terril Record, 7/6/1933; “Alcohol-Gasoline Fuel Test 
Delayed,” Des Moines Register, 9/14/1933. 
85. Editorial, Humboldt Independent, 8/1/1933. 
86. Hurt, Problems of Plenty, 76–77. On the politics and policies of the AAA in 
1933, especially the corn-hog program, see Van L. Perkins, “The AAA and the 
Power Alcohol Movement      69 
 The AAA remained supportive of power alcohol but now re-
ported that “there are practical obstacles to immediate utilization 
of . . . corn in making alcohol for motor fuel. Federal legislation 
to this end has been asked, but it may be at least two years before 
the present domestic manufacturing capacity can be expanded 
sufficiently to handle more than 100 million bushels of corn a 
year.”87 Developing an alcohol fuel industry to soak up excess 
supply thus moved to the background.  
 At about the same time, distilleries began ramping up pro-
duction to meet the demand created by the repeal of Prohibition. 
Repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, one newspaper noted, 
“has assured Iowa of a new market for 50,000,000 to 60,000,000 
bushels of corn.” The National Recovery Administration distillers 
code drafted by Secretary Wallace required whisky to be made 
from corn, which was viewed as Wallace’s effort to protect Iowa’s 
agricultural interests.88 
 With the AAA focused on cutting back corn production and 
the opening of a lucrative new market thanks to the repeal of Pro-
hibition, alcohol fuel’s political momentum quickly fizzled out. 
When the Iowa General Assembly held a special session from 
November 1933 to March 1934, it took no action on power alco-
hol. The news was the same from Washington, D.C. When Iowa 
representative Guy Gillette wrote to his constituents about news 
from the capital in 1934, he noted, “The corn-alcohol fuel blend, 
which still has many warm supporters, does not seem to have 
gained any ground and many of its former supporters have be-
come lukewarm.”89 National efforts for power alcohol legislation 
foundered in 1934. In October, leaders of the power alcohol 
movement announced that they would not seek a bill in the up-
coming congressional session because of a smaller than expected 
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corn crop that fall and staunch opposition from powerful groups 
like the American Automobile Association.90 By early 1935, 
Secretary Wallace was actively downplaying power alcohol as a 
farm relief measure. “We contemplate no action further than that 
we have taken in the last two years,” Wallace said. Alcohol fuel 
was still held out as a long-term possibility but it was no longer 
considered a tool for immediate farm relief since the AAA’s crop 
reductions had already alleviated the worst problems facing corn 
farmers.91 
 
EVEN AS the political push for power alcohol faded in Des 
Moines and Washington, another Iowan took up the cause and 
moved forward with a plan to produce alcohol-blend fuels in the 
Midwest. Leo Christensen was one of the young chemical engi-
neering faculty at Iowa State College who had worked on the 
initial alcohol fuel experiments in 1932. He soon emerged as one 
of Iowa’s leading promoters of power alcohol. One newspaper 
noted how his “honest Danish features glow as he tells the pos-
sibilities of the alky blend.”92 
 In the summer of 1933 Christensen was among the scientists 
who observed the American Automobile Association tests that 
showed lower fuel economy with gasoline-alcohol blends, di-
rectly contradicting his own previous experiments. Christensen 
criticized the tests, arguing that the results were invalid because 
the test was conducted on an especially hot day with highly vol-
atile gasoline. The real-world tests conducted in Ames, he ar-
gued, were a much more accurate demonstration of the fuel’s 
performance.93 
 Traveling to Washington, D.C., Christensen became one of 
the chief supporters of a nationwide alcohol fuel bill. He later 
worked with the USDA to collect accurate statistics about power 
alcohol. He presented his findings to the Senate but could not 
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convince a Senate subcommittee to bring a national power al-
cohol bill forward for a vote. Christensen was “somewhat dis-
appointed” but vowed to continue lobbying for national power 
alcohol.94 
 Frustrated by the lack of political action on power alcohol, 
Christensen and two fellow Iowa State scientists, Ralph Hixon 
and Ellis Fulmer, wrote a book manuscript explaining the tech-
nical and economic benefits of alcohol fuels. They had difficulty 
finding a publisher for the treatise. Eventually they took it to 
William Hale at Dow Chemical, who arranged for it to be pub-
lished by the Chemical Foundation, the entity created during 
World War I to hold the patents for chemicals taken from Ger-
man firms.95 The book, titled Power Alcohol and Farm Relief, was 
published in 1934. 
 In the book, Christensen and his coauthors revealed the pri-
mary motivations driving power alcohol’s supporters in the 1930s. 
First, they were propelled by nationalism. Worried that relying 
on imported agricultural products weakened the United States 
in times of war and hurt the American farmer, they made replac-
ing imported products with alternatives derived from American 
farms central to their research agenda. They also worried that the 
long agricultural depression of the 1920s and early 1930s was 
causing American farmers to sink into European-style peasantry, 
fatally undermining democracy. Second, Christensen and his co- 
authors advocated an early version of resource nationalism and 
energy independence, contrasting fossil fuels such as coal and 
petroleum, which were a “national reserve” that was depleted, 
with the “national income of energy” from photosynthesis. They 
wrote, “Agriculture stores up energy each year from the rays of 
the sun; in contrast, all energy secured from coal and petroleum 
represents a destruction of natural resources which can never be 
replaced. It is sound national economic policy to utilize this an-
nual income of energy and to conserve the reserve supplies of 
coal and petroleum.”96 Like other alcohol fuel proponents in the 
1930s, Christensen proceeded from the assumption that American 
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supplies of petroleum were an exhaustible resource that would 
run out in the near future, although he stopped short of predict-
ing when, exactly, oil supplies would run dry.97 
 Most of Christensen’s book concerned technical analysis of al-
cohol fuel’s performance in engines and its economic challenges. 
Christensen argued that the engineering changes that would be 
required in engines to use pure alcohol as fuel made that option 
unfeasible at the time. He advocated blends containing 10–20 
percent alcohol as an acceptable compromise.98 
 Christensen’s political recommendations were relatively 
conservative, although he did insist that government action was 
needed to spur the alcohol-fuel industry. He opposed laws man-
dating specific amounts of alcohol in the gasoline supply. In-
stead, he recommended altering the federal gasoline tax to make 
alcohol blends competitively priced with straight gasoline and 
then letting consumers decide. Yet the need for farm relief com-
pelled immediate action, in his opinion. He suggested that alco-
hol fuels receive a government subsidy to begin but that such aid 
should be “eliminated at some future date.”99 These political rec-
ommendations never took hold in Des Moines or Washington. 
 In the absence of political action, Christensen joined William 
Hale of Dow Chemical and Francis Garvin of the Chemical Foun-
dation as leading advocates of a nationwide movement to use 
agricultural products, including alcohol fuels, as the basis for a 
chemical industry. Known as the farm chemurgy movement, this 
little-remembered fusion of chemical engineering and agricultural 
sciences was prominent in the 1930s. The chemurgists embraced 
a “vision of a worldwide, agrichemical revolution from which 
alcohol would emerge as a renewable, alternative fuel.” Farm 
chemurgy attracted attention from wealthy industrialists such as 
Henry Ford, who hosted several conferences on the topic.100 
 Although efforts to mandate alcohol fuels via legislation 
foundered after 1934, Christensen continued his quest to create 
an alcohol fuel industry by partnering with the Chemical Foun- 
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dation in a business venture. Christensen resigned his position at 
Iowa State in 1936 to move to Atchison, Kansas, where the Chem-
ical Foundation was building a distillery to produce alcohol for 
fuel. Christensen personally oversaw construction of the distillery, 
worked to perfect the distilling process there, and even coordi-
nated a marketing campaign for the fuel, which was marketed 
throughout the Midwest as Agrol. The Agrol venture had some 
success in the late 1930s. At its zenith, Agrol was offered at two 
thousand filling stations across the Midwest.101 
 When the Agrol blend arrived in Iowa filling stations in 
1937–1938, there was considerable debate in the press over the 
fuel’s benefits and drawbacks. A March 1938 advertisement for 
the fuel urged Iowans to use it to support the farm economy: 
“[Whether or not] you will buy and use an alcohol blend of gas-
oline is not for us to attempt to dictate but you must admit it is 
a step in the right direction. After all, in this vicinity we are all 
farmers, and anything that benefits the farmer benefits all of us.” 
Although the Agrol plant was located in Kansas, Christensen re-
minded Iowans that they still benefited from it. During the first 
half of 1938, the plant purchased approximately 125,000 bushels 
of corn from Iowa farmers and shipped 100,000 gallons of the fuel 
to Iowa in May 1938 alone.102 
 By early 1938, plans were in the works for a second Agrol 
distillery to be located in Sioux City, Iowa, even though the orig-
inal Atchison distillery was struggling to turn a profit. Local 
boosters encouraged Agrol to expand into Iowa. The Sioux Center 
News described “considerable demand around here for an alco-
hol blend fuel.” The Sioux City Chamber of Commerce led efforts 
to bring an Agrol distillery to the city. In a radio address, a 
speaker from the chamber told Sioux City residents that the fate 
of alcohol fuels rested on their willingness to purchase the fuel 
once it became available. “Mr. Fleet Owner, Mr. Car Owner, Mrs. 
Car Owner, will you do your part in this great movement? Have 
you the interest of America and your own welfare enough at 
heart so that you will make a real effort to help this movement 
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succeed? Have you the courage to drive from a filling station un-
serviced when told that Agrol is not on sale?” Yet plans for the 
Sioux City plant fell apart in the summer and fall of 1938 as the 
larger Agrol venture failed. Leo Christensen, who had worked 
tirelessly for alcohol fuels, both in Iowa and Kansas, returned to 
his family farm in Nebraska.103 
 
POWER ALCOHOL sputtered out in the late 1930s, a victim of 
cheap oil, coordinated attacks from the oil industry, and farm 
policies that emphasized reducing supply rather than expanding 
markets for agricultural products. Yet the end of power alcohol 
hardly marked the final debate over ethanol in Iowa. 
 Just a few years after the Agrol experiment failed, Iowa was 
again at the center of national controversy over alcohol derived 
from corn. In that case, the issue was not liquid transportation 
fuels but synthetic rubber. Immediately after the United States 
entered World War II, the nation grappled with a crippling short-
age of rubber because most natural supplies were under Japa-
nese control. Although a U.S. crash program to create synthetic 
rubber was successful, debate broke out over whether the feed-
stock for synthetic rubber should come from petroleum, which 
the oil industry preferred, or alcohol derived from agricultural 
products. Iowa Senator Guy Gillette demanded that the nation 
use corn alcohol as a synthetic rubber feedstock, opening a con-
troversial investigation in Congress. The debate pitted “farm 
rubber” against “monopoly rubber” or “Standard Oil rubber.” 
As in the 1930s power alcohol movement, though, petroleum-
based synthetic rubber proved cheaper and more immediately 
available than alternatives created from farm products.104 
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 After a hiatus during the postwar decades, Iowa’s ethanol 
debate roared back to life in the 1970s in response to concerns 
about pollution from automobiles and, most importantly, the en-
ergy crises of the decade. When the nation launched an ambi-
tious effort to cut back on smog and air pollution in the 1970s, 
Farm Belt politicians recalled the earlier power alcohol debate and 
suggested alcohol fuels as clean-burning alternatives to leaded 
gasoline. In the wake of the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1978–
1979 energy crisis, Iowans urged the nation to adopt ethanol-
gasoline mixtures—called gasohol in that era—as a gasoline 
supply extender and a tool for achieving energy independence. 
In the early twenty-first century, Iowa’s ethanol industry was 
boosted by the Renewable Fuel Standard (passed in 2005 and up-
dated in 2007), national legislation mandating that ethanol be 
blended into the nation’s gasoline supply. 
 What lessons can be drawn from Iowa’s original ethanol de-
bate? Iowa’s early consideration of alcohol fuels established sev-
eral important precedents that would shape the state’s—and the 
nation’s—alcohol fuels policies for the rest of the century. First, 
the 1930s power alcohol debate revealed that the high cost of 
alcohol fuels forced them into an uphill battle in their contest for 
market share with gasoline. Producing alcohol for fuel simply 
made it more expensive than gasoline in the 1930s.105 Thus, all the 
arguments in favor of alcohol fuels faced the difficult challenge 
of explaining why consumers should pay more for the new fuel. 
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During the 1930s, a few drivers in the Midwest were willing to 
do so, but it proved impossible to convince most consumers that 
it was worth paying more at the pump to support farmers. In later 
decades, namely during the 1970s oil shocks and the early 2000s, 
ethanol claimed a broader share of the fuel market at moments 
when high oil prices made alcohol fuels competitive with gasoline. 
In contrast, oil was abundant and cheap throughout the 1930s, 
and alcohol fuels never could compete with gasoline on price 
without changing the tax code. 
 Second, and closely related, the 1930s power alcohol debate 
pitted farmers’ interests against the concerns of petroleum pro-
ducers and consumers. There was little doubt that a law mandat-
ing use of alcohol fuel would provide a valuable new market for 
farm crops and perhaps raise commodity prices. But those price 
increases would be passed on to drivers in the form of higher-
priced fuel. That dynamic has persisted in ethanol debates as 
the number of drivers dwarfs the number of farmers, even in the 
1930s and more so today. Yet within the state of Iowa there was 
something closer to a balance between those interests, which 
accounts for the state’s long advocacy on behalf of alcohol fuels. 
Asking drivers to pay a bit more at the pump to help farmers 
resonated in Iowa more than elsewhere in the country. Many 
Iowans in the 1930s either lived on farms or could reach back a 
generation or two to recall their own rural roots. 
 Although the 1930s power alcohol debate established prece-
dents that have lasted for decades in the nation’s ethanol policies, 
there were important differences between the situation in the 
1930s and later debates such as the gasohol policies pursued in 
the wake of the 1970s energy crises and post-1990 ethanol policy. 
The generation of farmers and drivers who debated alcohol fuels 
in the early 1930s remembered the transition from animal to 
engine power. They were keenly aware of what had been gained 
from their new tractors and automobiles, but they also likely had 
nostalgic memories of beloved work horses. Arguments for 
power alcohol in that era were therefore tinged with agrarianism, 
in this case the demand that distant oil companies owed some-
thing to the farmers and their products for all they had displaced. 
 Additionally, debates over alternatives to oil and gas as mo-
tor fuels before the 1970s were not focused on national energy 
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independence or security, which became central to U.S. energy 
policies after the 1970s energy crises. Some of power alcohol’s 
most vocal proponents, such as Leo Christensen, certainly an-
ticipated these arguments by fretting that the nation would be 
dependent on foreign supplies in a time of war. But most Amer-
icans had little worry over energy independence in the 1930s 
when the United States was awash in cheap oil from domestic 
wells. Instead, arguments over alcohol fuels in that era were re-
gional and emphasized interstate competition. Rhetoric in favor 
of power alcohol imagined a noble heartland of struggling farm-
ers pitted against a corrupt but powerful eastern and southern 
elite of oil and gas barons. Not surprisingly, Iowa’s power alco-
hol supporters drew on a deep well of antimonopoly rhetoric in 
American culture that increasingly focused on so-called big oil 
by the middle of the twentieth century. 
 Finally, the 1930s power alcohol debate differed fundamen-
tally from later biofuels arguments in that the environmental 
benefits and costs of producing transportation fuel from farm 
crops were not central to the discussion. Beginning in the 1970s 
and continuing into the twenty-first century, arguments for and 
against ethanol have hinged on the fuel’s environmental trade-
offs. That was not the case during the 1930s. In part, the lack of 
environmental focus during the 1930s reflected that era’s think-
ing about the natural world. Modern environmentalism and con- 
cerns about environmental harm from gasoline-powered auto-
mobiles did not become widespread until the postwar era.106 
To be sure, some power alcohol proponents anticipated later en-
vironmental critiques of the oil and gas regime. Leo Christensen 
described oil as a finite natural reserve in contrast to alcohol fuels, 
which he framed as a renewable national income. Other farm 
chemurgists went further in anticipating environmental argu-
ments. For instance, William Hale argued that gasoline-powered 
automobiles were already leading to smog and carbon monoxide 
problems in major cities such as London and New York.107 Yet 
that issue never became a focus of the 1930s power alcohol debate, 
                                                 
106. Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the 
United States, 1955–1985 (New York, 1987); Wells, Car Country. 
107. William J. Hale, The Farm Chemurgic: Farmward the Star of Destiny Lights Our 
Way (Boston, 1934), 149–51. 
78      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
although it was perhaps a missed opportunity for power alcohol 
proponents because one of their strongest arguments was that 
alcohol could replace tetraethyl lead as an octane booster, known 
even then to be poisonous. 
 Iowa’s first serious debate about the merits of using alcohol 
derived from corn as transportation fuel occurred in the 1930s. In 
the short term, the power alcohol movement of the 1930s was a 
failure. Bills mandating that 10 percent of the state’s motor fuel 
supply come from alcohol failed in the General Assembly, and 
the Agrol experiment was bankrupt by the end of the decade. But 
the state’s debate over alcohol as a motor fuel was just beginning. 
Well into the next century, Iowans are still debating the intersec-
tion of corn and politics. 
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Lincoln in Indiana, by Brian R. Dirck. Concise Lincoln Library. Carbon-
dale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2017. ix, 132 pp. Illustrations, 
notes, bibliography, index. $24.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Bruce Bigelow is professor of geography at Butler University. His 
publications focus on Indiana during the Civil War, especially politics, and 
also on the Midwest as a culture region. 
The purpose of the Concise Lincoln Library series is to present lucid 
narratives for general readers about Lincoln based on recent research. 
Brian Dirck does a superb job in this regard, recounting Lincoln’s up-
bringing in southern Indiana near the Ohio River from 1816, when he 
was seven, to 1830, when he became an adult legally. In the first book 
dealing exclusively with Lincoln’s formative era written by a profes-
sional historian, Dirck describes the geographical, social, and political 
context of Lincoln’s upbringing. His main source is the Herndon-Weik 
collection of interviews compiled in 1865 and 1866. 
 In chapter one, “Beginnings,” Dirck follows the Lincoln family—
father Thomas, mother Nancy Hanks, older sister Sarah, Abraham, and 
cousin Dennis Hanks—as they crossed the Ohio River from Kentucky 
to Indiana in 1816, the year that the “wild region” of dense forests, dan-
gerous wildlife, and Native Americans became a state. The Lincolns 
moved because the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 made the land north 
of the river free soil that had been surveyed by a grid system that made 
the sale of land orderly and unambiguous. 
 In chapter two, “Roots,” the author traces the ancestry of the Lin-
coln and Hanks families from Virginia to Kentucky. A major event in 
the Lincoln family was the murder of Abraham’s grandfather by a Na-
tive American in 1786; in the Hanks family, there was the illegitimacy 
of mother Nancy and cousin Dennis. Dirck also discusses the demands 
of family farming on the frontier, including the removal of the forest, 
the construction of housing, and disease that took the life of Abraham’s 
mother and sister. 
 In chapter three, “Mothers,” Dirck focuses on the arrival of Lincoln’s 
widowed stepmother, Sarah Bush Johnston, from Kentucky along with 
three children to create a blended family. Dirck employs the concept of 
“Republican motherhood” to praise Abraham’s two mothers for intro-
ducing him to books and encouraging his education. However, Lincoln 
only had about one year of formal public education. 
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 In chapter four, “Father and Son,” Dirck emphasizes the tension 
between Abraham and Thomas. The father provided well materially for 
his large family by farming and carpentry, but there was always the 
threat of failure and the county poorhouse. Thomas did not drink or 
gamble and was a member of a Calvinist Baptist church. Even so, 
Thomas was perceived as a “piddler” and was only semiliterate. Abra-
ham, on the other hand, disliked manual labor, read constantly, did not 
participate in organized religion, and disliked having to turn over his 
wages to his father until he reached adulthood. 
 Chapter five, “Growing,” emphasizes the alienation of father and 
son. The son created partial separation from the father by working in 
small businesses in nearby Ohio River towns and even took a long jour-
ney to New Orleans with another teenaged boy during which Abraham 
became disgusted with slavery upon seeing slaves in chains. 
 In chapter six, “Leaving,” we see Abraham helping his family move 
to the central Illinois prairie in 1830 to farm richer soil. After the move, 
Lincoln quickly divorced himself from the family by moving to the 
Springfield region in order to ascend to the professional urban class. His 
example embodied the opportunity for success for ambitious white 
men in the urbanizing antebellum Midwest. The 1787 Ordinance made 
a great difference in Lincoln’s life and for many other midwesterners.  
 
 
Lincoln’s Greatest Case: The River, the Bridge, and the Making of America, by 
Brian McGinty. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., a division of 
W. W. Norton & Co., 2015. 260 pp. Illustrations, timeline, notes, bibliog-
raphy, index. $26.95 hardcover, $15.95 paperback. 
Reviewer Marvin Bergman has been the editor of the Annals of Iowa since 
1987. He edited the Iowa History Reader (1996 and 2008) and coedited The 
Biographical Dictionary of Iowa (2008). 
The legal case Hurd et al. v. The Railroad Bridge Company, better known 
as the Effie Afton case, is the subject of a paragraph or so in many histo-
ries of related topics, such as railroads, steamboats, Abraham Lincoln, 
and regional economic development in the Midwest. Here, in fewer 
than 200 pages of text, the case gets a detailed treatment and is thor-
oughly set in its context, with its ramifications also spelled out. 
 For context, readers are treated to accounts of such topics as steam-
boats and steamboating on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, the 
development of railroads and Lincoln’s advocacy of that development, 
the history of bridge building going back to Roman times and beyond, 
the history of Rock Island (which includes Dred Scott’s residence there 
as well as a brief account of the Black Hawk War, in which Lincoln 
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served as a militiaman), and Lincoln’s involvement in a few other cases 
relating to river traffic and in many both for and against railroads. (In 
one case, Lincoln successfully represented the Illinois Central but then 
sued the company when it refused to pay his $2,000 fee because that 
was “as much as Daniel Webster himself would have charged.” Lincoln 
sued for $5,000 instead—the shocking equivalent of about $130,000 in 
today’s dollars—and won.) This context is usually helpful and interest-
ing, although sometimes it seems excessive: Do we really need a biog-
raphy of the author for whom the Effie Afton was named? 
 The trial itself is the subject of just 4 of 14 chapters (56 of 192 pages). 
Technically, the case was a suit by the owners of the Effie Afton to re-
cover the damages they incurred when the steamboat and its contents 
were destroyed (along with a portion of the bridge) when it crashed into 
a pier of the Rock Island Bridge, the first railroad bridge over the Mis-
sissippi River, completed just a month earlier. In effect, though, it was 
a case that pitted steamboat interests against railroad interests or, to put 
it more simply, a case of St. Louis versus Chicago. Official transcripts of 
the trial were lost in the great Chicago Fire of 1871, but readers of this 
book might actually be grateful for that. McGinty relies on newspaper 
reports from the Chicago Press and especially the Missouri Republican, 
whose reporter recorded much of the trial in his own shorthand and 
passed it along to readers. McGinty complains that both reporters 
“were content from time to time to summarize points they considered 
marginally important and eliminate those they considered obvious, 
repetitious, or merely trivial” (119). Readers might occasionally wish 
that McGinty had used more of that kind of judgment. 
 A couple of concluding chapters quickly summarize Lincoln’s sub-
sequent career, emphasizing his support for a transcontinental railroad 
beginning in Omaha, and describe subsequent efforts to bridge the up-
per Mississippi River. 
 The title is somewhat disingenuous. Although the author high-
lights Lincoln’s role in the story at every opportunity, he also takes 
pains to show that Lincoln was not a lead attorney in the Effie Afton case, 
and it’s not clear how prominent his role actually was. This is a story 
primarily about the case, not about Abraham Lincoln. 
 It’s unlikely that historians of Lincoln, railroads, steamboats, or the 
economic development of the Midwest in the mid–nineteenth century 
will learn anything significant from the treatment of those topics here, 
and there’s no real thesis, except for the author’s advocacy of the im-
portance of the case for Lincoln and for sectional development (the result 
strengthened the ties linking Iowa and the Great Plains to Chicago at the 
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cost of St. Louis and New Orleans). Most of the context is based, appro-
priately enough, on secondary sources. Sometimes the choice of second-
ary source is questionable; for example, his account of the famous 1854 
Grand Excursion on the recently completed Chicago & Rock Island route 
from Chicago to Rock Island and then up the Mississippi by steamboat 
to St. Anthony Falls relies on a 1933 article in the Palimpsest by William 
J. Petersen rather than the more recent and more thorough book, Grand 
Excursion, by Steven J. Keillor (2004). If there’s nothing particularly new 
here for scholars, however, the narrative is clear and engaging enough 
for the book to appeal to any lay person who might be interested in the 
topics it covers. McGinty’s book complements the earlier privately pub-
lished book by Larry Riney, Hell Gate of the Mississippi: The Effie Afton 
Trial and Abraham Lincoln’s Role in It (2006) in illuminating an important 
legal case for the development of Iowa and the Midwest. 
 
 
Prairie Defender: The Murder Trials of Abraham Lincoln, by George R. Dekle 
Sr. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2017. xiv, 248 pp. 
Illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. $34.50 hardcover. 
Reviewer John A. Lupton is executive director of the Illinois Supreme Court 
Historic Preservation Commission. He was formerly an assistant editor on 
The Papers of Abraham Lincoln and has written extensively about Lincoln 
as a lawyer. 
Since the publication of the Law Practice of Abraham Lincoln: Complete 
Documentary Edition (LPAL) in 2000, new books on Lincoln’s pre-presi-
dential career have enlightened readers not only on his 25-year law 
practice but on midwestern antebellum society as well. In Prairie Defender, 
George Dekle Sr. relies on 30 years of experience as a criminal lawyer 
paired with the documentary record made available by LPAL to exam-
ine Lincoln’s criminal cases generally, and murder cases specifically.  
 Dekle argues against a long-standing misconception that Lincoln 
detested criminal practice and was not good at it (2). He focuses primarily 
on Lincoln’s 18 murder cases but mentions other criminal cases—most 
notably, a child-rape case in which Lincoln served as prosecutor. He 
devotes one chapter to Lincoln’s pardon practice and concludes the 
book with a summary assessment of Lincoln’s murder cases, decon-
structing several popular myths about his criminal caseload.  
 By examining famous (Almanac, Harrison, and Goings) and not-so-
famous (Patterson, Longnecker, and Bantzhouse) murder cases, Dekle 
provides, for the first time, a complete study of Lincoln’s murder cases, 
demonstrating that Lincoln was a competent and successful criminal 
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lawyer. The author thrives in his legal analysis. His chapter on the Go-
ings case, in particular, shines. The elderly defendant, Melissa Goings, 
charged with murdering her husband, failed to appear in court. After 
she asked for a drink, Lincoln allegedly suggested that she flee by tell-
ing her there was good water in Tennessee (138). Dekle discounts the 
story and convincingly argues that Lincoln most likely repeated a joke 
from fellow lawyer Usher Linder, who had used a similar story previ-
ously. It is well established that Lincoln frequently borrowed stories and 
inserted himself into them. 
 With murder cases constituting less than 0.5 percent of Lincoln’s total 
caseload, Dekle does not argue that these cases are representative. Lincoln 
was a general practice attorney who occasionally represented and pros-
ecuted alleged criminals. Murder cases are better known because of 
their intrinsic interest and extensive contemporary newspaper cover-
age. Lincoln’s entire criminal practice also was a small percentage of his 
total caseload (approximately 6 percent), which previous biographers 
have used as proof that Lincoln did not like criminal law. Dekle coun-
ters this notion effectively but could have strengthened his argument 
by noting that Lincoln’s criminal caseload generally mirrored the court 
docket as a whole.  
 Two interesting threads appear frequently in Dekle’s analysis. First, 
the social nature of the criminal courts is best exemplified by the un-
favorable treatment Tom Patterson received, despite a pretty clear case 
of self-defense, because he was a newer resident in the community who 
had killed a long-time resident (153). Dekle does not investigate as 
deeply, however, the socioeconomic reasons for leniency in murder/ 
manslaughter cases. Many juries were reluctant to convict if the accused 
had a family lest his wife and children become dependents of the com-
munity. Dekle alludes to this type of leniency with respect to John 
Hibbs, who had been found guilty of manslaughter, and Lincoln as-
sisted in obtaining a pardon for him (93). Second, Dekle implies that 
Lincoln did not work as hard on a case when he knew he would receive 
little or no compensation (53, 189–90). The implication is that Lincoln, 
who argued that lawyers should be paid for their services, was perhaps 
less effective when there was no compensation, contributing to the 
longstanding narrative of Lincoln’s lack of interest in criminal cases. 
 Despite minor interpretive issues of not delving into certain matters 
more deeply, this is an engaging and interesting book that effectively 
demonstrates that Lincoln was indeed a successful criminal lawyer. 
More importantly, it illustrates a clear evolution in Lincoln’s skill as an 
attorney in general.  
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Gathering to Save a Nation: Lincoln and the Union’s War Governors, by 
Stephen D. Engle. Civil War America Series. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2017. iii, 725 pp. Appendix, notes, bibliography, 
index.  $49.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Wallace Hettle is professor of history at the University of Northern 
Iowa. He is the author of Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Hero in History and 
Memory and The Peculiar Democracy: Southern Democrats in Peace and War. 
In this ambitious book, Stephen D. Engle traces the impact of Union 
Civil War governors on the course and outcome of the conflict. Without 
minimizing the impact of President Lincoln or Congress, Engel first 
shows how governors built regiments in 1861. Union governors rushed 
to provide troops after Lincoln called for the raising of militias in the 
wake of Confederate shots at Fort Sumter. 
 Because Republican governors ruled the majority of northern states, 
the group responded to Lincoln’s calls for help with alacrity. Prior to 
Bull Run, though, Iowa’s Samuel Kirkwood was hampered by geo-
graphical distance, a weak militia system, and the need to defend Iowans 
against potential Indian attacks. Kirkwood also worried that proslavery 
Missourians could prove a threat to Iowa’s southern tier of counties. 
  It is hard to generalize about the governors across the board. While 
Republicans had more strength, Democratic governors often were ob-
stacles for Lincoln. Governors’ priorities diverged because their states 
differed so much. Through their governors, slave states like Maryland 
and Missouri stood with Lincoln. However, strongly antislavery states 
like Massachusetts supported the war with far more enthusiasm. In 
Engle’s account, Massachusetts Governor Andrew Curtin emerges as a 
particularly formidable Union leader.  
 Engle ably demonstrates that most governors were ahead of Lincoln 
on emancipation. Further, many of them pressed him to escalate the war 
effort to include emancipation. This emerging view among governors 
became especially evident after an 1862 conference in Altoona, Pennsyl-
vania. The group proceeded to Washington to share their views of the 
war with Lincoln. Although some historians have argued that lobbying 
efforts by governors had little impact on the president, Engle effectively 
makes the case that governors solidified his move from a war for the 
Union to a war against slavery. 
  At the Altoona conference, Iowa’s Samuel Kirkwood recognized that 
the cautious General George McClellan had to be fired after his failure 
to follow through on the Union victory at the Battle of Antietam in 1862. 
In Washington with his fellow governors, Kirkwood had the backbone 
to confront Lincoln directly about McClellan. During the meeting, Lincoln 
pushed back, but shortly thereafter he adopted Kirkwood’s point of view. 
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 A thread running through the book is the creation of a strong na-
tional government, which the author calls a Union “leviathan.” The suc-
cess of the war effort required leadership in both economic and military 
spheres; governors were extraordinarily cooperative in recognizing the 
need for strong national power. They created a nation, rather than just 
a collection of states. 
 This is a big book. In covering the stories of Union governors, Engle 
effectively retells the central story of the Union homefront. The work is 
based on massive archival research. It features accessible prose. How-
ever, its size, the plethora of characters depicted, and the scope of the 
argument may intimidate casual readers. 
 One should always hesitate before using the word definitive. Never-
theless, Engle’s book will be the indispensable source on Union gover-
nors for a long time to come. 
 
 
Theater of a Separate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River, 1861–
1865, by Thomas W. Cutrer. The Littlefield History of the Civil War Era. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017. xiii, 588. Map, 
notes, bibliography, index. $40.00 hardcover. 
Reviewer Robert Wooster is Regents Professor of History at Texas A&M 
University–Corpus Christi. His books include American Military Frontiers: 
The U.S. Army in the West, 1783–1900 (2009) and The Civil War Bookshelf: 50 
Must-Read Books about the War Between the States (2001). 
Thomas W. Cutrer’s Theater of a Separate War: The Civil War West of the 
Mississippi River, 1861–1865 represents the first modern attempt by a 
Civil War specialist to craft a comprehensive study of the entire Trans-
Mississippi West from secession through the collapse of the Confederacy. 
This is operational and tactical history at its best, told in bold, sweeping 
terms. Wisely, Cutrer does not attempt to overstate the significance of 
the fighting west of the Mississippi for the overall war effort. As he 
acknowledges, “The Civil War was neither won nor lost west of the 
Mississippi River” (443). Still, as the fastest-growing part of the South 
and as a vital component of the campaigns for the Mississippi River, the 
region had strategic importance, especially in the wake of Napoleon 
III’s military intervention in Mexico. Thus, as Cutrer demonstrates, “It 
was of vital importance in and of itself” (448). 
 Those seeking a comprehensive narrative of the conflicts between 
Union and Confederate soldiers and sailors and their Indian allies from 
the Mississippi River to New Mexico need go no further. Printed pri-
mary materials are supplemented in some cases by manuscript collec-
tions, but the strength of the work lies in its narrative power. With an 
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eye for the telling quotation, Cutrer describes in often vivid prose the 
maneuvering of soldiers who usually deserved better than the sad lead-
ership of generals like Earl Van Dorn, Theophilus Holmes, Nathaniel P. 
Banks, and Benjamin F. Butler. Thematically, Cutrer emphasizes just 
how savage the war became in Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Terri-
tory, as well as of the Federal advantage in artillery that proved decisive 
in sharp (if often overlooked) battles like Buzzards Prairie, Louisiana, 
and Honey Springs, Indian Territory. Even more insightful is his re-
minder that the geographic boundaries of military districts and depart-
ments had unforeseen but significant consequences. Already suffering 
from a distinct disadvantage in material resources, the Confederates 
found that their defense of the Mississippi River was made even more 
difficult because lines of military authority were “divided east and west 
. . . with authority sharply delineated by the river” (4). Whereas the 
north-south axis of Union commands promoted (at least in many cases) 
“the common cause of opening the Mississippi” (4), Southerners west 
of the great river had little reason to cooperate with their cousins to the 
east, and vice versa. Thus, more often than not, the Trans-Mississippi 
was to the Confederacy a separate war, long before the fall of Vicksburg. 
 Writers of big and ambitious books like this get to choose their fo-
cus—in this case, Cutrer’s interest lies in the Civil War itself rather than 
the conflicts between federal and local authorities in New Mexico, Col-
orado, Utah, Minnesota, and the Dakotas versus Native Americans that 
occurred during the war, which are treated in but one of 24 chapters. 
The Confederate recapture of Galveston in January 1863, for example, 
receives 20 paragraphs of text, whereas the three-and-a half–year con-
flict (not two, as Cutrer suggests) in Minnesota sparked by the Dakota 
uprising in 1862 receives just 11 paragraphs. As a consequence, although 
Cutrer’s work is clearly superior to the earlier work of historian of 
American Indians Alvin M. Josephy Jr., The Civil War in the American 
West (1991), those interested in more emphasis on Indian versus non-
Indian conflicts will still find Josephy’s older work most useful. 
 With that caveat, Theater of a Separate War is the best single volume 
on the Civil War west of the Mississippi River. Students of Iowa history 
will find much of interest, with the service of Iowa troops in the fighting 
at Pea Ridge, in the campaigns for South Texas of 1863–64, and more 
explicitly the devastating losses suffered by the Nineteenth and Twen-
tieth Iowa Infantry regiments at Prairie Grove receiving the author’s 
due attention. Unfortunately, the publisher has done readers a major 
disservice by publishing such an important book without including the 
maps necessary to bring the splendidly written text to life. Almost 
astonishingly for a detailed operational narrative like this, the book 
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includes only one map, and that map, though clear and pleasing to the 
eye, fails to locate points like Helena, Arkansas; Alexandria, Louisiana; 
or Niblett’s Bluff, Texas—all places of strategic importance referred to 
repeatedly in the text. 
 
 
Pioneer Girl Perspectives: Exploring Laura Ingalls Wilder, edited by Nancy 
Tystad Koupal. Pierre: South Dakota Historical Society Press, 2017. 317 pp. 
Illustrations, maps, notes, index. $29.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer John J. Fry is professor of history at Trinity Christian College, Palos 
Heights, Illinois. He is the editor of Almost Pioneers (2013) and is writing a 
biography of Laura Ingalls Wilder that pays particular attention to her faith. 
When reading Laura Ingalls Wilder’s Little House books, one is led to 
believe that things happened exactly as they were written. In addition, 
at a speech at a book fair in Detroit in 1937, Wilder said, in reference to 
the most recent book published, that “every story in this novel, all the 
circumstances, each incident are true. All I have told is true but it is not 
the whole truth” (15). After Wilder’s death in 1957, however, readers 
and researchers began to discover many ways that the books were not 
historically accurate. That process accelerated when it was revealed that 
Wilder had previously written an adult memoir she called “Pioneer 
Girl” that publishers had rejected. The memoir was first made widely 
available to the public by the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library in 
West Branch, Iowa, during the 1980s. The South Dakota Historical So-
ciety (SDHS) Press published Pioneer Girl: The Annotated Autobiography 
in 2014, and it quickly became a best-seller. It is now in its ninth printing; 
more than 165,000 copies have been sold. 
 Pioneer Girl Perspectives is a collection of essays edited by Nancy 
Tystad Koupal, director of the Pioneer Girl Project, and published by 
the SDHS Press. The volume was originally meant to address how the 
publication of Pioneer Girl shapes our understanding of Wilder and her 
work. However, contributors take their considerations in a number of 
new directions, including the life and works of Wilder’s daughter, Rose 
Wilder Lane, the popularity of the Little House books, and the books’ 
literary value. 
 The book is divided into four sections. “Working Writers” begins 
by reprinting Wilder’s Detroit Book Fair speech, and then biographers 
of Wilder and Lane engage the different types of writing each pub-
lished. In “Beginnings and Misdirections,” authors consider the history 
of the Pioneer Girl manuscript and the Little House books compared to 
other early twentieth-century children’s literature. Historians writing in 
the third section, “Wilder’s Place and Time,” situate Wilder in regional 
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and historical context. The essays in the final section, “Enduring Tales 
and Childhood Myths,” explore a variety of literary features of the books. 
 As in all books of essays, some chapters are more insightful than 
others. Readers of this journal will be especially interested in John E. 
Miller’s essay describing the midwestern context of Wilder’s life and 
work. He argues that the Midwest is depicted in the following charac-
teristics of the Little House books: “(1) the prominence of the land in its 
residents’ thinking and the centrality of agriculture in its way of life; 
(2) the Homestead Act and the frontier process as integral parts of its 
historical experience; (3) the crucial role that small towns played in 
its culture; and (4) the development and nurturing of specific values as 
a result of those cultural experiences that helped shape residents’ special 
identities as Midwesterners” (155). Paula Nelson does a thorough job 
placing Wilder’s views on family, women’s roles, farming, and woman 
suffrage into the multiple contexts of the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth centuries. Nancy Fraser examines the use of the tale of 
the “Bloody Benders” in some Pioneer Girl manuscripts in order to 
assess Wilder and Lane’s relationship to the “yellow journalism” of 
the early twentieth century. Elizabeth Jameson considers how Wilder’s 
troubled and poverty-ridden childhood was transformed into the 
happy childhood of the Little House books. Finally, William Anderson 
gives a fascinating brief history of the Pioneer Girl manuscript between 
Wilder’s death in 1957 and its publication in 2014. 
 Overall, Pioneer Girl Perspectives is an excellent book. It’s slightly 
larger than a normal hardback, and the dust jacket art is beautiful. It 
includes many illustrations from the original Helen Sewell editions of 
the Little House books as well as historical photos of Wilder, Lane, and 
others. Many essays fill gaps in Wilder scholarship or bring together 
what is already known in helpful ways. It is a worthy companion to 
Pioneer Girl on the shelves of anyone interested in the Little House 
books and the way that they depict the West—and the Midwest. 
 
 
Coxey’s Crusade for Jobs: Unemployment in the Gilded Age, by Jerry Prout. 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2016. Illustrations, notes, 
bibliography, index. 152 pp. $25.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Carlos A. Schwantes is Saint Louis Mercantile Library Endowed 
Professor of History Emeritus, University of Missouri–St. Louis. He is the 
author of Coxey’s Army: An American Odyssey (1985) and “Soldiers of Mis-
fortune: Jack London, Kelly’s Army, and the Struggle for Survival in Iowa” 
(Annals of Iowa, 1983). 
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Do readers need yet another book on the highly publicized 1894 march 
to Capitol Hill led by Jacob S. Coxey? Yes, and Jerry Prout’s Coxey’s Cru-
sade for Jobs is a worthy addition to the substantial body of literature 
already extant on the topic—by my count, five books (counting this one) 
published since Henry Vincent’s official history appeared contempora-
neously while the marchers were still 40 miles from their goal. For all 
that has been written about “Coxey’s Army,” the term most often used 
by its observers, Prout explores in depth a number of topics that have 
been ignored or given very slight attention by previous writers on the 
topic, such as how African Americans came to view the march in highly 
positive terms because it drew no “color line” in terms of its member-
ship or its stated goals.  
 Prout, as the title of this book suggests, portrays the Coxey phe-
nomenon as a crusade for jobs. It was that, of course, but it was so much 
more. For Coxey himself, the main purpose was to drum up support for 
his crusade to improve the awful condition of American roads and 
make them usable by the rapidly growing legions of bicyclists. (The first 
American automobiles made their sputtering appearance in Massachu-
setts and Indiana only months before the 400-mile march from Coxey’s 
hometown of Massillon, Ohio, to Washington commenced on March 25, 
1894, a blustery Easter Sunday.) Prout’s account is exceptionally thor-
ough in its narration of the march’s gestation in Chicago in 1893 and the 
weeks of preparation in Massillon that took place before the unprece-
dented “petition in boots” took its first steps toward Capitol Hill. 
 At some level, the Coxey phenomenon was pure entertainment, a 
dramatic national soap opera with a new episode unfolding each day 
on the front page of newspapers across the United States. In fact, it be-
came the biggest news story since the disputed election of 1876. Prout’s 
account of how that happened is excellent and is perhaps his most im-
portant contribution. He introduces readers to the cadre of newspaper 
reporters “embedded” in the ranks of the Coxey marchers—none of 
those more important in Prout’s account than Ray Stannard Baker and 
Robert Peet Skinner. Baker (of the Chicago Record) was an energetic 24-
year-old not long out of the University of Michigan who had never be-
fore reported on news outside Chicago. Skinner, the publisher and edi-
tor of the Massillon Evening Independent, wrote the initial accounts of the 
Coxey phenomenon unfolding almost literally on his doorstep that 
soon became the talk of the nation. This portion of Prout’s book is espe-
cially fascinating not only in its description of newspaper coverage of 
Coxey’s crusade but also because it serves to explore the evolving world 
of journalism in the 1890s. Prout notes, too, how young Jack London 
marched with a troop of Coxeyites across Iowa and was thus able to 
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hone his writing skills in terms of the working-class subject matter he 
later used in his novels. 
 Prout brings to his topic the unusual perspective of a corporate ex-
ecutive: he was from 2000 until 2013 the vice-president of government 
and public affairs for FMC, the Fortune 500 Corporation he joined in 
1979. However, when Coxey’s Crusade for Jobs was published in 2016 the 
author was visiting professor of political science at Marquette Univer-
sity. He does not reveal how or why he became interested enough in 
the Coxey phenomenon during his time as a business executive to write 
a book about it, yet Prout clearly has produced a highly informative and 
entirely satisfying study of the contribution of Coxey’s “Industrial 
Army” to the history of American protest.  
 By the way, the author includes 24 pages of highly informative chap-
ter notes; however, they appear densely compressed by type so small that 
my aging eyes needed a magnifying glass to study them. Yet it would 
be a mistake for serious readers to ignore them: the notes contain valuable 
additional details on the Coxey phenomenon and its context in Gilded 
Age America.  
 
 
Finding Bix: The Life and Afterlife of a Jazz Legend, by Brendan Wolfe. Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press, 2017. ix, 235 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. 
$24.95 paperback. 
Reviewer C. A. Norling is a graduate student in musicology at the Univer-
sity of Iowa.  
Simultaneously pitied and idolized, jazz cornetist Bix Beiderbecke ac-
quired an increasingly discordant legend after his premature death in 
the summer of 1931. The 28-year-old Davenport native, a noted alco-
holic, was likely at the peak of his career when he succumbed to sudden 
and still highly debated causes. Despite having worked for both Jean 
Goldkette and the presumed “King of Jazz,” Paul Whiteman, Beider-
becke was scarcely a public figure in his own time. The ensuing dec-
ades, however, saw heightened admiration for and musical imitation of 
his recorded solos, bringing about a decidedly cult-like “Bixophilia.”  
 More than a biographical profile of a famous musician, Brendan 
Wolfe’s Finding Bix chronicles the author’s navigation through a subject 
fraught with misinformation and polarizing opinions. Including topics 
of discography, bibliography, myth-making, and musical canonization, 
Wolfe presents a synthesized reinterpretation of what he calls the 
“Great Bix Myth” (11). He also updates the Beiderbecke discourse with 
new interviews and accounts from internet forums. Although not an 
ideal source for historians and music scholars—Wolfe himself is “not 
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normally a huge fan of academic papers” (103)—the book’s light, acces-
sible nature is perfect for casual readers and jazz enthusiasts. 
 Perhaps of greatest interest to readers of the Annals of Iowa is the 
book’s overt connection to the Hawkeye State. A text by an Iowan, about 
an Iowan, and published by the University of Iowa Press may inherently 
reflect its surroundings, yet Finding Bix provides more than mere refer-
ences to Iowa. With a particular focus on Davenport, Wolfe recontextu-
alizes the famously agricultural state in terms of regional modernity and 
challenges the established story of a seemingly provincial cornetist’s 
“emerg[ence] from the cornfields” (11). By no means a “cultural back-
water,” claims Wolfe, Davenport was not “entirely the caricature that 
many historians and biographers have rendered” (22). A prominent 
river and railway center since the mid-nineteenth century, it was a thriv-
ing industrial metropolis during Beiderbecke’s formative years. Much 
like New Orleans, Davenport, with its historically intemperate sensibili-
ties toward alcohol and adult entertainment, created its own burgeoning 
jazz scene that attracted musicians on the Mississippi’s riverboat circuit. 
Wolfe’s subsequent presentation of Beiderbecke’s early performance op-
portunities and musical encounters in Iowa mocks the flawed percep-
tions of previous biographers, a theme that recurs throughout the book. 
 Finding Bix is not without concerns, however. With mostly short, 
sporadic chapters, the book lacks an effective organizational cohesion. 
The modest page count, encompassing nearly 50 discrete chapters, is 
forced into sections that are too brief for adequate development. The 
resulting string of arguments is regularly interrupted and left open-
ended, thus stifling rhetorical momentum and requiring repeated back-
tracking. Instances of disconnected thoughts could have been mitigated 
by longer, sustained chapters with plainly defined criteria. Secondarily, 
Wolfe’s writing, while refreshingly lively and conversational, suffers 
from hyper-colloquial idioms that distort his otherwise clear authorial 
voice. Phrases such as “artsy-fartsy” (25), “up pops a band of Johnny-
come-latelies” (85), and “gotten all Hoagy Carmichael about it” (10), 
even when used sarcastically, color the text as unnecessarily campy.  
 Critiques notwithstanding, Finding Bix is an entertaining narrative 
that addresses the ambiguous and rather convoluted nature of jazz his-
toriography. By organizing dissonant sources and, at times, subverting 
prior inaccuracies, Wolfe formulates a new, personal sketch of the late 
jazz musician. Readers will undoubtedly glean valuable historical con-
texts for Beiderbecke’s life and musical output, Iowa’s urban develop-
ment, and the ever-mythologizing culture of jazz fandom. “Bix is a spec-
ter,” claims Wolfe, “flitting in and out of the snaps and pops of a wax 
record. . . . He is a shadow” (8).  
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J. C. Penney: The Man, the Store, and American Agriculture, by David Del-
bert Kruger. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017. xiv, 346 pp. 
Maps, illustrations, notes, index. $29.95 hardcover.  
Reviewer William Friedricks is professor of history and director of the Iowa 
History Center at Simpson College. He is the author of A Great State Fair: 
The Blue Ribbon Foundation and the Revival of the Iowa State Fair (2017); editor 
of the University of Iowa Press’s Iowa and the Midwest Experience book 
series; and author of biographies of Iowa businessmen F. M. Hubbell, John 
Ruan, and Bill Knapp. 
Business journalists have spilled a lot of ink about the demise of depart-
ment store J. C. Penney amid the retail revolution led by Amazon. In 
the wake of this negative news comes J. C. Penney: The Man, The Store, 
and American Agriculture, an interesting biography of the company 
founder. Readers should not judge the book by its title, however. Au-
thor David Delbert Kruger, an agricultural research and instruction 
librarian at the University of Wyoming, focuses primarily on Penney’s 
ties to, and then involvement in, agriculture; those seeking a detailed 
business biography of Penney the merchandiser and the store bearing 
his name will need to look elsewhere. 
 Penney was born into a large family in rural Missouri in the late 
nineteenth century. Tough agricultural times meant a hardscrabble ex-
istence on the Penney farm. Besides farming, Penney’s father also vol-
unteered as a Baptist pastor, and the young Penney was imbued from 
an early age with a mixture of Christian morality and the Protestant 
work ethic, emphasizing hard work, independence, frugality, and treat-
ing others fairly. 
 The adolescent embraced agrarian life but did not envision a future 
in farming. Penney’s father agreed, and seeing his son’s aptitude for 
sales and marketing, he arranged a job for him with a local merchant. 
After learning the basics of retailing, Penney headed to the American 
West in 1897. There he joined Thomas Callahan in Colorado in his 
Golden Rule chain store operation. With a business based on low mark-
ups, repeat business, and his core value of fair treatment of suppliers 
and consumers, Callahan found a ready market for his retail formula in 
small mining towns and agricultural communities in the region. Calla-
han taught Penney about mass merchandising and the idea of growing 
through employee partnerships. Penney rose rapidly and was soon of-
fered a generous deal. In 1902 he became the managing partner of the 
new Golden Rule store in Kemmerer, Wyoming. Under Penney’s savvy 
leadership, it was immediately successful. By 1904 he was overseeing 
three Golden Rule stores; three years later, he bought his partners out. 
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 Penney expanded rapidly, employing the partnership strategy. By 
1913 there were 48 stores in eight western states. That year, the opera-
tion was renamed J. C. Penney and changed from a partnership to a 
corporation. Growth continued as the company went nationwide and 
eventually moved into larger cities and suburbs, but for years its bread 
and butter remained Main Street storefronts serving small rural com-
munities. There were nearly 70 J. C. Penney stores in Iowa as of 1933. 
 Curiously, it was shortly after Penney moved to New York City, 
where the firm’s corporate headquarters had been relocated, that his 
interest in agriculture was reignited. He purchased a large farm in 
Dutchess County, New York, but had no intention of being a gentleman 
farmer. He knew the difficulties faced by American farmers and now 
had the opportunity to better their situation. He bought the farm with 
his Golden Rule principle of “doing unto others” in mind and estab-
lished a Guernsey dairy cattle operation in an effort to improve the 
breed and help farmers generally. The effort was a success and became 
“a living blueprint of [his] future projects” (36).  
 Penney later returned to Missouri, buying his family’s former farm 
and others, where he started a purebred Aberdeen Angus beef herd and 
horse and mule business. But by far his most ambitious agricultural 
effort infused by his Golden Rule philosophy was Penney Farms, a 
120,000-acre model community he established in northeast Florida in 
the 1920s. There he planned to use the partnership strategy he had em-
ployed so successfully in building his department store. After going 
through a rigorous application process, selected farmers and their fam-
ilies were provided with a home on 20 acres rent-free for one year. They 
could gradually accrue an interest in the farm by raising crops and 
eventually purchase their own land. Besides carving out the town and 
building the infrastructure, Penney also established an agricultural 
research institute there to educate farmers. Unfortunately, he suffered 
major losses during the Great Depression and was forced to sell off most 
of the land making up the farms. However, many of the farmers who 
bought into the experimental community stayed, and Penney Farms re-
mains an incorporated town today. 
 As the foregoing suggests, this book offers a different perspective 
on mass merchandising mogul J. C. Penney. It is not a comprehensive 
biography, but those interested in learning about Penney’s abiding ties 
to American agriculture will want to read it. 
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The Religion of Chiropractic: Populist Healing from the American Heartland, 
by Holly Folk. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017. 
xii, 351 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. $34.95 paperback. 
Reviewer Eric Juhnke is professor of history at Briar Cliff University. He is 
the author of Quacks and Crusaders: The Fabulous Careers of John Brinkley, Nor-
man Baker, and Harry Hoxsey (2002). 
Iowa holds a special place in medical history as the wellspring of the 
chiropractic movement. In the late nineteenth century, D. D. Palmer, 
the self-proclaimed “fountainhead” of chiropractic, introduced a new 
medical philosophy as well as its premier training facility in Davenport, 
Iowa. In The Religion of Chiropractic, Holly Folk takes on D. D. Palmer 
and his son B. J. as well as the ways they and other chiropractors per-
ceived and publicized their field. Folk contends that D. D.’s “discovery” 
of chiropractic as well as its early success must be seen within the con-
text of the late nineteenth century, “in which science, religion, and po-
litical sentiment . . . fused together” in a vitalist outlook of “Body, Mind 
and Spirit” (2, 17). As medicine became less individualistic and more 
institutionalized, alternative medicine, Folk argues, served as a “form 
of cultural resistance” for those struggling to come to grips with post-
industrial society. The autodidactic Palmers’ commingling of metaphysics 
and populist rhetoric with health care resonated because it echoed es-
tablished thinking. It also limited the boundaries of chiropractic’s appeal.  
 The Palmers play a starring role in Folk’s book. Although D. D.’s 
first chiropractic treatment allegedly cured a patient of deafness, he was 
slow to feature spinal adjustments, a core feature of the “straight” chiro-
practic theory later taught at the Palmer school. In fact, D. D.’s medical 
theories shifted markedly over the years. The one constant for the free-
thinking D. D. was his belief in a “divine force connecting all reality” 
that fused health care with religion. Like his father, B. J. also combined 
metaphysics and chiropractic, claiming that the spinal cord served as a 
vibratory “cable transmitter” of life force or God (233). B. J. navigated 
the Davenport school through several schisms with rival chiropractors, 
including his own father, and developed a “chiropractic empire” through 
aggressive salesmanship and shameless self-promotion (193). Folk argues 
that B. J. made chiropractic protest against organized medicine “fun” 
with populist crusades, such as encouraging state-sanctioned chiroprac-
tors to “go to jail for the cause” (196). Such anti-establishment rhetoric 
never penetrated the mainstream, although it did align chiropractic with 
other oppositional social stances, including racist and nativist movements.  
 Folk moves beyond the Palmers to chart the evolution of chiropractic. 
Thirty thousand strong in the 1930s, chiropractors’ numbers dwindled 
in the 1940s and 1950s only to rebound again in the 1970s and 1980s as 
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the public lost faith in various institutions, including established medicine. 
In 1987 the AMA lost an antitrust suit that ended their longstanding 
campaign against chiropractic. Victims of their own success, chiroprac-
tors have struggled in recent decades to compete against holistic and 
allopathic practitioners who “learned from the chiropractic story” and 
incorporated touch-based therapy and even spinal manipulation (256). 
Folk admits that chiropractic has a “poor track record for healing 
structural damage to the spine” and may best be viewed as “condition 
management” (254). Although chiropractic has modernized and pro-
fessionalized in many respects, Folk shows that it remains connected to 
its spiritual and populist past. For example, contemporary chiropractors 
“form a sizeable contingent” of the right-wing “Tea Party, Sovereignty, 
and Tax protest movements” (263). The Palmers’ embrace of metaphysics, 
although often shielded from the patient, also persists among many 
chiropractors today.  
 Folk has done her research, scouring popular health and religious 
literature from the late nineteenth century as well as the special collec-
tions at the Palmer School of Chiropractic. Her coverage of chiropractors’ 
metaphysical views makes for fascinating reading, although including 
the outlook of patients would have added greater depth. The Religion of 
Chiropractic was clearly a personal endeavor for Folk, a self-identified 
religionist who shares “lifestyle habits associated with alternative 
health movements” (8). Despite frequent editorializing, Folk skirts crit-
icism of the Palmers’ controversial beliefs, including their rejection of 
vaccinations and the germ theory and B. J.’s embrace of gadget quackery. 
Folk also dismisses D. D.’s theoretical vacillations as only “unsettling if 
one prefers consistent thinking” as well as B. J.’s plagiarism as “com-
mon” within “populist intellectual writing” (89, 210). Folk does, how-
ever, critique the Palmers’ personalities if not always their beliefs. She 
admits that “there is no way to hide” their “strangeness and remain 
intellectually honest” (52). Both were eccentric—particularly B. J., who 
collected phallic relics, housed alligators in his basement, and iconized 
himself as a Greek god on cigar boxes. Each was so “selfish, dishonest,” 
and “provocative with people,” concludes Folk, that “it is hard to de-
cide which of the two . . . was worse” (235). In the final analysis, The 
Religion of Chiropractic helps demystify chiropractic medicine by placing 
the Palmers and their movement within a broader historical context. 
Those interested in the history of alternative medicine as well as chiro-
practic’s fascinating founders will appreciate Folk’s work. 
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Women in Agriculture: Professionalizing Rural Life in North America and 
Europe, 1880–1965, edited by Linda M. Ambrose and Joan M. Jensen. 
Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2017. xii, 258 pp. Illustrations, 
notes, index. $65.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Jenny Barker-Devine is associate professor of history at Illinois 
College in Jacksonville, Illinois. She is the author of On Behalf of the Family 
Farm: Iowa Farm Women’s Activism since 1945 (2013). 
With Women in Agriculture, editors Linda Ambrose and Joan Jensen pre-
sent an ambitious collection of ten skillfully crafted essays that shift cen-
tral conversations in rural women’s studies toward the issues of food 
security and women’s professional lives. For nearly 40 years, historians 
have explored the experiences of rural women within the context of the 
home and local community, grappling with the assumption that coun-
try folks negotiated traditional practices with urban-based reforms in 
agricultural science and home economics. The essays in Women in Agri-
culture reveal a more complex story, showing that rural women in 
North America and Europe played significant roles as reformers, scien-
tists, economists, and producers in shaping the technological revolu-
tions of the last century. 
 By focusing on the years between 1880 and 1965, Women in Agri-
culture captures the emergence of agricultural science, agricultural eco-
nomics, rural sociology, and home economics as distinct professional 
fields. During those years, women enjoyed access to higher education 
in greater numbers, the development of new technologies such as auto-
mobiles and radios enhanced communication, and members of margin-
alized groups, including African Americans and indigenous popula-
tions, continued efforts to realign dynamics of power. At the outset of 
these rapid changes, gendered spaces within the professions had not 
been clearly delineated, allowing some room for women to quietly con-
test patriarchal attitudes and institutions.  
 Within this context, Ambrose and Jensen argue that the women 
featured in the book’s essays, many of whom came from rural back-
grounds, challenged understandings of the New Woman as a purely 
urban phenomenon. Rural women also “sought more independence, 
visibility, and participation in public life” as they asserted that edu-
cated, middle-class women should pursue careers in agriculture (36). 
Their aspirations materialized in myriad ways: women organized 
women’s institutes (in the case of Canada and the United Kingdom) and 
educational clubs (in the case of the Netherlands); they also oversaw 
cooperatives, worked as home demonstration agents, produced radio 
shows, and conducted crucial scholarly research that set standards in 
the fields of agricultural economics, anthropology, and rural sociology.  
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 The essays in Women in Agriculture focus primarily on women’s ef-
forts in the fields of food production and security and are arranged into 
three categories: education, experts, and extension. The first section on 
education reveals how reformers created opportunities for women to 
enter agricultural professions, from cultivation to rural sociology and 
agricultural economics. The second section on experts presents three bi-
ographical essays on women who initiated research projects or organi-
zations that defined and supported women as agricultural producers 
and professionals. Finally, in the third section on extension work, read-
ers learn about how educated experts imparted information to women 
in their local communities, and then how those women interpreted and 
applied that information.  
 The essays demonstrate that women prioritized food-related issues 
across time and throughout North America and Europe, and they ap-
proached the issue of food security with diverse strategies. The authors 
and editors made a conscious effort to link essays that might otherwise 
seem unrelated, and readers can move easily from wealthy female re-
formers in urban London to poultry operations in Montana and then 
from women’s educational programs in The Netherlands to African 
American home demonstration agents in rural Arkansas. Striking com-
monalities emerge from these varied experiences. Women’s strategies 
were shaped not so much by geography as by economic class, race, and 
patriarchy. Regardless of their location in place or time, female profes-
sionals encountered complicated, hierarchical relationships with male 
leaders in male-dominated spaces. Their success often hinged on the ap-
proval of male superiors or women’s willingness to act primarily within 
all-female spaces. At the same time, these professional women grappled 
with conflicting professional priorities and local women’s priorities.  
 Women in Agriculture unifies diverse voices that set a welcome new 
tone in the field of rural women’s studies. As Ambrose notes in her es-
say on women’s institutes in Canada and the United Kingdom, popular 
discourse and scholarly research have minimized the influence of rural 
women’s organizations and expertise. Labeling such organizations as 
conservative, limited, “inconsequential ‘tea parties,’” scholars have 
largely overlooked the power of women’s professional work in agricul-
tural fields (120). There is much to be gained from comparative studies 
that reveal how regional and temporal factors shaped women’s lives. 
Women in Agriculture opens rich new conversations that will allow schol-
ars of rural women to situate their work in broader frameworks of pro-
fessionalization, the New Woman, and food and food security studies. 
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Conserving the Dust Bowl: The New Deal’s Prairie States Forestry Project, by 
Sarah Thomas Karle and David Karle. Reading the American Land-
scape Series. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2017. xi, 
160 pp. Maps, illustrations, tables, photo essay, notes, bibliography, in-
dex. $35.00 hardcover, pdf, and ebook. 
Reviewer Rebecca Conard is professor of history emeritus at Middle Ten-
nessee State University. Her books include Places of Quiet Beauty: Parks, Pre-
serves, and Environmentalism (1997). 
Conserving the Dust Bowl provides a succinct history of one of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s signature New Deal projects—the shelterbelt 
project to curb wind erosion on the Great Plains. The Prairie States For-
estry Project (PSFP), its official title, was an ambitious federal response 
to catastrophic drought and monstrous dust storms that brought agri-
culture to its knees in this region in the 1930s. Between 1935 and 1942, 
more than 200 million trees were planted, more or less strategically, in 
a corridor stretching from the Canadian border through eastern North 
and South Dakota, eastern and central Nebraska, central Kansas, central 
and western Oklahoma, and into the Texas panhandle.  
 In their first two chapters, the authors, drawing on the scholarship 
of Wilmon Droze, Donald Worster, and others, provide a good over-
view of nineteenth-century federal land policies and laws that enabled 
the development of agriculture in the ecologically fragile Great Plains 
and—once it became clear that rain would not, in fact, simply follow the 
plow—the two basic approaches devised to change the plains climate: 
rainmaking schemes and planting trees. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s triumph 
in the 1932 presidential election was a boon to the latter. FDR, who once 
self-identified as a tree farmer, threw the weight of his office behind soil 
conservation and forestry as instruments of resource stewardship (chap. 
3). Chapter 4 delves into the policy and politics of implementing the shel-
terbelt idea, which Roosevelt launched with an executive order in July 
1934, with funding to come from work relief appropriations. His execu-
tive order touched off a debate that had foresters arguing its scientific 
merits and politicians questioning whether the federal government 
should be spending emergency funds on a long-term project designed 
to help farmers in a sparsely settled part of the country. Ultimately, the 
project went forward, administered by the U.S. Forest Service until it 
was transferred to the Soil Conservation Service in 1942. For seven years, 
the Roosevelt Administration kept the project going with annual infu-
sions of work relief funds, ultimately totaling less than $14 million and 
coming mainly through the Works Progress Administration (chap. 6). 
This signature New Deal project, “never fully endorsed by Congress” 
(97) and initially projected to cost $75 million, was thus implemented 
on a shoestring budget.  
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 What the authors do not adequately explain is how a project that 
came to be associated almost exclusively, in historical memory, with the 
venerated Civilian Conservation Corps, popularly known as “Roose-
velt’s Tree Army,” was, in reality, a very complicated undertaking. Brief 
passages devoted to funding, land tenure, management, and workers 
reveal that the PSFP employed a variety of specialists and workers, in-
cluding women, and relied on cooperative agreements with farmers to 
achieve what would have been impossible had the federal government 
tried to repurchase the land: establish “nearly 19,000 miles of dis-
connected shelterbelts on 33,000 separate farms” (141). The PSFP thus 
forged an important pathway into what we now call public-private 
partnerships, one that ultimately left farmers in control of the shelter-
belt’s long-term sustainability.  
 Deeper inquiry into how the PSFP worked on the ground would 
have been helpful, and would have been warranted considering the au-
thors’ purpose, which is finally revealed only in a concluding chapter 
devoted to the project’s legacy. In a nutshell, despite inconsistent and 
often competing agricultural policies that swing from promoting maxi-
mum production to encouraging resource conservation, plus wide-
spread use of irrigation technology that is slowly draining the Ogallala 
Aquifer, the PSFP, the authors argue, “represents a balance among 
long-term planning, far-reaching national policies, and a willingness to 
reconsider core values at the local level regarding the federal govern-
ment’s involvement on private land” (134). They see a “striking parallel” 
(139) between the looming effects of climate change on agriculture and 
the federal government’s response to the devastating environmental 
and economic effects of the great drought of the 1930s, positing that the 
PSFP is a cogent case study for climate adaptation. Although the authors 
might have developed their argument more coherently, Conserving the 
Dust Bowl is worth a look by those who continue the noble effort of culti-
vating a land ethic in the agricultural sector. A good bibliography awaits 
anyone who wants to dig deeper. 
 
 
From Warm Center to Ragged Edge: The Erosion of Midwestern Literary and 
Historical Regionalism, 1920–1965, by Jon K. Lauck. Iowa and the Mid-
west Experience Series. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2017. xii, 
246 pp. Notes, index. $27.50 paperback. 
Reviewer C. Elizabeth Raymond holds the Grace A. Griffen Chair in His-
tory at the University of Nevada, Reno. She has written extensively about 
a sense of place in the Midwest and West. 
Midwesterners weary of eastern intellectual condescension, or of hear-
ing the charms of their subtle landscape casually dismissed as “flyover 
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country” by Californians who have never actually seen it, will find 
much to cheer about in Jon Lauck’s latest book. From Warm Center to 
Ragged Edge is a fervent regional call-to-arms disguised as a modest 
history of the Midwest’s brief, late nineteenth-century ascendancy in 
American politics and culture and its subsequent decline into margin-
ality during the years highlighted in the subtitle.  
 Lauck makes his argument in three succinct chapters, along with 
an introduction and conclusion. The entire text takes up less than half 
the volume, the bulk of which is devoted to footnotes (of which more 
later). His sympathies are never in doubt. From the beginning, Lauck 
announces that his “primary purpose” is “to bolster the new and con-
certed search for the history of the lost region at the heart of our nation 
by studying what went wrong” (3). In that quest he is a clear, consistent, 
and unabashed booster of the region he defines loosely as “the rolling 
green expanse between the rivers Ohio and Missouri” (2).  
 Readers looking for a nuanced assessment of that expansive region 
will be disappointed. Jon Lauck takes the Midwest as a given, assuming 
that his readers will recognize it as their own home territory. Rather 
than examining its origins or history, he sets out to explain why such 
“vast mental and physical territories . . . have been neglected and mar-
ginalized” in contemporary scholarship (7). Although his context is 
nominally global, with allusions to both Scotland and Catalonia justify-
ing his contention that “the regionalist impulse persists” (6), his book 
focuses resolutely on the American Midwest as “the warm center of the 
world” (108). His perspective on it is predominantly, though not exclu-
sively, scholarly. In this work Lauck apprehends the Midwest through 
its literature and its historical scholarship. He writes clearly about both, 
with a fluency based on extended study of his subject. 
 From Warm Center to Ragged Edge recounts the origin and persis-
tence of the familiar “revolt from the village” characterization of mid-
western writing. The trouble began in 1921 with the publication of an 
essay by Columbia University professor Carl Van Doren in The Nation. 
Van Doren suggested that a bold new crop of contemporary American 
novelists like Sherwood Anderson, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Sinclair 
Lewis were unified in their liberating rebellion against the provincialism 
of the interior American villages from which they came. Lauck explains 
how Van Doren’s provocative thesis was taken up and repeated verbatim 
by subsequent literary critics and scholars, all of whom ignored other, 
more nuanced regional writers, and even the nonconforming works of 
the writers initially championed by Van Doren. 
 The damage to midwestern regional reputation was done, how-
ever. Regardless of the determined efforts of regionalist writers like 
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Frederick Manfred, Ruth Suckow, and Herbert Quick, or publishers 
such as John T. Frederick in The Midland, the region was visible to eastern 
intellectuals only as a backwater. In a prevailing postwar intellectual 
climate of cosmopolitan internationalism, the frequently agricultural 
and small-town subject matter of midwestern writers was easily dis-
missed by modern critics as nostalgic and ultimately inconsequential. 
The difficulties were compounded by concurrent trends in the history 
profession, as midwestern universities enlarged their faculties to en-
compass new areas of study such as Russian history and international 
affairs. Midwestern history did not disappear, but it was no longer so 
prominent or so exclusive a focus. Previously, the history of the Mid-
west had been seen as the history of all America, as illustrated by Fred-
erick Jackson Turner in his famous 1893 essay, “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History.” By the 1940s, however, that was no longer 
the case. The unfortunate association of Senator Joseph McCarthy with 
Wisconsin further solidified the region’s national reputation as a domain 
of ignorance and prejudice. In that context, the controversial trans-
formation in 1964 of the venerable Mississippi Valley History Review into 
the Journal of American History was emblematic of a broad cultural turn 
away from the American Midwest. 
 In his conclusion Lauck argues for a view of midwestern regionalism 
that does not simply equate it with the 1920s village revolt and thereby 
confine it to the irrelevant past. Instead, he seeks a vibrant, revived re-
gional study that would amplify Hispanic and African American voices 
and grapple with twentieth-century regional transformations in agri-
culture, population distribution, and economy. A culture that obsessively 
seeks out local food, he seems to suggest, might profitably also learn to 
appreciate other, even more consequential forms of regional variation.  
 Lauck is too modest to inform readers that he himself is at the heart 
of just such an effort. Instrumental in the formation of the Midwestern 
History Association in 2014, he has almost singlehandedly rejuvenated 
scholarly and public attention to the region by means of the new organ-
ization and its two associated journals: Middle West Review (where Lauck 
serves as a member of the editorial board,) and Studies in Midwestern 
History (where he is the general editor). In addition, Lauck has pub-
lished four other books on various aspects of midwestern history and 
politics and is editor or coeditor of numerous others. His immersion in 
all aspects of contemporary midwestern regional study makes the foot-
notes of From Warm Center to Ragged Edge a particular treasure trove. 
Longer than the actual text, they are a tour de force for any scholar or 
general reader interested in aspects of midwestern writing or history 
scholarship. Lauck has read broadly and generously, and he shares his 
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knowledge joyfully. These are not the pedantic notes of a critic, but the 
enthusiastic comments of a supportive scholar. No one with interest in 
the region should skip his footnotes. They testify volubly to the fact that 
descriptive writing and scholarly analysis have, in fact, continued in 
and about the Midwest even as it moved to what Lauck regretfully 
characterizes as “the ragged edge” of American culture. 
 
 
The Fighting Sullivans: How Hollywood and the Military Make Heroes, by 
Bruce Kuklick. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. xi, 212 pp. 
Maps, illustrations, notes, bibliographical essay, index. $27.95 hardcover. 
Reviewer Anna Thompson Hajdik is a full-time lecturer in the English De-
partment and Film Studies program at the University of Wisconsin–White-
water. She is the author of “ ‘You Really Ought to Give Iowa a Try’: Tourism, 
Community Identity, and the Impact of Popular Culture in Iowa” (Online 
Journal of Rural Research and Policy, 2009). 
Bruce Kuklick brings together various elements of biography, commu-
nity history/memory, and the broader currents of twentieth-century 
American history through the lens of the “Fighting Sullivans,” five 
brothers who lost their lives together on the USS Juneau during the 
naval battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942. But this is far from a 
simple story. Rather, it is fraught with contradiction and controversy 
and lays bare the many tensions between nation and region, family and 
community, and even propaganda and truth. Ultimately, as Kuklick 
writes in his introduction, it is a book that “shows how narratives of the 
heroic are constructed and why we need them” (3).  
 Kuklick’s work is at its strongest when he places the Sullivans’ story 
in context with such topics as the shifting fortunes of the American war 
effort in 1943–44, Hollywood’s influence on the home front, and the 
postindustrial decline of Waterloo, Iowa. Chapters 8–11 are especially 
valuable, as Kuklick traces the history of Hollywood’s treatment of the 
Sullivan family, turning to such rich archival sources as correspondence 
among movie executives, the film’s director (Lloyd Bacon), various 
screenwriters, and family matriarch Alletta Sullivan. Script treatments 
and various promotional materials also prove to be especially rich ar-
chival documents. Ultimately, the film became much more of a home-
front story, centering on an idyllic family and its strong Catholic faith, 
in stark contrast to the reality of the actual Sullivan family. As Kuklick 
argues, the persuasive power of Hollywood was much greater in the 
1940s than it is now, shaping “morality, politics, and attitudes towards 
social problems” (96).  
 Much of the Sullivans’ story takes place in Waterloo, Iowa, the fam-
ily’s hometown. The author chronicles the family’s working-class exist- 
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ence, heartbreak, and tragic notoriety from the early twentieth century 
to the present against the backdrop of the rising and declining fortunes 
of that blue-collar, industrial city. The book is a bit weaker when the au-
thor sets out to uncover just who the “real Sullivans” were, concluding 
ultimately and perhaps somewhat unconvincingly that prior to their 
entry into the war the majority of folks in Waterloo who actually knew 
them saw the five men as either unambitious louts or mischievous 
hoodlums. The reality of course is lost to history, as most of the Sulli-
vans’ contemporaries are now gone. Kuklick’s actual evidence proves 
thin, consisting mostly of the town’s admittedly anemic response to the 
brothers’ deaths soon after the sinking of the USS Juneau. A more nu-
anced and balanced portrayal of the Sullivan brothers might have been 
appropriate. Still, Kuklick’s discussion of Waterloo’s response to the 
brothers’ collective sacrifice decades later is fascinating and worthy of 
attention.  
 In the 1990s, for example, Waterloo rode a wave of World War II 
nostalgia that resulted in the founding of a multimillion-dollar veterans 
museum named for the brothers. A highly engaged group of World 
War II veterans from across the country, along with more limited sup-
port from the city, helped make this possible. Steven Spielberg’s release 
of the World War II drama Saving Private Ryan (1998) furthered the 
legend of the Sullivan family’s collective sacrifice. Meanwhile, the city 
itself had hit some hard economic times, as postindustrial decline accel-
erated after the 1960s and resulted in the closure of meatpacking plants 
and other associated businesses. As Kuklick notes, “In the first part of 
the twentieth century, when the town was up, the family was down; 
at the end of the century, when Waterloo was down, the Sullivans were 
up” (166).  
 Ultimately, The Fighting Sullivans is a valuable work of cultural 
history. It spotlights a story that suffers tremendously from decades of 
calculated mythmaking and attempts to unpack and deconstruct those 
myths. It would be especially relevant as a text for courses that focus on 
Iowa history, World War II, or twentieth-century American history. 
 
 
Teacher Strike! Public Education and the Making of a New American Political 
Order, by Jon Shelton. The Working Class in American History Series. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017. xii, 274 pp. Notes, bibliog-
raphy, index. $95.00 hardcover, $27.95 paperback, $25.16 ebook. 
Reviewer John W. McKerley is a research associate at the University of 
Iowa Labor Center. He is researching the Keokuk teachers strike of 1970 and 
the origins of Iowa’s Public Employment Relations Act. 
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The 1970s was a critical decade in U.S. history. At the decade’s outset, 
the U.S. labor movement was still a potent and well-recognized force in 
the nation’s economic and political life. Although union members were 
sometimes at odds over civil rights and the Vietnam War, they were 
also crucial backers of and participants in the era’s progressive social 
movements. Moreover, despite the increasing pressure of capital flight 
on unions, a new wave of public-sector organizing seemed to offer new 
possibilities. By the decade’s end, public-sector unions had become a 
newly powerful force, but proponents of a revived free-market ide-
ology (neoliberalism) were poised to undermine the power of orga-
nized labor as a whole and reshape U.S. politics for a generation. 
 Historians largely agree on the broad outlines of this narrative, but 
they continue to debate the identities of its main actors. In Teacher Strike! 
Jon Shelton makes an important contribution to this debate by focusing 
on the interplay between the rise of teacher unionism and neoliberalism 
in the context of the 1970s. 
 For Shelton, unionized teachers’ willingness and ability to use strikes 
(especially illegal strikes) to advance their collective interests played a 
key role in shifting public opinion away from the “labor liberalism” of 
the post–New Deal era. By the end of the 1970s, he argues, “the nation’s 
political center” had developed “a deepening sense that the labor-liberal 
state now victimized both white middle-class Americans and corporate 
America,” leading to “new calls to let the market structure life in Amer-
ica” (160). 
 Shelton develops this argument by focusing on public debates pro-
voked by a series of teacher strikes in major U.S. cities during the “long” 
1970s (roughly 1968 to 1981). Most of the cities in question were in the 
East Coast and Midwest and reflected centers of a pre-1970s political 
economy based around the influence of predominately white, male, ur-
ban, private-sector union members. Shelton draws most of his evidence 
from newspaper opinion pieces and letters to the editor. Perhaps his 
most innovative sources are the letters sent by people across the country 
to American Federation of Teachers (AFT) president David Selden dur-
ing his prison stay in 1970 for defying an anti-picketing injunction. 
 Since World War II, labor liberalism had substantially improved 
the lives of U.S. workers (especially private-sector union members) but 
left many public-sector workers, including teachers, behind. Although 
many prosperous urbanites (union members in particular) were ini-
tially sympathetic to teachers and other public-sector workers, those 
sympathies declined over the course of the 1970s as capital flight, 
recession, and inflation combined to undermine the urban industrial 
economies. 
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 According to Shelton, this shift in sympathies also had racial and 
gendered dynamics. As employers fled urban centers, the most success-
ful white workers attempted to follow them, often leaving behind fi-
nancially struggling cities dominated by impoverished and excluded 
people of color. As teachers—women especially—turned to unioniza-
tion for professional status and dignity in their workplaces, they came 
into conflict with people of color, who argued for greater control over 
the apparatus of the state (including schools) in the name of community 
empowerment. 
 These conflicts further alienated members of minority communities 
from unionism and labor liberalism and empowered conservative crit-
ics who saw both public employees and nonwhite urban “rioters” as 
having “flouted the law and siphoned off the resources of hardworking 
Americans” (2). It was these battles over 1970s urban teacher strikes, 
Shelton argues, that forged a producerist rhetoric in which owners and 
employees of private enterprise were “makers” in conflict with the 
unproductive “takers” of the urban (often non-white) poor and public 
employees. 
 Overall, Shelton makes a compelling case for the importance of 
teacher militancy in the debates over urban public policy during the 
1970s. As he readily admits, however, the book, like any ambitious 
national study, leaves as many questions as it answers. What role did 
strikes by other public-sector workers play in this process? How did the 
provisions of particular laws (for example, arbitration) shape teachers’ 
risky decisions to engage in illegal strikes? If the teacher strikes of the 
1970s played such an important role in undermining labor liberalism, 
why did the coordinated backlash against public-sector unionism at the 
state level begin in the 2010s rather than the 1980s? And, of particular 
interest to Iowans, how did states without large urban centers fit into 
this framework? Such questions are to Shelton’s credit, however, as 
they reveal the groundwork his expansive vision has laid for other 
scholars seeking the roots of neoliberalism in the United States. 
 
 
The Good Governor: Robert Ray and the Indochinese Refugees of Iowa, by 
Matthew R. Walsh. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2017. vii, 
233 pp. Map, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $35.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Paul Hillmer is dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sci-
ences at Concordia University, St. Paul, Minnesota. He is the author of A 
People’s History of the Hmong (2010). 
Thanks to Matthew Walsh, I now see the connection between the gu-
bernatorial candidate whose hand I shook in 1968 at the Clay County 
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Fair (still on crutches after his April plane crash) and the people from 
Laos who moved in across the street from our home in Spencer in the 
mid-1970s. “From the close of the Vietnam War until 2010,” writes 
Walsh, “Iowa alone resettled refugees as a state-run voluntary agency” 
(5). Elsewhere, the U.S. State Department contracted with voluntary 
agencies (VOLAGs) like Catholic Charities or Lutheran Social Services 
to resettle refugees.  
 Walsh first focuses on the ethnic Tai Dam, beginning with a fine, 
necessarily brief introduction to their history and beliefs and the place 
they occupied during the two phases of the Vietnam War. These were 
not backward or hapless victims but “shrewd negotiators who man-
aged centuries of survival among more powerful neighbors” (7). De-
siring to be resettled together in one place, they wrote letters to 30 
American governors. Only one, Iowa’s Robert Ray, replied. He requested 
and received a federal exemption from the State Department rule that 
required refugees to be scattered across the country. Resettling one 
linguistic/cultural group, he reasoned, would make assimilation and 
employment simpler and the state’s burden lighter. This emphasis on 
“cluster resettlement,” along with a “work first” philosophy intended 
to keep refugees off welfare and enlistment of local sponsors responsible 
for refugees’ success, were the program’s three cornerstones. “Staying 
off cash assistance represented a form of assimilation to Iowa culture 
and work values” (66).  
 There were bumps along the way. The U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare found that families in Ray’s program refused 
welfare (despite qualifying for it), fearing that acceptance would jeop-
ardize relatives’ chances for resettlement. That “work first” approach em-
barrassed ethnic Kinh refugees from Vietnam (settled by the Catholic 
church), who received welfare at higher rates. Male-dominated Tai Dam 
culture interacted problematically with America’s more “liberated” 
social norms and with Job Service of Iowa’s director, Colleen Shearer 
(whose criticism of Kinh welfare rates opened the Governor’s Task 
Force to charges of favoritism). Tensions between Tai Dam and African 
Americans emerged as the former associated blacks with French mer-
cenaries in Southeast Asia, and African Americans who helped resettle 
Tai Dam felt that their charges were both ungrateful and racist. Even so, 
problems were taken seriously and addressed effectively, making the 
Iowa program a model both nationally and internationally.  
 After discussing the Tai Dam’s unique contributions to their own 
successful resettlement, Walsh discusses the dual crises of the Vietnam-
ese “boat people” and the Khmer refugees who fled the Killing Fields 
of Cambodia. These events may be more familiar to general readers, but 
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Walsh provides historical context before detailing Ray’s role in helping 
both populations. In the case of the “boat people,” Ray was moved by 
Ed Bradley’s 60 Minutes television report. Ray and five other governors 
visited Khmer camps in October 1979. On the day they visited Sa Khaeo, 
50 people died (135). 
 Governor Ray was Christian enough to have compassion for refu-
gee populations, conservative enough (by 1970s standards) to be strate-
gic about resettling them in a fashion palatable to Iowans, and savvy 
enough to anticipate and blunt criticism. Ray’s Iowa SHARES (Sends 
Help to Aid Refugees and End Starvation) program, launched over the 
1979 Thanksgiving weekend, invited Iowans to buy a “share” in hu-
manity for $2.20, the price of a bushel of corn. Ray’s goal of $115,000 
was nearly quadrupled, a sign of his moral and political leadership. By 
1980, Ray was playing a crucial role in the creation of the Refugee Act 
of 1980, which guaranteed three years of federal support to states for 
the refugees they welcomed. 
 Walsh dedicates chapters to the perspectives of refugees and the 
sponsors who worked and lived alongside them. These chapters fit very 
comfortably in the broader literature of immigration and Southeast 
Asian refugee history. Shedding little new thematic light for scholars, 
they are nonetheless indispensable in the telling of this specific story. 
Walsh’s book is as much about refugee agency as it is about Ray’s leader-
ship; the short shrift given those accounts in this review does not reflect 
their importance to our understanding of this subject. 
 Weaving oral history with state records and broader historical lit-
erature into a first-rate yet accessible, short narrative, Matthew Walsh 
effectively makes the case for Robert Ray’s greatness and Iowa’s unique 
role in the resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees. 
 
 
A Great State Fair: The Blue Ribbon Foundation and the Revival of the Iowa 
State Fair, by William B. Friedricks. Des Moines: Business Publications 
Corporation, 2017. x, 178 pp. Illustrations, note on sources, notes, index. 
$20.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Michael Kramme is professor emeritus of theater at Culver Stock-
ton College in Canton, Missouri. His most recent books are The Governors 
of Iowa, The Schaffner Players, and Images of America: Washington, Iowa. 
William B. Friedricks begins his book by acknowledging several recent 
books about the Iowa State Fair, explaining that his focus is on the story 
of the Iowa State Fair Blue Ribbon Foundation. He begins by giving a 
brief history of the fair. The first two fairs were held in Fairfield. Later 
fairs were held in Muscatine, Oskaloosa, Iowa City, Dubuque, Burling- 
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ton, Clinton, Keokuk, and Cedar Rapids before moving permanently to 
Des Moines in 1879. During the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Fair Board erected several Beaux-Arts buildings, including 
Exposition Hall, Machinery Hall, Administration Building, Agriculture 
Building, Livestock Pavilion, Women’s and Children’s Building, and 
livestock barns. Through the years, additional buildings, both perma-
nent and temporary, were added to the grounds. 
  In 1980 the Women’s and Children’s Building (1914) was in great 
disrepair. It would have taken $700,000 to renovate the structure. The 
Fair Board did not have enough funds for the project, so the building 
was razed. Many of the fair’s other iconic buildings were also in disre-
pair, including the Administration, Agriculture, and Varied Industries 
buildings, the grandstand, and the 1920s Ye Old Mill. This was a wake-
up call for the preservation of other buildings on the fairgrounds.  
 The Fair Board formed the Iowa State Fair Foundation. Its purpose 
was specifically to raise money for the fair and fairgrounds. After a slow 
start, it was reformed in 1993. Soon the Blue Ribbon Foundation was 
incorporated with John Putney as its first director, a position he held for 
several years. The first major success came in 1997, when Des Moines 
businessman Bill Knapp agreed to donate one million dollars. Other do-
nations followed, and the foundation’s coffers grew. 
 Members of the foundation began to educate legislators about the 
program. Many legislators were unaware that the state owned the fair-
grounds. After much lobbying, the legislature agreed to several funding 
requests. A series of events and special programs followed, including 
the “Corndog Checkoff” passed by the legislature, allowing citizens to 
contribute to the fair on their state income tax forms. Other campaigns 
included “Treasure Our Fair” and “Rebuilding the Dream.” “The Corn-
dog Kickoff,” a pre-fair party, became an annual event. 
 As the improvements continued, the fair’s popularity increased to 
over one million visitors each year. After only a decade, the foundation 
helped raise an amazing $53 million for the fair’s facelift. At the time of 
the book’s publication, the foundation had raised over $135 million. As 
a result of the success of the Blue Ribbon Foundation’s continuing ef-
forts, the Iowa State Fair and its grounds have been transformed from 
a shabby embarrassment to a major part of Iowa’s proud heritage. 
 Friedricks’s book on the foundation is well illustrated, although a 
map of the fairgrounds would have been a good addition. He includes 
detailed documentation and a thorough index. The book might not be 
of interest to the average fair enthusiast, but it would be enjoyed by any-
one interested in a behind-the-scenes story of the restoration of the fair-
grounds and its return to former glory and a bright future. 
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White Birch, Red Hawthorn: A Memoir, by Nora Murphy. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2017. xvi, 179 pp. Illustration, re-
sources and further reading. $17.95 paperback. 
Reviewer Greg Olson is curator of exhibits and special projects at the Mis-
souri State Archives. He is the author of several articles and books on the 
Ioways, including Ioway Life: Reservation and Reform, 1837–1860 (2016). 
While growing up in a middle-class neighborhood in Minneapolis, 
Nora Murphy never questioned the comfort of the Victorian houses on 
the street where she lived or the belief that everything she could see 
from a nearby hilltop naturally belonged to her, her family, and other 
white people like her. However, Murphy’s complacency about her 
place in America slowly began to be challenged when, as an adult, she 
started working at the Minneapolis American Indian Center. There, 
Murphy’s Native colleagues invited her to become part of a circle that 
showed her the world from a new perspective and led her to question 
many of the conventions she had grown up with. She was forced to con-
sider the extent of her white privilege—a phrase Murphy avoids—and 
to wrestle with “the embarrassing but fuzzy recognition that non-
Natives have some unpaid debt to Native Americans” (10). This reali-
zation sent Murphy on a journey to “uncover a different way of under-
standing what it means to be an American in this land” (10). 
 White Birch, Red Hawthorn is Murphy’s frank account of that voyage. 
In some instances, her journey involved physical travel. She visited her 
family’s homestead in northern Minnesota and her ancestral home in 
North Tipperary, Ireland. In part, her travels helped satisfy her longing 
to reconnect with her past and with the earth. “The conqueror’s thirst,” 
Murphy writes, is “to connect, to belong” (55). 
 The most difficult and painful segment of Murphy’s journey in-
volved self-reflection. She shows rare courage in her willingness to ques-
tion her assumptions and to examine the process by which she and 
those like her have labored to erase the lives of Native people who had 
lived on the land before her family arrived. This exploration takes Mur-
phy back to her ancestors, who, as immigrants, worked hard to put their 
own heritage and their connection to nature behind them in order to 
assimilate. Along the way, Murphy revisits stories she read as a child 
about Paul Bunyan, who cleared the north woods in order to rid it of its 
wildness, and Laura Ingalls Wilder, whose family took the newly do-
mesticated land as their own without considering the Native people 
who had called it home for centuries. 
 This, in turn, causes Murphy to consider the process by which the 
U.S. government removed Native people from their land in her home 
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state. She examines the Doctrine of Discovery, the 1819 Indian Civiliza-
tion Act, and forced assimilation and lists the more than 40 treaties that 
took place in Minnesota alone between 1805 and 1847. 
 When a Native elder asked Murphy, “When you find the truth, 
what are you going to do with it?” (138), she realized that she was on a 
journey with no end. She understood that she was obliged to tell the 
true story of how the United States was settled in hopes that it would 
help heal the scars of the land and the people. She also concluded that 
she must learn to listen to those who were not like her if she was going 
to become a more effective ally.  
 Murphy has engaged in a process of self-examination that few white 
people seem willing to undertake in public. She acknowledges her fears 
and the shame she felt over her privilege and articulates her struggle 
with clarity. White Birch, Red Hawthorn is a work of great insight and 
bravery that manages to challenge readers’ beliefs without becoming 
strident or arrogant. No matter where we live on this continent, this 
work serves as a valuable guide for all who want to understand the pro-
cess by which our cities, towns, and houses were built on top of some-
one else’s home.  
 
 
A Spectrum of Faith: Religions of the World in America’s Heartland, edited 
by Timothy Knepper, photography by Bob Blanshard. Des Moines: 
Drake Community Press, 2017. ix, 126 pp. Full-color photographs. 
$30.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Bill R. Douglas lives and writes in Des Moines. His article on Des 
Moines’s Calvary Baptist Church in the 1920s appeared in the Summer 
2017 issue of Baptist History & Heritage. 
This lavishly illustrated book is the result of sending Drake University 
students to 15 Des Moines religious communities: three of the four Jewish 
congregations (no Chabad), two Sikh groups, three Muslim mosques 
(Bosnian, primarily Arab, and international), two Buddhist and two 
Hindu temples (including an ethnically Nepali Bhutanese refugee com-
munity), and three Christian churches (Orthodox, Catholic, and Prot-
estant but no Pentecostal). 
 With subsections on history, identity, space, and practice, the proj-
ect should be seen as an exercise in lived religion, as the introduction 
makes clear. The book also succeeds in its aim of uncovering the spec-
tacular contemporary diversity of religious practice in one midwestern 
city. Concentrating on practice leaves at least one major question unre-
solved: why the degree of diversity within religions in Des Moines? Of 
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course there must be ethnic, historical, personal, and theological an-
swers, but the book does not ask the question.  
 Limiting a broad religious tradition to three congregations also 
hides much of the new ethnic diversity within Christianity: Tai Dam 
Mennonites (and animists), Burmese Baptists, Mexican Pentecostals, 
Korean Methodists, South Sudanese Presbyterians and Lutherans, and 
Congolese evangelicals (for starters) complicate a Des Moines religious 
scene that seems a long way from 1950s-era Life and Christian Century 
portrayals of Iowa religion as white, Protestant, middle-class, and gen-
erous but self-absorbed. 
 
 
Local Vino: The Winery Boom in the Heartland, by James R. Pennell. Heart-
land Foodways. Champaign, Urbana, and Chicago: University of Illi-
nois Press, 2017. xi, 192 pp. Illustrations, tables, references, index. $95.00 
hardcover, $19.95 paperback. 
Reviewer Josh Sopiarz is associate professor and reference librarian for 
social sciences and government information at Governors State University. 
He has presented conference papers on craft brewing and wineries in the 
Midwest. 
James Pennell’s romp through wineries in Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, and 
Iowa offers readers a glimpse into the Midwest’s growing wine industry. 
Local Vino is an ode to the region’s vintners, enologists, vignerons, 
oenophiles, and casual imbibers and reflects Pennell’s quest to better 
understand the wine boom he has recently been observing in the Heart-
land. Initially, Pennell set out to write solely about Indiana’s burgeon-
ing wine industry. At his editor’s suggestion, Pennell expanded his 
scope to include wineries in Ohio, Illinois, and Iowa. The book benefits 
from this expansion; however, Pennell’s ethnographic approach led 
him primarily to wineries reached easily by car from his home base in 
Indianapolis. To his credit, Pennell made many such trips and did his 
homework on the industry in each of the four included states. The result 
is a lively jaunt across a swath of a region not widely known for its wine, 
but whose winemakers are clearly working to establish its reputation 
nationally, if not globally.  
 In the first half of the book, Pennell lays the groundwork for the 
project by identifying three common themes that apply across the region. 
First, local wineries provide generally “merry, festive, convivial” places 
for people to gather and socialize informally. Second, local wineries unite 
“the need for community and the desire to pursue and be rewarded for 
good work” (3). Third, local wineries benefit both from the “buy local” 
movement and the burgeoning international wine market. Pennell 
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supplements personal interviews and anecdotes with data to bolster his 
arguments throughout.  
 In the book’s stronger second half, Pennell breaks down the various 
challenges facing midwestern wineries. He identifies the usual suspects 
and market forces at work in all four of his target states. These include 
the three-tiered distribution system, labor issues, money/investment 
difficulties, problems at harvest or during production, quality control, 
and that one great big obstacle to success—reputation. At a time when 
affordable wines from the world’s leading regions are available, how 
do majority first- and second-generation grape growers/vintners dis-
tinguish themselves and make ends meet? For Pennell, it is the people 
and their dedication to the product and their patrons that will deter-
mine the future. There is a boom underway, but major challenges loom 
and Pennell is not naïve about this. 
 The diversity Pennell encountered at wineries in his target states 
suggests that the industry is bigger and more complex than one might 
assume. And this is without including the state of Michigan, which is 
arguably the biggest player in the region. Also, although Pennell does 
mention the work of university extension services, it would have been 
appropriate to include something about Elmer Swenson (formerly at 
the University of Minnesota), whom many recognize as the person re-
sponsible for hybridizing grapes able to both withstand midwestern 
winters and make good table wine. This and the majority of any other 
quibbles are minor. Ultimately, Pennell’s book presents a nuanced look 




Retired, Rehabbed, Reborn: The Adaptive Reuse of America’s Derelict Reli-
gious Buildings and Schools, by Robert A. Simons, Gary DeWine, and 
Larry Ledebur, with Laura A. Wertheimer. The Sacred Landmarks Se-
ries. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press in cooperation with Cleve-
land State University’s College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, 2017. 
ix, 382 pp. Maps, tables, charts, illustrations, notes, glossary, index. 
$45.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Paula Mohr is an architectural historian for the State Historical 
Society of Iowa. 
In the mid-1990s, the conversion of St. John the Baptist Church in Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, into a microbrewery and restaurant was both 
praised and condemned (the beer is made where the altar was located). 
Historians and theologians held up that project and others like it as 
evidence of the commodification of “the sacred” in the postmodern era. 
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(See, for example, Paula Kane’s article, “Is That a Beer Vat Under the 
Baldochino?”) For those of us who work in historic preservation, 
however, the potential loss of some of our most monumental and archi-
tecturally rich buildings in the wake of profound shifts in American 
religious life is also significant. Changing worship patterns and demo-
graphics as well as church scandals that strain budgets have led to hun-
dreds of buildings becoming vacant or being demolished each year. 
In the midst of this period of decline, the number of congregations in 
the United States actually rose in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century. Unfortunately, that does not necessarily mean good news for 
our old buildings. New congregations build new facilities and in other 
cases convert secular buildings into worship space, leaving old build-
ings empty and needing a new purpose. 
 Retired, Rehabbed, Reborn is intended to provide a road map for the 
conversion of these vacant historic buildings into new uses. Written pri-
marily for an audience of developers, architects, public officials, and 
building managers, the book defines the problem, explains how to as-
sess the feasibility of a project, and provides case examples. The primary 
authors are academics at Cleveland State University joined by an urban 
planner. Selected chapters are written by other design practitioners. 
While the focus is on religious buildings, the book also includes discus-
sion of the adaptive use of historic schools, likewise accompanied by 
case studies. 
 Historians and preservationists will find value in the authors’ chron-
icling of trends in Americans’ spiritual life that have led to this preser-
vation crisis. The real contribution of the book, however, is its pragmatic 
advice on how to determine the feasibility of a project, conduct market 
analysis, leverage financial incentives, and navigate the approval pro-
cess. A glossary of financial, development, and governmental terms and 
acronyms is a handy reference. The level of detail in the book is impres-
sive; a few examples are a checklist for holding a community meeting, 
sample pro formas, and a lengthy “developer’s toolbox” of financial 
sources.  
 The case studies are detailed as well. The authors note that they 
present projects of varying financial and preservation success. The con-
version of the Duetsche Evangelical Reform Church in Dayton, Ohio, 
into a rock-climbing gym will make some preservationists wince. St. 
Joseph Church in Fayetteville, Arkansas, turned into apartments, is one 
of the few case studies that used historic tax credits, ensuring that the 
work was done according to the Secretary of the Interior’s standards. 
 All told, this book is an important contribution to the fields of plan-
ning, preservation, and real estate development. It should be noted that 
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much of the guidance and tools presented here can be applied to other 
historic buildings types. While outside the scope of this publication, it 
does highlight the need for guidance on the architectural challenges of 
converting these buildings. Large sanctuaries (and other similar assembly 
spaces) that give religious buildings their unique character are among 
the most difficult spaces to sensitively convert to a new use. One hopes 
that this book that deals so thoroughly with the pragmatic concerns of 
adaptive use will result in more successful projects and that those, in 
turn, can be the basis of a work that explores the challenges and solu-
tions from the preservation architect’s point of view. 
 Announcements 
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA (SHSI) 
announces a grant program for the 2018/2019 academic year. 
SHSI will award up to ten stipends of $1,000 each to support 
original research and interpretive writing related to the history 
of Iowa or Iowa and the Midwest. Preference will be given to 
applicants proposing to pursue previously neglected topics or 
new approaches to or interpretations of previously treated topics. 
SHSI invites applicants from a variety of backgrounds, including 
academic and public historians, graduate students, and indepen-
dent researchers and writers. Applications will be judged on the 
basis of their potential for producing work appropriate for publi-
cation in The Annals of Iowa. Grant recipients will be expected to 
produce an annotated manuscript targeted for The Annals of Iowa, 
SHSI’s scholarly journal.  
 Applications for the 2018/2019 awards must be postmarked 
by April 15, 2018. Download application guidelines from our 
website (iowaculture.gov/about-us/about/grants/research-
grant-authors) or request guidelines or further information from: 
Research Grants 
State Historical Society of Iowa 
402 Iowa Avenue 





THE IOWA HISTORY CENTER at Simpson College is pleased 
to congratulate Dwain Coleman as the 2017 recipient of our prize 
for the outstanding master’s thesis in Iowa history. His award-
winning thesis, “Still in the Fight: The Struggle for Community 
in the Upper Midwest for African American Civil War Veterans,” 
was completed at Iowa State University. 
 The Center now seeks nominations for the outstanding mas-
ter’s thesis in Iowa history for 2018. Selection will be based on 
contribution to the knowledge of Iowa history; originality of the 
subject matter or methodology; use of sources; and written ex-
pression. Nominees must have completed their master’s degree 
between July 1, 2017, and June 30, 2018.  
 The winner will be announced in the fall of 2018 and will re-
ceive a $1,000 cash prize and an award plaque. Three copies of 
the thesis and a brief letter of nomination from the thesis advisor, 
which must include contact information for the nominee, should 
be submitted to Bill Friedricks, Director, Iowa History Center, 
Simpson College, 701 North C Street, Indianola, IA 50125. Appli-
cation deadline is June 30, 2018.  
 For further information, contact Linda Sinclair, (515) 961-
1528 or linda.sinclair@simpson.edu. 
 
EACH ISSUE of The Annals of Iowa brings to light the deeds, mis-
deeds, and accomplishments of our predecessors and shows how 
they fit into the intricate mosaic of Iowa’s past. Its in-depth articles 
will satisfy even the most serious explorer of Iowa’s past. 
 
Anyone with a serious interest in Iowa history will gain valuable per-
spective from the pages of the Annals. Give it as a gift to a friend or 
relative. Check to see if your public, school, or academic library 
subscribes; if they don’t, encourage them to do so or, better yet, 




 Annals of Iowa Subscription  New  Renewal  Gift* 
   One year, $24.95  
  Two years, $44.95 







City __________________ State __________ Zip ___________ 
 
Make check payable to the State Historical Society of Iowa and 
return with this coupon (or a photocopy of it) to: 
 Subscriptions 
 State Historical Society of Iowa 
 402 Iowa Avenue 
 Iowa City IA 52240 
 
 Please send information on membership in the State Historical 
Society of Iowa. 
 
*For gift subscriptions, write the recipient’s name and address on this form, 
and include your name and address on the back or on a separate sheet of 




JEFFREY T. MANUEL is associate professor in the department of 
historical studies at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. He 
won the Midwestern History Association’s Hamlin Garland Award 
for Popular History for his book, Taconite Dreams: The Struggle to 
Sustain Mining on Minnesota’s Iron Range, 1915–2000 (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2015). He is currently writing a history of alcohol 
fuels, better known as ethanol or biofuels, in the United States. 
 
PAUL EMORY PUTZ is a doctoral candidate in history at Baylor Uni-
versity. His research focuses on religion, sports, and the Midwest. 
He has recently published essays in The Midwestern Moment: The 
Ascendance of Midwestern Regionalism, 1880–1940 (Hastings College 
Press, 2017) and The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. 
The State Historical Society of Iowa 
The Annals of Iowa is published quarterly by the State Historical Society of 
Iowa, the Historical Division of the Department of Cultural Affairs of the State 
of Iowa. The society operates from two centers, Des Moines and Iowa City. 
A museum, research library, state archives, special collections, community 
programming, historic preservation, and membership programs are located at 
600 East Locust Street, Des Moines, IA 50319, phone 515-281-5111. Publica-
tions, a research library, and special collections are located at 402 Iowa Avenue, 
Iowa City, IA 52240, phone 319-335-3916. The society also operates several 




Subscriptions to The Annals of Iowa are $24.95 per year; single copies are $7. 
Contact Publications, State Historical Society of Iowa, 402 Iowa Avenue, 
Iowa City, Iowa 52240. 
 
The Annals is available on microfilm from Xerox University Microfilms, 300 N. 




The Annals of Iowa invites the submission of articles on Iowa history and on 
subjects concerning the nation and the Midwest with an Iowa focus. State, 
local, and regional studies of political, economic, social, cultural, intellectual, 
institutional, ethnic, religious, material culture, archeological, and architec-
tural history are welcome. The Annals also reviews significant books on re-
lated topics. A detailed set of editorial guidelines is available on request. All 
correspondence concerning editorial matters should be addressed to: 
 Marvin Bergman, editor 
 The Annals of Iowa 
 State Historical Society of Iowa 
 402 Iowa Avenue 
 Iowa City IA 52240 
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